DISSENT

THE YOUNG

"A Cup of Coffee and a Seat"—a Special Report on Negro Student Action in the South by Michael Walzer, plus articles on the Neatniks, the Beatniks, the Teenagers, the Politics of the Campus, and:

"Growing Up Absurd" by Paul Goodman

Towards Total Disarmament	NORMAN THOMAS
Paradoxes of Foreign Aid	HENRY PACHTER
The Economics of World Tension	THOMAS BALOGH
Negro African Independence	DANIEL FRIEDENBERG
France: With Each New Crisis	JEAN-JACQUES MAYOUX

Reviews *Miscellany* *Letters*

SPRING 1960 75c

DISSENT

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A DISSENT Conference:

Held under the auspices of the:
POST-WAR WORLD COUNCIL

IS A PROSPEROUS COMMUNISM POSSIBLE?

A discussion of the New Russia—Speakers:

LEWIS COSER RICHARD LOWENTHAL

NORMAN THOMAS

Saturday, May 14, 1 p.m.

Carnegie Endowment International
Center—345 East 46 Street
(near UN building) New York City

Admission: One dollar

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AMONG OURSELVES

It is a curious society we live in. When Charles Van Doren confessed to systematic deception, a number of Congressmen publicly congratulated him on his moral strength and predicted a glowing future for him. When the Reverend Willard Uphaus, a pacifist minister, refused to divulge the names of those who visited his "World Fellowship Center" in New Hampshire, he was sentenced to a year in jail. Uphaus is a man in his mid-sixties, and no matter what one may think of his politics, one is bound to admire his unwillingness to "bear false witness against my brother." Van Doren is a man about half the age of Uphaus, and while no one should wish to harass him, there is surely a terrible imbalance in the fate of these two men.

DISSENT readers are urged to write Gov. Wesley Powell, State House, Concord, New Hampshire urging the release of Uphaus. Meanwhile, perhaps the final word on this comes from a recent effort by the daughter of a DISSENT editor to visit Uphaus. When she arrived at the jail where the pacifist is being kept, she was told by the keeper: "What do you want to see him for? He's a *prisoner*."

> *At the recent congress of the Hungarian Communist Party, Premier Janos Kadar gave his formula for a good party worker:*
>
> *"The best workers are not always those who, half-way through a sentence [of instruction], not even waiting to hear it out, jump right to their feet shouting 'Hurrah, right, we agree on everything.' The best workers are those who listen to the end, reflect, weigh the problem of implementation, and then say, 'We approve, we agree, we shall carry it out.' "*

The U.S. Army Chemical Corps, reports the London *Economist,* has recently begun a campaign "to make chemical and bacteriological warfare popular." These weapons are being presented as "humane," for they are designed to incapacitate temporarily rather than to kill. According to Lieutenant General Trudeau, in charge of this army department, there are two kinds of chemical weapons, those "off the rocker," which "disturb the normal behavior or pattern of the individual, causing either apathy, fear, disorientation or personality withdrawal" and those "on the floor," which "would cause an enemy to be unable to fight due to temporary blindness, lowering of blood pressure," etc. At a special demonstration before a congressional committee, adds the *Economist,* "a mouse was put into a cage with a cat, and the cat naturally killed the mouse. The cat was then injected with one of the new drugs and a second mouse was introduced; now the parts were reversed and a four-footed David chased a cowering and frightened feline Goliath around the cage... Soldiers subject to one of the new [chemical] agents ignore the commands of their sergeant—but this unthinkable event has been shown only

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on film." . . . Now *there's* a movie we'd like to see.

On Feb. 1, 1960 Erich Eastman, Upper Manhattan Rent Administrator, ordered a cut of 10 per cent in the rents of East Harlem tenements that were found to be rat-infested. This occurred, it might be remembered, in New York City: the source and center of endless propaganda about the affluent society, the life of plenty and the happy workers who, as Josiah Bounderby says in Dickens' Hard Times, *are always wanting to eat turtle soup and venison from gold spoons.*

A malicious friend suggests that some do-gooders in New York will be outraged by Mr. Eastman's order: they may well demand that rents in rat-infested houses be cut 20 *per cent.*

We've been bemused by a series of advertisements appearing in the national press under the auspices of the Association of American Railroads. Entitled "Red Russia's railroads get the green light," these ads begin: "If you think the great era of railroad building is gone, you should see Russia today!" They continue by extolling the achievements of the Russian railroad system and deploring the taxes to which U.S. railroads are subject. Does this, by chance, constitute an indirect plea for the nationalization of railroads in this country?

The American Friends Service Committee has published an interesting pamphlet by Stewart Meacham, Labor and the Cold War. *One of the things Meacham shows in this factual study is that with the increasing specialization of military production, the generals have lost a certain portion of their control over the development of new weapons and that corporations like General Dynamics have first to educate the Pentagon on what weapons the government will need. A General Dynamics spokesmen is quoted as saying in regard to their B-58 supersonic bomber, "First, we had to dream it up, then sell it, then operate a poor man's State Department to get the cooperation of other contractors." This poor man's State Department had at its disposal: GD president Frank Pace, former Secretary of the Army, and 54 retired military officers, including 17 former admirals and seven former generals.*

NOTICE: COPIES OF THE FALL 1959 ISSUE OF DISSENT—THE SPECIAL ISSUE ON THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT—ARE AGAIN AVAILABLE. THE SUPPLY IS LIMITED, HOWEVER. SEND IN ORDER IMMEDIATELY IF YOU WISH ONE; 75¢ SINGLE COPY; BUNDLE ORDERS OF 3 OR MORE, 40¢ EACH.

From the Socialist party comes an interesting brochure by Erich Fromm, Murray Kempton and others providing brief statements as to why they are joining that party. Kempton's statement merits quotation:

"The ideal of democratic socialism has often been defeated in the world; it has never died. It has been harder to kill than any notion which moved great numbers of men at the beginning of this

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century. We have just concluded one of the darkest decades in human history; yet almost every light we have had toward something better has been held up in that night by a democratic socialist. Those Hungarian intellectuals who began this decade's bravest display of the human spirit thought of themselves as struggling back toward democratic socialism. If Boris Pasternak is anything, he is a democratic socialist. When Milovan Djilas went off to Tito's prison, he was asked to identify himself and this man, without rank or trade, answered simply and proudly: 'Social Democrat.' And they are all men who will return because they are the guardians of man's future. Looking at them, we know that America, its life, its politics, its very voice, is governed by a dead idea. Few men worth their salt in all time have been moved long by the dream of personal private avarice; no men worth their salt are moved any longer by it today . . .

"I have tried living for eighteen years outside the ideal of democratic socialism. It worked as badly in my case as it has worked in the case of my country. I feel as though I have returned to the family of the human species."

Enemy of Progress exposed: The Russian journal *Voprosy filosofii* (*Problems of Philosophy*) in its April 1959 issue attacks Irving Howe's *Politics and the Novel* as revealing "a commitment to the anarchist notion of 'free will,' a fierce hatred of Communism . . . an affinity for political renegades . . . The book is . . . an apotheosis of political betrayal, which is brazenly misconstrued as the 'symbol of an era,' championing of anarchism and of vaunted 'free will'—notions bred by the confusion and cowardice of bourgeois intelligentsia . . . Howe upholds the tenets of subjectivism in esthetics . . ." *etc., etc.*

We were glad to see in the New York Times *this February a letter from several intellectuals—Sidney Hook, Dwight Macdonald, Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer—pleading that Harry Gold and Morton Sobell, involved in the Rosenberg atom secrets case, be released from prison. These men have now been jailed for ten years, and as the authors of the letter say, have received greater punishmnt than such "far more important and sinister figures" as Allen Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs.*

Shortly afterwards Norman Thomas, also in the Times, *pleaded that Henry Winston, one of the three remaining Communists still imprisoned under the Smith Act, be freed. Winston has undergone a severe brain operation and is recovering very slowly. Humanenes, if nothing else, prompts one to agree with Thomas.*

Dissent *Doings:* The last issue, containing the remarkable document "On Socialist Realism," by an anonymous Russian writer, received a good deal of attention. References to the article appeared in a number of places; copies still available . . . Plans are completed for a special enlarged issue on New York City in winter 1961. The issue will also appear as a paperback book. Most of the articles have been arranged for, but there are still a few possible openings, especially in the areas of municipal politics and economics . . . Coming

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up in summer and fall: a study of poverty in the U.S. by H. Brand, a translation of Theodore Adorno's brilliant study of the "half-educated," a survey of recent Latin American politics by Robert Alexander... We have been a little overwhelmed—and extremely pleased—by the many returns that have come in for the questionnaire sent to all subscribers. It will be an enormous job to go through the answers and codify them, but we hope to have a report by summer.

Watched Hugh Gaitskell recently. TV "Open End" discussion program, in company of Norman Thomas, Sidney Hook, etc., all shepherded over by the charming and boyish David Susskind (and the long "i" sound, if you please). It's not difficult to sympathize (emotionally) with the British "left wingers," even if you feel their approach is wrong. Gaitskell is a cold customer; no fire, nothing. Smart, "clever," yes; but what else? No soul. Is this socialism? Clearly, "nationalization" as a fighting word is simply symbolic for him and the others. What the "leftists" are saying, in their confused way, is: what kind of a socialist you are; no heart, no blood, no feelings—just a technical brain. Who can't sympathize with them?

Among our contributors . . . Michael Walzer, a member of the editorial board of DISSENT, contributed two articles on American education to our Spring and Summer 1959 issues . . . Paul Goodman, author of *The Empire City* and many other works, is one of our most frequent and valued contributors . . . Barbara Probst Solomon's novel, *The Beat of Life,* will be published late this Summer by J. B. Lippincott. Her work has appeared in *New Campus Writing,* and periodicals in France, England, Argentina and the U.S. . . . Arthur Mitzman is a graduate student in the history of ideas program at Brandeis University . . . Ed Murray is a former newspaperman who now devotes himself to free lance writing. His work has appeared in *The Nation, The Progressive* and other magazines . . . Edouard Roditi appears frequently in publications here and abroad. He is the author of a biography of Oscar Wilde and *Poems, 1928–1948* . . . Daniel Friedenberg's articles, based on his wide travels, have been published in *The New Republic, The New Leader,* etc. . . . Jean-Jacques Mayoux, well-known French writer, is associated with *Esprit* . . . Dennis H. Wrong teaches sociology at Brown University. His reviews and articles have been published in many magazines . . . X. J. Kennedy is in the English Department at the University of Michigan.

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DISSENT

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SPRING 1960

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A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

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AN APPEAL FROM THE SOUTH!

For the: *—Student Defense Fund of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference; —Committee to Defend Martin Luther King, Jr.; —Registration and Voting Crusade in the South*

Dear Friend:

In recent weeks three developments have combined to create a civil rights crisis of historic depth and magnitude:

First, Southern Negro students have launched a mass offensive that is cracking the walls of segregation. Their courageous and non-violent spirit has given a new dignity to the cause of freedom. In retaliation, the Southern racists have expelled them from schools, arrested and jailed them, denied them bail, and visited violence upon them.

Second, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference has launched a crusade to bring over a million new Negro voters into the 1960 Presidential election, threatening the political power of the Dixiecrats.

Third, as the student sit-ins and voting crusade struggled on with grim determination, the State of Alabama, with calculation and on obviously false charges, indicted Martin Luther King, Jr., leader of the historic Montgomery Bus Protest, on perjury.

What is the purpose of this sinister indictment? It seeks to destroy leaders to whom students are looking for support and guidance, and to cripple the voting crusade now under way. Because of Dr. King's importance to these struggles, and because of his organizational drive and influence as president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Dixiecrats are determined to jail him.

Today, as it becomes increasingly clear that nothing of meaning can emerge from the current "debate" in Congress, we are again reminded by the students of where the real battleground lies: it is not in Congress, where unprincipled compromise rules, but in every concrete struggle in which the people themselves grasp their freedom from those who oppress them.

Your help is urgently needed *now!* The crucial nature of the situation requires that we have funds immediately for all three needs—the Student Defense Fund, the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King, and the Registration and Voting Crusade.

Please send your contribution today. Sincerely,

BERNARD LEE, President
Montgomery Student Protest Movement

REV. RALPH ABERNATHY, Treasurer
Voting and Registration Committee

REV. FRED L. SHUTTLESWORTH, Secretary
Southern Christian Leadership Conference

A. PHILIP RANDOLPH, Chairman Comm. to Defend Martin Luther King

HARRY BELAFONTE
LANGSTON HUGHES
DAISY BATES
BAYARD RUSTIN
NORMAN THOMAS
SIDNEY POITIER

P.S. *Please make checks payable to Nat King Cole, Treasurer.*

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 312 West 125th Street, New York 27, New York

☐ Enclosed find my contribution of $..... for Combined Emergency Appeal.

☐ Enclosed find $..... which I am lending to the Revolving Bail Fund of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, to be used for students and others arrested in the struggle. I understand that this money is 100% returnable at any time upon request.

Name .....

Address .....

City ..... Zone ..... State .....

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THE YOUNG

A CUP OF COFFEE AND A SEAT

Michael Walzer

Durham, North Carolina is probably a town like many others; I doubt that ordinarily I would have found it unfamiliar. I saw it, however, only at night and carried away only two memories. The first is of a drug store with its lunch counter closed, where I did not get a cup of coffee. The second is of a policeman to whom I showed an address, who did not give me directions. The address was that of a Negro church where Martin Luther King was speaking at 8:00 that evening, February 16. The policeman said he had never heard of the street. Later I learned it was the main street in the Negro section of town.

Two days later I was in Raleigh, a half hour by bus from Durham. Raleigh is a handsome town; its main street, dominated by the state capitol, is wide and spacious; the store fronts are plain, not gaudy. In front of four of those stores some twenty Negro students were picketing. As a Northerner I expected, and felt, the tenseness of the city. The day before there had been a fight on the picket lines and a Negro boy had been hit with a tire chain. What I found there, by talking to Negro students and visiting their colleges, was a spirit and a method of action which made such incidents . . . incidental. Dangerous they were—and are—but they are not the key to the sitdowns. For the Negro students, like the earlier Montgomery bus boycotters, are engaged in a new kind of political activity, at once unconventional and non-violent.

Late in the afternoon of Monday, February 1, four freshmen from the Agricultural and Technical College, an all-Negro school in Greensboro, North Carolina, walked into a downtown Woolworth's, purchased a few small articles and then sat down at the lunch counter.

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Not one of them had ever sat there before. They each asked for a cup of coffee and were told that they would not be served. This was the customary policy of the store: "We don't serve colored here." Yet the students refused to leave; they remained seated, and ignored, until 5:30 when the store closed. The next morning at 10:30 the freshmen reappeared with sixteen friends and resumed their sitdown. Again they were not served. Again they did not leave until 5:30. During the seven hours they studied or talked quietly. The counter in front of them was not covered with the usual cups and saucers but with books, notebooks, sliderules. Several policemen came in and walked up and down the aisle that ran the length of the lunch counter, staring at the sitdowners. There was no disturbance; nor were the students intimidated.

On the third day the Negroes occupied virtually all the forty seats at the Woolworth's counter. Describing that day one student wrote:

> After attending a mass meeting in Harrison Auditorium, I was . . . inspired to go down to Woolworth's and just sit, hoping to be served. . . . By luck I was able to get a ride with six other fellows. We rode down to the parking lot and there left the car, after which we walked to Woolworth's, read a passage from the Bible and waited for the doors to open. The doors opened and in we went. I almost ran, because I was determined to get a seat and I was very much interested in being the first to sit down. I sat down and there was a waitress standing directly in front of me, so I asked her if I might have a cup of black coffee and two donuts please. She looked at me and moved to another area of the counter.

The number of sitdowners continued to increase, spilling over into other chain stores. A few white sympathizers joined in—an act of considerable bravery in the South. Finally the lunch counter was closed. The students agreed to a two-week "truce"; the manager agreed to negotiate. At this writing, a full month later, the counter remains closed.

SITDOWN IN THE SOUTH has a very literal meaning. In the past, the variety and five and dime stores have freely invited Negroes to every counter but the lunch counter. There they were not permitted to sit down on any of the long row of stools, but were served standing up at a far end. Negroes were often hired to cook the food or to wash dishes, hard jobs and especially in restaurants of this sort. But the counter was a color line: on the side with seats only whites sat.

As in the buses, sitting down together at a lunch counter symbolizes a kind of equality which Southern whites have not been prepared to admit. Nor have Southern Negroes, until very recently, been prepared to demand it. Now the sitdowns have made clear the immediate and central issue in the integration battle. "We don't want brotherhood," a Negro student told me when I visited Durham, "we just want a cup of coffee—sitting down." This was a demand for an end to the ordinary, unrecorded, day-to-day indignity of Negro life in the South

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EXTRA **REGISTER** EXTRA

"The Crown of College Need"

VOLUME XXXIX, No. 2 THE AGRICULTURAL AND TECHNICAL COLLEGE, GREENSBORO, N. C. FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1960

FOR SERVICE

Students Stage Sitdown Demand



Get In Study Chores

Students from A&T College began Monday afternoon what they called a "passive sitdown demand" for service at the restaurant lunch counter at Woolworth's downtown five and dime store in Greensboro. Shown above are five students who spoke out as one entered in a little study time. The number has approximately forty stools, and at times during the third day (Wednesday), when this photo was made, there were only three or four seats left vacant by the students.

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—an indignity more demoralizing, perhaps, than the terror of lynching or murder has ever been. The A&T students were "tired of humiliation." The method which they found in their "tiredness" was so dramatically effective that in the week following their demonstration, sitdowns were staged in half a dozen North Carolina towns and within two weeks had spread to more than twelve cities in four states: Virginia, Tennessee and the Carolinas. The sitdowns spread unpredictably; it is obvious that there was no central organization. Yet it is not entirely fair to call the movement spontaneous. *"In a way,"* one student said, *"we have been planning it all our lives."*

Everywhere the pattern was more or less the same. The Negro students, well-dressed and quiet, came into the stores—always the local branches of national chains—and sat down at the lunch counters. They were jeered at more frequently as news of the demonstrations spread, but did not reply. There were occasional fights. The counters were closed or roped off after a day, sometimes after only an hour; signs were posted saying "Closed for repairs," or "Closed in the interest of public safety." At this point in many of the towns a mayor's committee hastened to arrange some sort of negotiations. For a moment the students were confused: they could not continue their sitdowns once the counters were closed, yet they had a deeply ingrained distrust of Southern negotiation. "If we negotiate," the editor of a Negro college paper told me, "my grandchildren will still be worrying about that cup of coffee."

Now, in the last few days of February, action has been resumed; picketing, boycott, mass marches are the new methods of the students. Their activity continues to be orderly, disciplined, non-violent. Yet the number of incidents, usually provoked by white hecklers, has increased; several students have been attacked and beaten up; many more have been arrested. Negro high-school students have imitated their older brothers, but in larger numbers and without the same organization or discipline. And in the meantime, the movement has spread to the deep South; sitdown demonstrations have taken place in South Carolina and Alabama.

II

I asked every student I met what the first day of the sitdowns had been like on his campus. The answer was always the same: "It was like a fever. Everyone wanted to go. We were so happy." In Durham students were still pouring into town after the original sitdowners had closed the counters and started home. The two groups met with cheers, many of the students raised two fingers in the air for victory. The news from Greensboro was spread rapidly by the press and radio; more effectively, it spread along the basketball circuit. Most of the schools involved in the early weeks were athletic rivals; basketball games were occasions for the transfer of enthusiasm. A&T played five games in two weeks and students at each of the five schools were shortly involved in sitdowns.

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Organization on each new campus was amazingly rapid, accompanied by the usual bickering over leadership positions ("Everyone wanted to be on a committee"), but fundamentally shaped by a keen sense of solidarity. The student council was usually at the center of what was invariably called, with no self-consciousness, the Student Movement. Sometimes command was assumed by the campus NAACP, sometimes by an *ad hoc* committee. Few students talked about anything else; the seemingly endless discussions of tactics among the leaders and within the committees were repeated in the dorms, in the canteen, in the local (illegal) beer hall. Even in the last it seemed to dominate the more usual topics: basketball and girls.

After the counters had been shut in Durham and negotiations begun with a "human relations committee" appointed by the mayor, a sign appeared on the door of the student council office at North Carolina College: *"Please stand by for further instructions concerning movement. (signed) Leaders."*

The office really looked like a room from which a movement was being run. A bulletin board extended the length of one wall. Newspaper articles about sitdowns throughout the state were posted, along with various notices, instructions and a few recently received CORE pamphlets. Piled high on the desk of one of the council officers were schedules filled out by more than 500 students, listing their free hours so that the sitdowners could be relieved and a minimum of classes missed. The office was almost never empty; students came in to hear the latest news, do a little work, or jubilantly read their clippings.

When I reached the council office at Shaw University in Raleigh it was even busier. The students at Shaw and at nearby St. Augustine's College had been the first to begin picketing once the lunch counters had closed. I visited the office on the sixth day of picketing. Two old desks stood at either end of a rectangular room; chairs lined the longer sides. At one of the desks a girl sat, checking the pickets in and out and arranging transportation into town. The students sat around, waiting for their rides, the boys restless, the girls more quiet.

The placards they would carry stood on a ledge along the wall: *"Do we eat today?" "How do we get invited to lunch?" "Temporarily closed. Why? Just a cup of coffee. Shame!" "Let's be Just for a change. No traditions attached."* At about ten o'clock the first carload of pickets, four girls and three boys, drove downtown. Before they left they received instructions which I heard repeated many times that day: "Walk in a single file. Don't bunch up. Don't talk. We'll get relief out." It was pouring outside; it rained all day and well into the night.

At the other desk sat a boy from Jamaica, small, smart, a member of the Intelligence Committee which was running things at Shaw. He was there all day. "We say we don't cut classes," a student told me, "our teachers say we don't cut classes; but we cut classes." On the desk in front of the Jamaican boy were a few old textbooks, left there by student pickets. Among them I found a copy of Big Bill Haywood's

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Autobiography, with the bookmark near to the end. The Jamaican boy knew about Haywood, but wouldn't talk to me about him. He spent the day—when he wasn't on the phone—reading an Ibsen play.

Posted on a wall over one of the desks was a giant placard headed "Shaw University-St. Augustine College Student Movement." The placard was covered with a detailed diagram of the movement's organization, which looked as if it had been copied out of a textbook on bureaucracy. At the center was the Intelligence Committee; straight lines pointing downward connected it with the student councils of the two cooperating colleges; lines radiated upwards to various subsidiary committees: transportation, negotiation, etc.

Every night since the sitdowns started, the Intelligence Committee had called mass meetings at both Shaw and St. Augustine's. Together the two schools have about one thousand students; Shaw, slightly larger, is a Baptist school, St. Augustine's Episcopalian. The meetings have been marvelously well attended. But the night I was there the rain was pouring down outside, and only about 200 students assembled in the Shaw auditorium; there were seats for twice as many. The leaders were immediately afraid that student enthusiasm was waning and sent runners to the library and dorms. Meanwhile the meeting began, with a prayer from the floor and the singing of a hymn. The president of the student council called it "our national anthem"; the hymn had as its appropriate refrain: "March on, march on, until victory is won."

There was a leak in the roof of the auditorium and throughout the meeting, during singing and speech making, I could hear the water sloshing about in a giant bucket perched precariously upon two seats about halfway to the back of the room.

In the middle of a report on the size of the picket lines that day, the entire basketball team shuffled sheepishly into the hall; they were dragged along by the captain of one of the picketing groups. He rushed to the front of the auditorium and began denouncing the players for practicing during mass meetings. One of the players, obviously no militant at all, tried to defend the team: "We can't disrupt the whole basketball schedule," he said, "for just one movement." But he was shouted down and the student who had dragged him in took the floor again to display a remarkable talent for oratory. There had not been enough men on the lines that day, he said. (In general the girls were more ardent about picketing than the boys.) Several girls had been pushed, one had been slapped, by white men. That would never have happened had enough male students been walking. There could be no excuses; the girls needed protection, and—after all—the boys might meet their future wives "in the movement."

III

The students in Greensboro called their demonstration a "passive sitdown demand." What was most impressive about it, however, was the number of students it involved in *activity*. None of the

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leaders I spoke to were interested in test cases; nor was there any general agreement to stop the sitdowns or the picketing once the question of integration at the lunch counters was taken up by the courts. That the legal work of the NAACP was important, everyone agreed; but this, I was told over and over again, was more important. Everyone seemed to feel a deep need finally to act in the name of all the theories of equality. Once the sitdowns had begun, marching into Woolworth's or picketing outside became obvious, necessary, inevitable activities.

After a week or more of comparative neutrality, the police also began to act, supported by an intepretation of the trespassing law provided by the attorney-general of North Carolina. In that "liberal" state where race relations—so the newspapers but not the Negro students said—were "good," state officials, like the store managers, had at first declined to take the students seriously. They had no real contact with Negro students and were hardly capable of understanding their new temper. During the first week the Greensboro newspaper periodically announced that the sitdowners were losing both numbers and staying power. Someone compared their activity to college panty raids; it was all a prank. But as the movement began to spread, the astonished whites took a harder line. On Thursday of the second week, 43 students were arrested in Raleigh, charged with trespassing on private property. The story of those arrests reveals better than anything I know the nature of the student movement. It was told to me by a boy at Shaw University in a slow deliberate drawl with an undertone of pure joy.

On Wednesday, the Shaw-St. Augustine students had shut down the lunch counters at four stores on Fayetteville Street, a few blocks from the state house. The following day a small group of more ambitious students started out to Cameron Village, a suburban shopping center. There they were told that the entire center, including streets and sidewalks, was private property. They telephoned to the council office and someone consulted a Negro lawyer in Raleigh. He told them that the streets and sidewalks were public; he thought the police interpretation of the trespassing law should be tested. Fifteen more students drove out to the center. They were window-shopping when the vice-president of Cameron Village Inc. appeared on the scene with a single policeman. The students were officially notified that they were trespassing and given two minutes to leave. At the end of the two minutes—the vice-president looking at his watch—the policeman arrested one of the students. Apparently he thought that would be sufficient, for it would provide a test case. *But the other students refused to leave; they crowded around the policeman and demanded that they too be arrested.* One by one they were asked to leave and given two minutes. They waited their turns. When five had been arrested the policeman phoned for a paddy wagon. Eighteen students were under arrest when it arrived. Later twenty-five more came out to Cameron Village to "windowshop." When the news of the first arrests reached campus, there had been a rush for cars. "Everyone wanted to be arrested."

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Two weeks later when the now famous forty-three came up for trial, so many of their fellow-students jammed into the courtroom, that the judge postponed the case. The fire chief said that the crowd constituted a fire hazard. Perhaps it did. But the remarkable solidarity of the Negroes constituted a far greater danger to white supremacy. In Tennessee where some eighty sitdowners were fined for "disorderly conduct," thousands of Negroes gathered on the courthouse steps singing hymns and the national anthem. Inside, the sitdowners insisted that they would all go to jail rather than pay the fines.

The fact that many of the Negro colleges were state supported has provided an obvious opportunity for North Carolina politicians to bluster and threaten. At first it was only the college presidents who were under attack; later students were threatened with expulsion. The attorney-general of the state—now a candidate for governor—is widely quoted among Negro students as having said, "If these administrators can't control the kids, we'll get administrators who can." The result of such threats has been that students have sometimes had to fight on two fronts: both in the stores and on the campus—and the fight has become both complicated and confusing. When I left Durham negotiations were in progress between a committee appointed by the mayor, which could not speak definitely for the chain store managers, and a committee appointed by the president of North Carolina College, on which the sitdowners were not represented. Having closed the lunch counters downtown, the students returned to campus and began circulating a petition against their president's committee.

IV

At North Carolina College, Durham, three young men led the student movement. They were described to me by the editor of the campus paper as the righteous man, the prudent man and the proud man. The righteous man most fully embodied the spirit of the movement. He was a veteran and had spent two years in Japan. That was the only time in his life, he told me, when he had lived like a free man. When it was time to come home, the white boys were happy and he was afraid. Now he led the younger students with a quiet determination; he was the only one of the leaders I met who clearly possessed charisma. "We won't stop, regardless..." And he took the strongest position I heard on the confusing problem of negotiations. "If I have to negotiate for a cup of coffee, I won't pay for it. I won't negotiate across the table and then again across the counter."

The most remarkable thing about these students is their self-confidence. They have grown up in a South which is no longer a terror for them, but still a continual source of insult and indignity. They have been in the army or spent time in the North—summers at church camps, a year working in New York, a visit to relatives. They have developed thin skins; segregation is no longer tolerable to them. They have unlearned, perhaps they never learned, those habits of inferiority

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which have cursed Negro life in the South for a century. They have felt every insult—as an insult. They could not understand the "complacency" or the "fearfulness" of their parents. Students told me many times that their parents had been "brainwashed." "When the insurance man comes to the door," one boy said, "he asks, 'Is Thomas there?' I tell him my father's name is Mister Brown. But my father answers to Thomas and says yes, sir."

Less than twenty years ago, in the early forties, a Negro soldier was shot and killed by a Durham bus driver when he refused to move to the back of the bus. The bus driver was acquited by an all-white jury. I learned this from a white man, a German refugee who taught philosophy to the Negro students of North Carolina College. Not one of the students mentioned the murder. Instead they told one story after another about more minor but to them terribly important incidents in the buses, in stores, on the job. The stories usually ended with some version of: "I ran out of that store. I almost cried . . ." One student told how he had held a door open for a white woman who refused to come through. "I slammed the door. I stopped being courteous."

The schools I visited had one-third to one-half Northern students, most of them from Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey. But it was the Southern students who were supplying the fervor which kept the movement going. And among the Southern students it was especially the girls—perhaps because they are less mobile, more likely to stay South. The Northerners were often too blasé or too cynical to play a major part in the fight for integration. The Southerners were more militant (and more religious), committed to a long and gruelling struggle. None of them seemed to expect anything else. It probably is hard to be a Negro in the South and grow up naive. So their every act seems to have something of calculation in it: on the buses in Durham I noticed older Negroes moving as if by habit towards the back, while the Negro college students sat as far front as possible. And this surely was an act of will; one boy told me that after being insulted once, he had not ridden a bus for two years.

At a mass meeting of more than 1500 Negro adults in Durham a young woman from a Methodist church sang a hymn whose refrain (I may not have it exactly) was: "Give me Jesus, you can have all this world." The words did not seem appropriate at a meeting whose purpose was so emphatically to win a place for the Negro *in* this world. Yet it revealed the tone of the meeting almost as surely as did the chant begun by Martin Luther King: We just want to be free. A religion which seizes upon, dramatizes and even explains the suffering of the Negro people is joined here to an essentially political movement to end that suffering. Out of that combination, I believe, comes the stamina, the endurance so necessary for passive, non-violent resistance. The new self-confidence of the young people, however, is as important, and among them I found occasional discontent with "camp-fire religion."

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One boy told me that for King passive resistance might be a faith, but for him it was only a strategy. Another boy, smiling, said that he expected God to help the student movement, but meanwhile the students "would help the hell out of God." Though the press has played up the role of divinity students in the sitdowns, I discovered that most of the leaders on the campus were sociology, psychology, economics and physics majors. And yet for all of them, religion is a habit whose forms are fortifying and strengthening. Prayers and hymns are normal features of student meetings.

Several students I spoke with had read Gandhi, more had read about him. But I rarely felt Gandhi present among these Negroes as a significant or potent symbol. It was the Montgomery bus boycott, coming in their early manhood, that had been the decisive event. On the other hand, I have never encountered students so "up" on the law; many of them could literally recite every important court decision since school integration was ordered. Passive resistance and endless legal action were the two political forms with which they were familiar. I was a little surprised to find virtually nothing special—nothing Southern, nothing Negro—in their views of the presidential candidates. A few said they would not vote; a few said they would never again vote Democratic. Many more engaged me in discussions as to the relative merits of Kennedy and Stevenson. Presidential politics seemed to them a universe apart from sitdown, picketing, student solidarity.

FOR THE NEGRO STUDENT these new forms of political activity were a kind of self-testing and proving. Each new sitdown, each day of picketing, each disciplined march, each mass meeting was cause for pride and exhilaration. White students who were willing to participate were welcomed. But I attended two long meetings between Negro and white students at neighboring colleges (most of the students had never met before) and I never heard a Negro ask, or even hint, that whites should join their picket lines. It will be better for *them,* and for us, I was told, if they come unasked. The boy who said this was the same one who had told me that what he wanted was not brotherhood, but a cup of coffee. He was right of course, it is not necessary to feel fraternal towards the man you sit beside at a Woolworth's lunch counter. But what about the man you walk beside in a picket line? For it is there, I believe, on the line, that real equality is finally being won.

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GROWING UP ABSURD*

Paul Goodman

Part 1

I

Growing up as a human being, a "human nature" assimilates a culture, just as other animals grow up in strength and habits in *their* appropriated environments, that complete their natures. Present-day sociologists and anthropologists don't talk much about this process, and not in this way. Among the most competent writers, there is not much mention of "human nature." Their diffidence makes scientific sense, for everything we observe, and even more important, our way of observing it, is already culture and a pattern of culture. What is the sense of mentioning "human nature" if we can never observe it? The old-fashioned naive thought, that primitive races or children are more natural, is discounted. And the classical anthropological question, What is Man?—"how like an angel, this quintessence of dust!"—is not now asked by anthropologists. Instead, they commence with a chapter on Physical Anthropology and then forget the whole topic and go on to Culture.

On this view, growing up is sometimes treated as if it were acculturation, the process of giving up one culture for another, the way a tribe of Indians takes on the culture of the whites: so the wild Baby-tribe gives up its mores and ideology, e.g. selfishness or magic-thinking or omnipotence, and joins the tribe of Society; it is "socialized." More frequently, however, the matter is left vague: we start with a *tabula rasa* and end up "socialized" and cultured. ("Becoming cultured" and "being adjusted to the social group" are taken almost as synonymous.) Either way, it follows that you can teach people anything; you can adapt them to anything if you use the right techniques of "socializing" or "communicating." The essence of "human nature" is to be pretty indefinitely malleable. "Man," as C. Wright Mills suggests, is what suits a particular type of society in a particular historical stage.**

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* This article forms the opening chapter, entitled " 'Human Nature' and the Organized System," of a book, *Growing Up Absurd*.

** E.g. "The ideals that we Westerners associate with the classic, liberal, bourgeois period of modern culture may well be rooted in this one historical stage of this one type of society. Such ideals as personal freedom and cultural autonomy may not be inherent features of cultural life as such." (C. Wright Mills.) This is equivalent to saying that tragic poetry or mathematics were "rooted" in the Greek way of life and are not "inherently" human.

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This fateful idea, invented from time to time by philosophers, seems finally to be empirically evident in the most recent decades. For instance, in our highly organized system of machine production and its corresponding social relations, the practice is, by "vocational guidance," to fit people wherever they are needed in the productive system; and whenever the products of the system need to be used up, the practice is, by advertising, to get people to consume them. This works. There is a man for every job and not many are left over, and the shelves are almost always cleared. Again, in the highly organized political industrial systems of Germany, Russia, and now China, it has been possible in a short time to condition great masses to perform as desired. Social-scientists observe that these are the facts, and they also devise theories and techniques to produce more facts like them, for the social-scientists too are part of the highly organized systems.

II

Astonishingly different, however, is the opinion of experts who deal with human facts in a more raw, less highly processed, state. Those who have to cope with people in small groups rather than statistically, and attending to *them* rather than to some systematic goal—parents and teachers, physicians and psychotherapists, policemen and wardens of jails, shop foremen and grievance-committees—all tend stubbornly to hold that there is a "human nature." You can't teach people some things or change them in some ways, and if you persist, you're in for trouble. Contrariwise, if you don't provide them with certain things, they'll fill the gaps with eccentric substitutes.

This is immediately evident when something goes wrong, for instance, when a child can't learn to read because he has not yet developed the muscular accommodation of his eyes; if you persist, he withdraws or becomes tricky. Such cases are clear-cut (they are "physical"). But the more important cases have the following form: the child *does* take on the cultural habit, e.g. early toilet-training, and indeed the whole corresponding pattern of culture, but there is a diminishing of force, grace, discrimination, intellect, feeling, in specific behaviors or even in his total behavior. He may become too obedient and lacking in initiative, or impractically careful and squeamish; he may develop "psychosomatic" ailments like constipation. Let me give an instance even earlier in life: an infant nurtured in an impersonal institution during the first six months, does not seem to develop abnormally; but if during the end of the first year and for some time thereafter he is not given personal care, he will later be in some ways emotionally cold and unreachable—either some function has failed to develop, or he has already blocked it out as too frustrated and painful. In such examples, the loss of force, grace, and feeling seems to be evidence that somehow the acquired cultural habits do not draw on unimpeded outgoing energy, they are against the grain, they do not fit the child's needs or appetites; *therefore* they have been ill-adapted and not assimilated.

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That is, on this view we do not need to be able to say what "human nature" *is* in order to be able to say that some training is "against human nature" and you persist in it at peril. Teachers and psychologists who deal practically with growing up and the blocks to growing up may never mention the word "human nature" (indeed, they are better off without too many *a priori* ideas), but they cling stubbornly to the presumption that at every stage there is a developing potentiality *not* yet cultured, and yet not blank, and that makes possible the taking on of culture. We must draw "it" out, offer "it" opportunities, not violate "it" except for unavoidable reasons. What "it" is, is not definite. It is what, when appealed to in the right circumstances, gives behavior that has force, grace, discrimination, intellect, feeling. This vagueness is of course quite sufficient for education, for education is an art. A good teacher feels his way, looking for response.

III

The concept of "human nature" has had a varied political history in modern times. If we trace it even roughly, we learn something about the present disagreement. In the 18th century, the Age of Reason and the early Romantic Movement, the emphasis was on "*human* nature," referring to man's naturally sympathetic sentiments, his communicative faculties, and inalienable dignity. (Immanuel Kant immortally thought up a philosophy to make these cohere.) Now this human nature was powerfully enlisted in revolutionary struggles against courts and classes, poverty and humiliation, and it began to invent progressive education. Human nature unmistakably demanded liberty, equality, and fraternity, and every man a philosopher and poet.

As an heir of the French Revolution, Karl Marx kept much of this concept. Sympathy appeared as solidarity. Dignity and intellect were perhaps still in the future. But he found an important new essential: man is a maker, he must use his productive nature or be miserable. This too involved a revolutionary program, to give back to man his tools.

During the course of the 19th century, however, "human nature" came to be associated with conservative and even reactionary politics. The later Romantics were historically minded and found man naturally conservative and not be uprooted. A few decades later, narrow interpretations of Darwin were being used to advance imperial and elite interests. (The emphasis was now on *"nature";* the humanity became dubious.) It was during this later period that the social-scientists began to be diffident about "human nature," for, politically, they wanted fundamental social changes; and scientifically, it was evident that things were being called natural which were overwhelmingly cultural. Most of the social-scientists began to lay all their stress on institutionally organized reform. Nevertheless, scientifically trained anarchists like Kropotkin insisted that "human nature"—now become mutual-aiding, knightly, and craftsmanlike—was still on the side of revolution.

In our own century, especially since the Twenties and Thirties, the social-scientists have found another reason for diffidence: "human

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nature" implies "not social," referring to something prior to society, belonging to an isolated individual. They felt that too much importance was being assigned to Individual Psychology (they were reacting to Freud) and that this stood in the way of organizing people for political reform. It is on this view that growing up is now interpreted as a process of socializing some rather indefinite kind of animal, and "socializing" is used as a synonym for teaching him the culture.

IV

Let us now proceed more carefully, for we are approaching our present plight. *Is* "being socialized," no matter what the society, the same as growing up and assimilating human culture? The society to which one is socialized would have to be a remarkably finished product.

There are here three distinct concepts, which sometimes seem the same but sometimes very different: (1) society as the relations of human social animals, (2) the human culture carried by society, and (3) a particular society formed by its pattern of culture and institutions, and to which its members are socialized.

In ordinary, static circumstances, and especially when a dominant system in a society is riding high (as the organized system is with us), socializing to that society seems to provide all valuable culture, etc.* But *as soon as we think of a fundamental social change,* we see that (1) at once "human nature" is again invoked to prove the necessity of change, for "human nature" has been thwarted or insulted by the dominant system; (2) our notion of "human culture" at once broadens out to include ancient, exotic, and even primitive models as superior to the conventional standards (as, e.g., our disaffected groups lay store by

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* I think many social-scientists have been making an error in logic. Certainly only society is the carrier of culture (it is not inborn). But it does not follow that socialized and cultural are synonymous. What follows, rather, is that, since culture is so overwhelmingly evident in observing mankind, social properties must be of the essence of original "human nature," and indeed that the "isolated individual" is a product of culture.

This, of course, was just the line that Freud really took. Far from having an Individual Psychology, he tended to exaggerate the social nature of the baby by reading into it pre-formed traits of his own society. From the earliest infancy, imitation and emulation, love, striving to communicate, rivalry, exclusiveness and jealousy, punishment, introjected authority, identification, growing up on a model, finding safety in conforming—these were among the conflicting elementary functions of the "human nature" that must grow into culture. And Freud, with magnificent originality, tried to show that by their very conflict they made it possible to assimilate culture; only such a social animal *could* become cultured. Every step of education was the resolution of a difficult social conflict.

As might have been expected, from this hectic theory of human nature were drawn the most various political implications. Some, in the interests of community and sex-reform, have wanted fundamental social changes, like Ferenczi and Reich. Others, to save religion, have been ultra-traditionlist, like Jung or Laforgue. The run of orthodox psychoanalytic practice has been quietist, as the social-scientists claimed; but the most remarkable implication was that drawn by the social-scientists themselves, when they finally got around to making use of modern psychology: they have found in it techniques for harmoniously belonging to the organized system of society!

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the Japanese or the Samoans and Trobriand Islanders); and (3) "socialization" has been to a very limited kind of society. "Man" can no longer be defined as what suits the dominant system, when the dominant system apparently does not suit men.

A curious thing has occurred. Unlike most of their predecessors for a century and a half, most of our contemporary social-scientists are not interested in fundamental social change. To them, we have apparently reached the summit of institutional progress, and it only remains for the sociologists and applied-anthropologists to mop up the corners and iron out the kinks. Social-scientists are not attracted to the conflictful core of Freud's theory of human nature; a more optimistic theory is paid no attention at all. But they have hit on the theory I mentioned at the beginning: that you can adapt people to anything, if you use the right techniques. Our social-scientists have become so accustomed to the highly organized and by-and-large smoothly running society that they have begun to think that "social animal" means "harmoniously belonging." They do not like to think that fighting and dissenting are proper social functions, nor that rebelling or initiating fundamental change is a social function. Rather, if something does not run smoothly, they say it has been improperly socialized; there has been a failure in communication. The animal part is rarely mentioned at all; if it proves annoying, it too has been inadequately socialized.

Now, however, groups of boys and young men are disaffected from the dominant society. The young men are Angry and Beat. The boys are Juvenile Delinquents. These groups are not small and they will grow larger. Certainly they are suffering. Demonstrably they are not getting enough out of our wealth and civilization. They are not growing up to full capacity. They are failing to assimilate much of the culture. As predictable, most of the authorities and all of the public spokesmen explain it by saying there has been a failure of socialization. Background conditions have interrupted socialization, they must be improved. Not enough effort has been made to guarantee belonging, there must be better bait or punishment.

But perhaps there has *not* been a failure of communication. Perhaps the social message has been communicated clearly to the young men and is unacceptable.

I would therefore take the opposite tack and ask, "Socialization to what? to what dominant society and available culture?" And if this question is asked, we must at once ask the other question, "Is the harmonious organization to which they are inadequately socialized, perhaps against human nature, or not worthy of human nature, and *therefore* there is difficulty in growing up?" If this is so, their disaffection is profound and it will not be finally remediable by better techniques of socializing. Instead, there will have to be changes in our society and its culture, so as to meet the appetites and capacities of human nature, in order to grow up.

This brings me to another proposition about growing up, which is perhaps my main theme. *Growth, like any on-going function, requires*

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adequate objects in the environment to meet the needs and capacities of the growing child, boy, youth, and young man, until he can better choose and make his own environment. It makes no difference whether the growth is normal or distorted, only real objects will finish the experience. (In psychotherapy one finds that many a stubborn symptom would vanish if there were a real change in the vocational and sexual opportunities so that the symptom is not needed.) It is here that the theory of belonging and socializing miserably breaks down. For it can be shown that with all the harmonious belonging and all the tidying up of background conditions that you please, our abundant society is at present simply deficient in many of the most elementary objective opportunities and worthwhile goals that could make growing up possible. It is lacking in enough man's work. It is lacking in honest public speech and taking people seriously. It is lacking in the opportunity to be useful. It thwarts aptitude and creates stupidity. It corrupts ingenuous patriotism. It abuses science. It corrupts the fine arts. It dampens animal ardor. It discourages the religious convictions of Justification and Vocation and it dims the sense that there is a Creation. It has no Honor. It has no Community.

Just look at that list. There is nothing in it that is surprising, in either the small letters or the capitals. I have nothing subtile or novel to say here; these are things that *everybody* knows. And nevertheless Governor Rockefeller of New York says, "We must give these young men a sense of belonging."

Thwarted, or starved, in the important objects proper to young capacities, the boys and young men naturally find or invent deviant objects for themselves; this is the beautiful shaping power of our human nature. Their choices and inventions are rarely charming, usually stupid, and often disastrous; we cannot expect average kids to deviate with genius. But on the other hand, the young men who conform to the dominant society are for the most part apathetic, disappointed, cynical, and wasted.

I would make little distinction in value between talking about middle-class youths being groomed for $10,000 "slots" in business and Madison Avenue, or underprivileged hoodlums fatalistically hurrying to a reformatory; or between hard-working young fathers and idle Beats with beards. For the salient thing is the sameness among them, the waste of humanity. In our society, bright lively children, with the potentiality for knowledge, noble ideals, honest effort, and some kind of worthwhile achievement, are transformed into useless and cynical bipeds, or decent young men trapped or early-resigned, whether in or out of the organized system. My purpose is a simple one: to show how it is desperately hard these days for an average child to grow up to be a man, for our present organized system of society does not want men. They are not safe. They do not suit.

Our public officials are now much concerned about the "waste of human resources," and they have appointed Dr. Conant to survey the high schools. But our officials are not serious. For the big causes of

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stupidity, of lack of initiative and lack of honorable incentive, are glaring; yet they do not intend to notice or remedy these big causes. (This very avoidance of the real issues on the part of our public officials is, indeed, one of the big causes.) Our society cannot have it both ways: to maintain a conformist and ignoble system *and* to have skillful and spirited men to man that system with.

Part 2—CLASS-STRUCTURE

I

In our economy of abundance it is still subject to discussion whether or not there is as much poverty as there was in the thirties when "one third of a nation was ill-housed, ill-clothed, ill-fed." Some say 20 per cent are poverty-stricken, some as many as 40 per cent.* Nevertheless, all students would agree on two propositions: (1) The composition of the poor has immensely changed; it now consists mainly of racial and cultural minorities (including migrant farm labor); (2) And the economic relation of the poor to the system has importantly changed: simply, the earlier minorities, Irish, Jewish, Italian, Slavic, poured into an expanding economy that needed people; the new come into an expanding economy that does not need people. I would add another important difference: (3) The relation of the other classes to the poor has markedly changed. For example, many readers are no doubt surprised that there are so many poor and, reading about it, feel that it is a mere lag, a matter of mopping-up, in our general productive advance. Everything looks pretty streamlined.

The income pyramid has changed in shape. It used to be that the most were the poor at the bottom and then, *evenly,* fewer and fewer at each level up to a few at the top. But the meaning of the economy of abundance is that there are now very many, perhaps even a bulge, at the lower-middle-income level. These are the people with semi-professional and service jobs, the occupational category that has grown the most, and who get status-salaries; the skilled and semi-skilled semi-monopoly factory jobs, strongly unionized; the families where, in our artificially maintained nearly full employment, the man has two jobs or the woman also has a job; and families in newly industrialized areas in the South and Middle West. But conversely, the poorly paying unskilled jobs have diminished. It is here that simple automation (e.g., sweeping the floor in a factory) is allowed full development. Many categories are not unionized. Migratory farm labor, mostly Negro, usually is not covered by social insurance. By the connivance of

* It is hard to determine a criterion of poverty at present. E.g. a Negro family in the rich county of Westchester might have an income of $4,000 yet have to pay so much rent for substandard housing that it can't make both ends meet. In New York City novice Puerto Ricans are fleeced four times as much for a quarter of the space that experienced citizens manage to find in the same neighborhood.

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union and management, Negroes and the new Spanish minorities are often rejected for apprenticeship. These poor groups, behindhand to begin with, get less schooling.

That is, the economy of abundance, the bulge in the pyramid, means also that those at the bottom tend to fall out of "society" altogether.

Consider it. There is a higher standard of living and more to conform to, in order to be "decent"; it is more expensive to be decently poor. Yet there is a tighter organization above that is harder to belong to, so that the standard is increasingly unattainable for the underprivileged. So far as economic and vocational causes, poverty and joblessness, are factors—and they are mighty important factors when they add up to being "out" of society—this is a sufficient explanation for juvenile delinquency. One need go no further. For in such hopeless conditions *any* grounds of family hostility, unusual childhood frustration, or a gang on the street, will tip the balance. The question is whether or not this structure is organic in our present system.

(Let me say at this point, however, that many of the humble jobs of the poor are precisely *not* useless, morally. Farm labor, janitoring, messenger, serving and dish-washing—these jobs resist remarkably well the imputation of uselessness made against the productive society as a whole. In the potency-ideology of teen-age delinquents, of course, such jobs are contemptible and emasculating. But we shall see that they are important for the poverty-mystique of the more thoughtful of the Beat Generation.)

II

Recently I attended a conference (Student League for Industrial Democracy) where poverty was the theme. Eminent and earnest labor leaders spoke. As the day wore on I became more and more eerily disturbed at the difference in tone from such discussions in the Thirties. At last I hit it: they were talking not political economy but philanthropy. Partly, maybe, this tone crept in because they were talking about our poor black and brown brothers. Mostly, however, it was because their attitude toward poverty is no longer part of their own fighting economic theory. As labor economists they do not have solidarity with *these* poor.

When poverty used to be discussed by the socialists (these same men younger), the theory was that in the capitalist system labor as a whole must be at the bottom and must become poorer, because of the falling return on investment and its pressure on wages, because of the concentration of ownership and control and the increase of inequality, and the periodic crises and unemployment. Therefore the fight against poverty was solidary, it was the fight for the improvement of the whole system to give labor a better position. But now the rate of interest does not fall; the system cushions its crises; there is high employment or insurance. There is certainly a concentration of monopolistic control, but either inequality is less (that is debatable), or, certainly,

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workers on a fairly high standard don't much bother who has millions. Thus, nostalgic solidarity with poverty turns into philanthropy—and even exclusion, on issues where the poor are unassimilable into the abundant system.

One of the speakers, a portly labor leader, was asked whether the new pyramid did not resemble a middle-aged gentleman with a bulge beneath the middle.

I did not once hear the word "proletariat," and that made sense. For the word had been used, bitterly and nobly, in a different theory: "producers of offspring" paid by the iron law of wages just enough to reproduce labor. Our present poor are more like the ancient Roman proletariat, producers of offspring kept on a dole for political reasons. It was clear, too, why the word "do-gooder" has fallen into mild disrepute. It used to refer, like "muckraking," to quixotic attempts to reform the system; now it is diminishing suffering, accepting the system. (Muckraking, in turn, has become the protest of Angry Young Men. My own tone sounds like an Angry Middle-Aged Man, disappointed but not resigned.)

III

For those excluded from the high standard and its organization, it is becoming harder to maintain any American standard at all. It is characteristic of systems geared to high pay that it is hard to work for low pay. There are fewer such jobs; those there are are without benefit of union and subject to grueling exploitation. Low pay generally means harder work under worse conditions. Prices are, of course, geared to the high standard; and the use of any commodity tends to be increasingly tied up with the use of many other commodities and services that cost money.

For instance, it is impossible to be poor and run a jalopy. The insurance costs three times as much as the car. The old car, which is safe at 50 m.p.h., is effectually barred from parkways made for cars at 65 m.p.h. The price of gasoline pays for the parkways. The price of repairs is geared to the new cars.

It costs money to have any job at all; transportation and lunches, presentable clothes and laundry, are priced for good wages.

Unless he is capable of a different, inventive or community culture altogether, a poor person can afford little recreation; the popular culture is high priced, and he gets the dregs of it. His poverty tends to degenerate into stupidity. He cannot afford presentable shoes for the kids to go to school; they are ashamed and won't go. Thus, in Péguy's phrase, poverty becomes misery, and the poor belong to society less and less.

IV

There is little agreement in the sociology of delinquency. But one correlation that is generally agreed on is the following: Juv-

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enile delinquency, unlike adult crime, is more frequent in years of economic prosperity than in years of depression. Now this would seem to contradict the other, and rather *prima facie,* theory of poverty as the important condition. The paradox is softened by pointing out that in prosperity there is more employment of women, there is more divorce, and there is more money to buy liquor and drugs. These factors make sense, but let me raise some further considerations. First, there is the possibility that the prosperous, well-paying jobs do not filter down evenly to the poorest groups who tend much more to be unemployable altogether. This certainly seems to be our situation today. Second, in a high standard economy, there is a great difference between having a little extra money and being accustomed to the well-paid standard. As our Manchester forefathers used to say, you do a disservice to the undeserving poor by giving them money, because they will get into trouble. Consider the concrete situation: Even if the parents are suddenly getting better pay, the young are getting merely a little extra spending-money, and this, in a society where there is suddenly a lot of money, must work out as follows: (1) The underprivileged kids get around more and are exposed to the expensive glamor, but (2) this is precisely not attainable by them, unless they take short cuts. (3) Meantime, those who have the new money are more careless with it, they leave their cars unlocked, they buy sex. And (4) the spiteful feeling is increased, that those who are better off are squares, enemies, and fair victims of the gang. In boom-time, that is, there is effectually *more* exclusion than ordinarily.

During depression, contrariwise, there is more community because many others are in the same boat. The street is occupied by kids used to other mores, to whom the gang values are pointless. This leads to friction, of course, but also to other friendships and other activities. But above all, as everybody knows who was unemployed during the Great Depression, it is easier to be decently poor when prices are low and the pressure to maintain appearances is diminished. Things get nearer to a human scale and life makes more sense. Likewise, at such times political activity is more common; it is educative and increases self-esteem in a worthwhile way.

This whole picture would be quite different if the underprivileged and somewhat unemployable families had a pretty good secure income over a long period. They would then be members of society at least as consumers, and would eventually become as employable as the average. Such a device would at once diminish certain kinds of delinquency, e.g., thefts, malicious mischief, certain spiteful assaults, and maybe truancy. Simply to *subsidize* the poor might be the cheapest way of coping with juvenile delinquency. To re-establish in general what he calls the social balance, J. K. Galbraith proposes such a high long-time subsidy for all unemployed. He assures us that this would not be inflationary, and as the director of price controls for the OPA he should know.

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The popular bright idea to diminish delinquency is to penalize the parents; and perhaps the effective method would be, rather, to give them more money to spend, a kind of prize!

V

At present, however, our society is settling for the first time in its history into a marked class system—with increasing mobility of persons but rigidifying of statuses and opportunities; less easy gradation and fewer unique "classless" positions.

At the bottom are these poor, "outside" of society. Next are those groups who are *in* the organized system of production: (1) Those who are "in" but-couldn't-care-less about the production and distribution, for instance factory-operatives. These are paid the lower-middle-income wages, say $4,000 to $6,000. They buy on credit and have to keep on the job to make both ends meet. If the work week is shortened to 30 hours, there is evidence that they get other part-time jobs to buy new refrigerators. (2) The next status who are "in" are the Organization Men proper, whose hours, thoughts, families, play, and peace of mind are dedicated to maintaining their positions in their particular firms and pushing upward there or in some other firm. Salary $7,500 to $20,000. It is this group of junior-executives, for instance, that we have compared to the juvenile delinquents for their safe conformity and competitive individuality. We shall see that another important trait in common is having no real activity but living by role-playing.* (3) At the top, finally, are the 900 managers—figure of *Fortune* magazine—whose task is to minimize risk and maximize production and sales. Also the 50 Governors, the Federal staff, heads of Foundations, etc., etc.

It will be seen that these 3 statuses in the organized system (which includes bigger business, organized labor, entertainment, government, bigger education, etc.) are engaged primarily in keeping the system itself running and slowly expanding. The most self-aware of its members are the intellectuals of the middle status, among the advertisers, and junior-executives; and they describe the system as the Rat Race.**

But there is another large class: those who do not properly belong to the system and are not yet submerged into the poor "outside" of society: this is the vast herd of the old fashioned, the eccentric, the criminal, the gifted, the serious, the men and women, the rentiers, the free-lances, the infants, and so forth. This motley collection has, of

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* W. H. Whyte, Jr., the Hesiod of this tribe, pleads for individuality to offset the comformity of organization life. He (rather cynically) fails to see that such polar "individuality" is the conformity by which a man advances; it is one-upping. The only offset to the organization is nature or worthwhile objects; but the necessary, useful, and pleasant, and the good, true, and beautiful are not much mentioned in his book.

** But *cf.*, "Among the many models of the good society, no one has urged the squirrel wheel," says Galbraith. It is interesting to contrast the different species of imagined rodents between those who are running the race and the scholar who is contemplating it with wonder.

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course, no style or culture, unlike the organization that has our familiar "functional" style and popular culture. Its fragmented members hover about the organization in multifarious ways—running specialty-shops, trying to teach or give other professional services, robbing banks, landscape gardening, and so forth—but they find it hard to get along, for they do not know the approved techniques of promoting, getting foundation grants, protecting themselves by official unions, legally embezzling, and not blurting out the truth or weeping or laughing out of turn. They have no style at all, and it is understandable that neither they nor their usually rather irrelevant enterprises make much headway in the market, the universities, entertainment, politics, or labor. Besides they often speak a minority language, English.

This is roughly the class structure of America in the middle of the Twentieth Century. It seems most functional to speak of 3 *classes,* the Poor, the Organization, and the Independents; and of 3 *statuses* within the dominant class, the Organization. Viz:

Organized System
1. Workers
2. Organization Men
3. Managers

Poor
Independents

VI

Let us return now to our alert young man of average to good attainments and imagine him growing up in and *into* this arena. Most likely he will go to work for an Organization, in a factory or service job, manual or clerical, with the corresponding job attitude and way of life. But if he has been to college, he will likely be in the second status of the organization, in business-management, communications, sales, or technology, with *its* job attitude and way of life.

After a few years, many such young men will perceive that they are in a Rat Race. The young workers will perceive it as the work speeds up, the instalment payments fall due, etc. The Organization Man will perceive it as competition, company pressure to conform, etc. Of these, most will race on but a few will balk and stop running. Now what becomes of these few?

They are *not* likely to choose the other, motley, alternative of trying to remain in society independent of the organization. For their experience has been disillusioning. They have become hip. (We shall see later that this is a profoundly organizational attitude.) They *know* that the unorganized are up against it, for they have learned techniques of promotion and they don't think much, or much think, of other methods and kinds of results. But to be hip and cynical are not attitudes that prompt one to make a go on one's own. It is not surprising then that many of those who balk in the Rat Race will voluntarily choose

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the other remaining possibility, poverty "outside" society. (Whether they choose it or fall into it, comes to the same thing.) These, not boys but early disillusioned, hip, and resigned young men are the Beat Generation. The organization they have quit may be the armed forces or a university they cannot compound with; these tend to be more naive. Those who have had experience of working for a firm and making a pretty good living tend to be more cynical.

Naturally this cataclysmic transition, between being in and being "outside" society, does not occur without strong accompanying emotional moments—betrayals in love, binges, blow-ups against the boss, addiction to forbidden haunts and vices. But at this point let us stick to the social structuring of it.

VII

It is relevant to introduce our discussion of the Beat Generation in this context of present-day poverty because the present-day composition of the poor in America, Negroes, Puerto Ricans and Mexicans, migrant farm-labor, with large urban juvenile delinquency, has been fateful for the particular culture of these young folks. Let us analyze the accidental and essential influences as an interesting example of acculturation.

Artists and bohemians have always gravitated to the bottom of the income pyramid. It is cheaper there. There is less time-table there. Life is simpler and more factual. These factors somewhat operate today too, but less so, because in some ways it now costs more to be poor than modestly lower-middle, and in many of their tastes—e.g. clothes, cars, recreation, and even food—the poor are even more idiotic than the average. So let us see what is particular in the cultural effect of present-day poverty on present-day bohemians.

(*1*) The African and Spanish influence and a part of the migrant and delinquent influence on Beat culture is inevitable but accidental. Resigning, the Beats have chosen to be outside and the present poor happen to be those who, as unorganized minorities, *are* outside when they arrive. The poor might have been Chinese; the narcotics might have been different, or some other kick than narcotics altogether; the music might have been something else than *Negro* jazz; the jargon might not have had a Negro base; and perhaps there might be less going on the road (but this ants-in-the-pants moving about is now pervasive anyway). Surely all of this will be denied by the Beat fellows; for them every aspect of their scene is equally relevant and precious. But if these aspects of their culture were not accidental, such bright and inventive fellows would already have made more out of them. The bongo drums and jazz, as they practice them, are childish in the light of their knowledge and abilities. The jazz-and-poetry is feeble compared even to the TV commercial jingles that they have turned away from. The jive language embarrasses their poetry. The style of the drugs remains crude and experimental. Much of the delinquency rouses

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guilt and fear in them, instead of defiant righteousness or calm philosophy (contrast the style and depth of Jean Genet with similar material).

(2) On the other hand, the *structural* characteristics of the present-day poor—those that did not especially belong to the poor of older bohemias—*are* essential in the culture of those who gravitate to these poor. These include: Out-casteness and being objects of prejudice. Giving up trying to explain to those who, often literally, do not speak the same language. Provocative exclusiveness and in-group loyalty. Fear of the cops. Economic and job-uselessness. Courageously taking up or remaining with community substitutes rather than sinking in mere resignation (but this courage is common to many kinds of poor). Exotic or at least not-standard-American arts and folkways, and awkwardness in the standard folkways.

These structural characteristics of the present-day poor are essential in Beat culture. As, contrariwise, are the organizational characteristics of being hip and convinced that society is a Rat Race. This combination, we shall see, mesmerizes them into behaving as though they were trapped in a Closed Room and must live on their own guts without environment.

(3) But finally, there are essential traits of Beat culture that go counter to the social traits of the poor whom they have chosen. This is the essential morality, that is acculturated least. One striking trait is non-conformism and tolerance in sexual and racial questions and behavior. The poor Negroes or Puerto Ricans may be exotic to the standard customs and prejudices, but they are all the more narrow about their own. (In the case of the delinquents, of course, this conformity is so extravagant as to be dangerous: they cannot inwardly tolerate anything that hints that their own image of perfection is questionable.) It is hard to be sure, but my impression is that other poor, who were at the bottom, but *in* society, were among the most tolerant. Hard knocks had taught them to live and let live; and they did not need to protect their repressions so much as an out-caste poor. In this respect the Beat are more like the old-fashioned poor, and this of course makes it easier and more profitable for them to be poor. This brings us to another striking difference. Despite having minority traditions of their own, our present poor are absolute sheep and suckers for the popular culture which they cannot afford, the movies, sharp clothes, and up to Cadillacs. Indeed, it is likely that the popular culture is aimed largely at them, as the lowest common denominator. I do not mean that this is not a reasonable compensation, like an Englishman's liquor and an Irishman's betting on the horses. Everybody has got to have something; so our poor people show off and feel big with the standard of living. But in these circumstances, it is immensely admirable that the Beat Generation has contrived a pattern of culture that, turning against the standard culture, costs very little and gives far livelier satisfaction. It is communally shared, in small groups. Much of

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it is hand-made, not canned. Some of it is communally improvised. We shall speak later about the limitations of this procedure and the weakness of its products; but the *fact* of it, of a culture that is communal and tending toward the creative, is so capital that it must have a future, and it is worthwhile to study its grounding and economy.

VIII

Let us look also at Beat economics, as an interesting sidelight on the American standard economy. The Beats have a mystique of voluntary poverty; but how to get along at all if one has dropped "outside" and has no incentive to work and "make good"?

In our times the distinction between case-poverty due to illness, life-accidents, or personality-defects, and class-poverty, due to social defects, doesn't amount to much. For it could be asked: Why wasn't the accident insured? What social conditions formed such a careless personality? or conversely: Doesn't the poor class have, economically, a personality defect? (Just as in the Protestant Ethic the poor had a theological defect; but of course it is also persistently true that "only the poor are saved.") Likewise, the old monastic concept of voluntary poverty is no longer much distinguishable from either case-poverty or class-poverty, for it happens that a person *cannot* continue the Rat Race —he gets sick—and he chooses out, to survive. Another man would like to be rich and famous but he *cannot* work otherwise than the work demands and this might not be marketable; so he could be said to choose poverty. In an organized system, all poor tend to be the same poor. (The same blurring of distinctions has occurred between "political" and "common" criminals. As society becomes more close-knit and total, a criminal act may well be a dumb political gesture, and political protest is certainly criminal in effect. So the anarchist philosopher refused to distinguish these and said, "As long as *one* of these is in jail, I am not free.")

It makes little difference, then, whether a young fellow chooses his lot or is cast among the poor; especially if, being there, he soon takes on habits which make it impossible for him, or unattractive to him, to belong to the system.

Suppose then, with pretty good awareness, our scarred young man is now confirmed poor. He must still face the problem of vocation and money. On these points the writers on the Beat Generation are confused. For one thing, they have a false notion that the kind of artistic activity that proliferates among the Beats is art, and gives the justification of art as a vocation. But it is not art but something else; and they do not behave as if they were justified by it.

The problem of money, again, seems simple, but it is not. In voluntary poverty the problem of money is to get enough to subsist. (Money is called "bread.") But how? In his book, *The Holy Barbarians,* Lawrence Lipton gives a considerable list of jobs that Beat take, generally temporarily, to get subsistence. The principle is that

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anything will do. A fellow might work in the organized system, e.g. dressing a window at Macy's; but, it is argued, he would not thereby be in the Rat Race because he just wants "bread" and will quit. Naturally Macy's didn't know this when they hired him; so he's using them, not they him. This might come to pretending to conform rather elaborately, for the system is total; e.g. a fellow will get the job if he shaves off his beard. Work is no different from shop-lifting. One plays roles and is hip. (Money is now called "loot.") What is not understood in this form of reasoning is that playing roles and being hip in this way is very nearly the same as being an Organization Man, for the Organization Man doesn't mean it either.

Obviously the Holy Barbarian is here on shaky grounds. Getting his "loot" he is an exploiter of labor, but only a little bit. (The integral aim of useful man's-work is not mentioned by Lipton.)

Let me make a close analogy—so close that it is probably an identity—between the job in voluntary poverty and the service in wartime that a pacifist can agree to perform. Nearly any civilian job a man does advances the war. If he picks beans he replaces a farmer for the war-factory. Pacifists commonly have accepted jobs like attendant in a hospital (that is understaffed anyway). This is not a petty problem, for when the evil is general and close-knit, it is necessary to preserve one's own personal integrity, if only to influence the future when the emergency is past. Any one who does not understand this, and the soul-searching and hair-splitting involved, will not understand ingenuous youth. (E.g., I myself am pretty easy with my "integrity" by now, and I would sign almost anything convenient; yet when I am a teacher, I cannot sign a loyalty oath if I am going to face a class of the young, for they count on me not to.)

Among some of the Beat, such a principle of integrity is clearly operating in the job-choice. To quote a paragraph earlier in this chapter: "Many of the humble jobs of the poor are precisely not useless (or exploiting). Farm labor, hauling boxes, janitoring, serving and dish-washing, messenger—these resist remarkably well the imputation of uselessness (or exploitation) made against the productive society as a whole." These *are* preferred Beat jobs. For one thing, in them no questions are asked and no beards have to be shaved.

But on the other hand, such jobs, being hard and useful, are the most miserably exploited. (E.g., the hospital-workers who struck for a union so bravely last year were getting $34 a week. Migratory farmers might earn less than $900 a year, and the neighbors glad to see them leave.) All of the money is *in* the system. The wages are minimum, the price of subsistence is standard high; so a man loses his freedom, he never stops working. To have such a job is to be used and made a fool of by the system; and this is in itself dishonorable. This is the dilemma of voluntary poverty in our society: either to compromise one's integrity (but then why bother?) or to be abused and made a fool of.

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THE UNIVERSITY: EVERYBODY'S GOLD MINE

Barbara Probst Solomon

The following article, which provides a critical view of the American university from a student's perspective, comes from a young writer who in the past was a student at Columbia University. It might be added that, because of space restrictions, we have had to hold it for several issues, during which time a variety of public disclosures give its argument even more bite than it seemed to have when we first received it.—EDITORS.

In the last decade or so the American university has been put to unprecedented use by industry, the mass media and research teams, as well as by intellectuals who find it a handy home base. One result has been a failure on the part of the university to maintain itself as a value center for the young. Even worse, the student tends to become a public animal, fair game for all comers.

Today's student is proclaimed a failure before he starts. In the name of necessary research, scores of studies such as *The Unsilent Generation* by Otto Butz have been made. The thoughts, ideals and private lives of the students have been picked at and probed into by teachers, behavioral scientists and critics. Now the popular media people have also joined in. Generally, the conclusions of these studies show the young to be a rather dismal, apathetic lot. Obviously the mass magazines and TV have a stake in the student because their business is to explore whatever topics are currently in vogue. But as for the more serious studies, why are they made? What use do they serve? Why all this attention to the adolescent's *views on society*? Why all the negative conclusions? So far as I can see, it is a case of hoping that the blind will lead the blind. The educators and intellectuals have lost their way, they are no longer sure of their own ethical values. In the Greek sense, they have ceased to be teachers. Instead they have turned on their students.

Turnabout is fair play. The world and the university have examined the student. Now, how does that same world and university size up from the student's point of view? The first thing the student becomes aware of in the new university atmosphere is hurry: hurry and a fantastic respect for success. In an attempt to do away with the ivory tower approach to education, the universities have endorsed a quick, slick professionalism. Their relation to business is becoming increasingly intimate. More and more courses which are essentially apprenticeship courses aimed at specific careers are available to the undergraduate student. Indeed, apprenticeship is replacing scholarship.

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YEARS AGO, the Freshman student in English Composition was of interest to no one but himself, his teacher, his friends and his relatives. His teacher was generally someone who thought of teaching as a full-time profession. Today his young counterpart quickly gets to a "creative writing workshop" and as a "young writer" has a direct marketable value to the publisher always on the lookout for new talent. (I am using writing as an example, but, in different ways, the same essential experience occurs in the language, engineering, science, journalism, drama and government "fields.")

We've come a long way from the time when the Pepsi-Cola prize was unique. Today, industry besieges the university with student prizes. The student is grateful for the recognition and the financial reward—but he also realizes that industry is conducting a talent hunt on the campus. What possible harm is there, one can ask, in allowing a young writer publication in a respectable, established magazine? On the surface, none. This practice, however, has its repercussions. One, the prestige and importance of the undergraduate magazine has suffered. A student has his eyes on *Mademoiselle* or the *Paris Review;* he no longer devotes his interest or energies to the local publication. Two, subconsciously, at a very young age he molds his talents to what he thinks is wanted of him. The future is so golden and so little is asked of him. He need only not appear an amateur!

The other publication which beckons invitingly to the student comes from within the university. This is the little magazine serving the needs of the intellectual community which has come to rely on the universities to provide a good address. In focusing on these magazines rather than on the genuine undergraduate publication, the student is unaware that he is up against another kind of professionalism—intellectual professionalism—and that the attitudes of this world are just as preconceived and rigid as those of the commercial world.

UNLESS HE IS an extraordinary human being, the new part-time teacher, with his commitments to other worlds, both intellectual and industrial, carries into his classroom the sense that what really counts is happening outside. He himself is under all sorts of pressures. In today's busy world of conferences and meetings, schedules have a way of overlapping. The part-time professor hired by the university to give the students a chance to study with an "expert in the field" is in reality a man harassed by two jobs. Often assistants have to take over the classes and the student quickly learns that he is only of secondary importance to the busy teacher. The relationship between the part-time expert and the university is vague and impersonal. This new, rootless Academia has little awareness of itself and no real notion of its obligations to the university.

The modern teacher-student relationship is more practical than spiritual. Scholarship is no longer an end in itself. It has been replaced by an excessive emphasis on career. Both the professors and the university administration shower the student with opportunities to meet his future employers, and, of course, the new American way of life has become ever onward and upward with fellowships and grants. Some of these gatherings are of more benefit to industry on a talent hunt than to the students, who are of an age when they should be more concerned with learning and less aware of "jobs." What is the effect of

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all this on the student? He concludes that the university has tremendous awe and respect for this outside world and wholeheartedly embraces its values. He also gets a premature notion of his own success or failure. The clever ones quickly learn how to navigate. They pick the professors who can "help them along professionally." The atmosphere is filled with tension and artificial stimulation, where the message of "get smart quick" is constantly blared forth.

THE UNIVERSITY SERVES industry in more ways than by merely being a free employment agency. Affiliation with the *name* of a good university is an excellent way for business and advertising to buy prestige cheap, and prestige is a very valuable commodity these days. In this era of the "new-Nixon," the intellectual and liberal is coming into his own again, he is now blue-chip stock.

A good example of business's misalliance with the university is *Esquire* magazine's "cultural" get-together with Columbia University a year ago last fall. Because of competition from the new pseudo-girlie magazines like *Gent* and *Playboy,* and a decline in its advertising sales, about a year or so ago *Esquire* decided to become more respectable. This metamorphosis finally culminated in a wedding—a literary symposium at Columbia University's McMillan theatre with *Esquire* as the aggressive groom, Columbia as the uncertain bride and the students as the embarrassed bastard children.

Now, I have no quarrel with *Esquire* for trading its half-naked females for the works of established serious writers, peppered with an occasional newcomer, and I realize that this is the way they started out many years ago. (I do fear, however, that it will remain a publishing source of good writers only so long as quality writing has a good trade-in value with the advertiser, and it is not to be counted on when times get rough for the intellectual.) But I am concerned when a mighty university like Columbia, to the disgust of its own students, sells itself short to Madison Avenue.

Students receiving the silver invitations announcing the two-part symposium in honor of *Esquire's* twenty-fifth anniversary co-sponsored by *Esquire* and Columbia's School of General Studies failed to see any connection between the two institutions. Why any magazine? But especially, why *Esquire*? Indeed, what does one of our greatest universities have in common with a magazine that until recently most parents preferred their children not to see? Does the Columbia faculty think that you can buy a good name and honest intellectual conscience overnight? My own guess is that *Esquire* managed to appear very shiny, powerful and magically impressive to the Columbia faculty. This is the "real" world, and to it one must pay homage. Most teachers tacitly accept the public view of themselves as second-rate citizens, and are much more easily intimidated by the business world than people realize.

THE THEME of this symposium was the writer's place in America. Discussed at some length was the new phenomenon of the writer-teacher. Listening to the speakers argue back and forth about the relative merits of the campus as being a good or bad atmosphere in which the writer could "create," I had the uncomfortable feeling that I was listening to some voyagers remarking on the merits of plane travel over sea travel. But what about the students? Not one of the

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speakers mentioned his role or obligation as a teacher.

The most shocking feature of the symposium was the way Arnold Gingrich, editor of *Esquire,* treated the students while he was presiding over the second meeting. Apparently he had been angered by the earlier session which had been conducted by a faculty member in a leisurely university manner. Too slow, and too much student participation. True, he wanted questions from the audience, but they were to be short and snappy. Above all, he warned, no student opinion. He was Gingrich, the editor, trying to organize a "brain-storm." The speakers on the platform looked uncomfortable as they watched him lose his temper. Unable to make his audience respond with the precision of a business conference, Gingrich was reduced to the obscenity of insulting and mocking them, producing only a hostile silence for his troubles.

At the end of the evening the chic and fashionable crowded up front to meet the speakers, and the students went home. Walking along Upper Broadway I heard one student excitedly remark to his friend how much he would have liked to ask a certain question of one of the writers, but he hadn't wanted to make a fool of himself in front of that Gingrich character. His friend shrugged his shoulders. "Oh well," he replied, "Viva *Esquire.*"

I WAS REMINDED of Gingrich's fiasco at Columbia when I read Diana Trilling's account, "The Other Night At Columbia," in the Spring 1959 *Partisan Review.* On the surface Diana Trilling and Arnold Gingrich are quite different. He represents the commercial world; she the world of the intellect. She, as a critic, writes only for the most rarefied reviews. Her husband, Lionel Trilling, an outstanding critic and writer, is also a professor at Columbia University. Gingrich merely pretended to be interested in the student, as a backdrop for his anniversary celebration. Diana Trilling, in her article expressed apparent serious concern for the student, and one student in particular. This was Allan Ginsberg, the poet, who is also an ex-student of her husband. Yet she and Gingrich do have something in common, and that is an underlying contempt for the student.

Presumably she wrote the article because she was worried that the intellectual and teacher have failed to lead the student. She examines the case of Ginsberg and implies that if the teachers had not turned their backs when Ginsberg and all the other "lost boys of the forties" had wanted to talk, there might not be a "Beat Generation" today. I have no quarrel with this suggestion—but the tone of her article is incredible. Her concern for the young is mixed with antagonism. The core of her article deals with Ginsberg's triumphant return to Columbia for an evening of poetry reading. She quite casually writes of how she and other faculty wives had scores of back-and-forth telephone calls: should they go watch the freak show, or should they not? The brave ladies finally decided to attend the poetry reading, prepared to hold their noses against the stench.

Mrs. Trilling saw nothing amiss in stating that she, as a faculty wife, went to a Columbia University function expecting the audience, of whom a large part were obviously Columbia students, to "smell bad" and look seedy. Are these same students, after being called "rabble" and "hordes of barbarians" by Mrs. Trilling expected to face her husband in the classroom

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with the respect to which he is entitled? Or should they feel mollified because Mrs. Trilling did not find them as dirty as she had expected?

Mrs. Trilling echoes the concern of university administrators throughout the country over the chaotic, frenetic atmosphere created when writers such as Kerouac are invited to speak. The universities, however, have brought this on themselves by *making* the student into a public animal. They, not the student, have called the outside world in; they have conducted the studies encouraging the students to reveal their private lives; yet now they are worried about student exhibitionism. Mrs. Trilling deplores the ugliness of the *Life* cameraman with flashbulb poised at Ginsberg's poetry reading. Yet she sees nothing wrong in revealing intimate facts about Ginsberg's life known to her only because her husband was his teacher and confidant.

WHO, INDEED, has ever thought to teach this generation reticence? The faculty cannot solve this problem, which has gotten out of hand, by storming off the platforms at these gatherings, or by presiding half-heartedly, just to get the whole show over with. They cannot abdicate responsibility and teach responsibility. What they can do is let the students invite their own speakers, and close the meetings to the general public and press. Is there a law that says *Life* magazine must attend student functions? I doubt that last year's Hunter meeting, when Kerouac spoke, would have been such a mess if the cameramen and radiomen had not been a stimulant to the wildness for the purpose of mass audience entertainment.

Unfortunately, this will not occur until the large university rediscovers its own attitude toward its prime function. One reason the individual professor cannot be more forceful in maintaining his position against the onslaught of the outer world is that in today's society it is hard to feel strong and worthwhile when one earns substandard wages. The professor is forced to eke out his income in ways he regards as not being wholly honest—grants, international junkets, excessive publishing, etc. The university's complex alliance with the subsidizing world of big business, mass media, foundation grants and research projects, plus its role as home base for the footloose intellectual, leads to regarding the education of the young as a minor concern.

THE GREATEST damage done to the student, however, is the *attitude* taken toward him by the generation which should be showing the way. Undoubtedly, the majority of educators, critics, intellectuals and sociologists of a certain age come from the ranks of pre-Second World War political liberals. Having been obsessed with feelings of confusion, guilt and bewilderment since the war, they have buried their own self-hatred and frustration by turning on the next generation and damning it in advance. If the ship sinks, let's all go down together.

Critics like Mrs. Trilling (and Leslie Fiedler is another) are more forthright than the sociologists. Angrily she describes the Columbia audience as being *crazily* young . . . so few of the girls are pretty, so few of the boys manly. (The reverse is that the young are too old.) According to her the thirties was a glorious time, and intellectuals never had it better. She feels that those were the days when Jews were real Jews, Negroes were real Negroes and Stewart's Cafeteria

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was a wonderfully gay, witty Village cafeteria, not like the dreary West End Bar today's Columbia students have to put up with. Though she is proud that her youth was a time of passion and feeling, she, like Fiedler, seems a little ashamed of what the feeling was about. For her (and all the others) the great overwhelming and irrevocable tragedy of today's youth is that they were not born in her time.

But one's birthdate is never one's "tragedy." We cannot transport ourselves into the glory that was Greece, the brilliance of the Renaissance or the golden age of Stewart's Cafeteria. Nor should human beings have the egotism to feel that they *should* live in an "ideal time." But we can absorb the past. And if the thirties was such a valid experience, why are the survivors unable to communicate and make it meaningful today? In all good things there is historical continuity, one generation gives to the next. Why has that generation drawn a curtain of silence? It is they, uncertain and ashamed of their attitudes, who have isolated their life experience rather than let it take root and flower.

No, the loss of today's generation is not in our having to make do with the West End Bar instead of Stewart's Cafeteria in the Village. For if we are to survive anything, we will survive by being of our own time. But our moral destruction may come ever so gently via the Drake room.

THE CAMPUS RADICAL IN 1960

Arthur Mitzman

If there is to be an American political left in the 1960s and 70s it will be led, for the most part, by radical students of today and tomorrow, rather than by those who received their political training in the 1930s and 1940s. It is this fact which gives a certain interest to the posture and moods of the current generation of radicals.

Thus it is significant that in the two spontaneous student movements that have developed recently—movements against segregation and bomb testing—there has been a notable coolness toward programs and *realpolitik*. This reaction stems largely from a deeply-felt notion that the older kind of politics, with its resolutions, machinations and polemics is both futile and totally unnecessary for dealing with such clearcut questions as Strontium 90 and the right of a child to be decently educated. To these problems one need apply no dialectic, but simply an immediate response of emotion and will. And these *are* the kinds of problems to which today's campus radicals address themselves, not the victory of socialism in Ceylon or, for that matter, the problem of fascism in France. The area of vision is different, and the organ of response has shifted from the brain to the intestines.

I exaggerate, of course. Moral in-

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dignation in the face of injustice was always the mainspring of socialist activity and today's young radicals are by no means incapable of logical thinking. Furthermore, pockets of the older radicalism still exist, especially in New York City. But there has been a decided shift in emphasis. To fully appreciate the reasons for this shift, I want to relate an incident—trivial in its own right but revealing as a symptom—in the life of a quasi-radical student organization functioning under the old dispensation in the mid-fifties. Since I have little experience with the desegregation movement, my further comments will be directed exclusively toward the anti-bomb campaign.

In 1953 and 1954, at the height of the McCarthy era, conventions of the liberal Students for Democratic Action passed resolutions supporting the right of Communists to teach unless proved incompetent. But the New York chapters of SDA were prevented from publicly protesting against the purges of Communists in the city school system by SDA's senior organization, Americans for Democratic Action, which supported the firings. When SDA, which had originally been independent, affiliated with ADA, the adult group agreed to grant it autonomy in regard to academic freedom issues, provided the SDA did not contradict any ADA position on other matters. Because ADA insisted that the issue did not primarily concern academic freedom, SDA never made public its stand favoring the right of Communists to teach.

At the 1955 SDA convention there was a strong left wing determined to bring the organization's position into the open. This proposal, however, never reached a vote. Instead, the right wing of SDA submitted a resolution which would have permanently surrendered the organization's right to take a public stand on matters concerning academic freedom. The SDA left wing was puzzled by this move, since it was clear that the right wing was in a minority on this issue. Then there came a telegram from a leading ADA officer who threatened disaffiliation if the resolution was voted down. A phone call by the left wing leadership to a sympathetic New York editor, then a member of ADA's national board, brought the reply that he could do nothing to prevent the threat from being carried out.

The left wing leadership consisted primarily of two groups: one extended out in concentric circles of diminishing orthodoxy from a pair of young "Shachtmanites" who saw as their ultimate goal some day to push both ADA and SDA into a labor party. The other group, in my judgment, was essentially opportunisitc, with no more significant political aim than that of obtaining paid positions with the national organization. Both leadership groups were terrified by the threat of disaffiliation: the Shachtmanites because they saw themselves about to be sundered from a potential agent of the world-historical spirit, the opportunists, because they saw themselves about to be sundered from $16,000—SDA's annual subsidy from ADA, and most of its budget.

Both groups decided to ask their followers to abstain from the vote. The measure surrendering autonomy passed by about twenty-five to five, with some thirty-five abstentions.

The effect of this humiliating defeat on the morale of the left-wing

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was devastating. Hopes of the left leadership that a forthcoming ADA convention would take a stand favorable to SDA on Communist teachers proved illusory. ADA did not alter its stand, but SDA did. With the decline in numbers and spirit of the leftist contingent that resulted from the convention debacle, SDA's national committee was soon able to purge the leadership of the left caucus.

THIS INCIDENT is clearly devoid of intrinsic importance. Of SDA's national membership of about 750, between 50 and 100 good liberals became exhausted in a sequence of futile maneuvers. What is significant, however, is the political pattern revealed by the case, a pattern which does much to explain why radically inclined students in 1960 no longer join groups like SDA, but, when they join anything at all, favor campus SANE groups or go on Quaker work projects.

In the complex string of relations between the Shachtmanites and SDA, SDA and ADA, ADA and the liberal Democrats, and the liberal Democrats and the Democratic Party, one common factor emerges. Each group on the left side of a pair was firmly convinced that the agent of historical progress, lay in its partner to the right. The Shachtmanites, with their Marxist analysis, saw the future in a labor party, but had not the slightest confidence in their powers to produce such a thing; they counted on an amalgam of the labor movement and ADA to bring it into being. Getting control of SDA was a step toward this objective.

The ADA, in turn, accepted the same kind of relationship to the "left wing" of the Democratic Party. ADA could not dream of embarking on an independent political venture, but could only hope that the Democratic liberals might finally break from the southern Democrats and form a genuinely liberal party. But of course the Democratic liberals had no intention of ruining their presidential chances by sending the South over to the Republicans. In short, each party of principle, realizing its impotence, played the game of *realpolitik* by supporting, while hoping to convert, the larger group to its right, until the chain reached the Democratic party —all *realpolitik* and no principle— which by this system received, with little expense, the support of everyone to its left.

There would seem to be a kind of natural selection that goes on in political life. A changing environment shows the incapacity of certain formerly thriving species to survive or accomplish anything under new conditions. The radical generation of the thirties and forties, whose poignant specter hovers around the above proceedings, had as one of its cardinal assumptions the notion of history as the story of progress. The hero of that story was to be the proletariat. Even with the hero present, and all the wheels of progress gyrating wholesomely around his frame, one often had to choose an attainable lesser evil over an immediately unattainable ultimate goal. Nevertheless, the hero was always visible, and the realpolitiking could always be seen in terms of his ultimate victory.

The situation described at the beginning of this article is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the older politics, with the hero, of course, missing. The attempt of the SDA radicals to

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blend high idealism and *realpolitik* was quickly frustrated. Their betrayal of the immediate issue—the right of a Communist to teach—in the name of an ultimate goal—Socialism—won them no decoration from ADA but only led to the infliction on their leaders of a persecution similar to that which they had refrained from protesting publicly in the interest of the telos.

THERE ARE MANY REASONS for the withdrawal from politics by American students in the mid-1950's. Desires to fit into the plush positions which await the compliant college man, a feeling that there is an intimate connection between radicalism of any sort and the Russian horror, the gradual disappearance of the student veterans who had transmitted a residue of both radicalism and reality to some campuses, and the sheer intimidation caused by McCarthyite inquisitors—all these were important. But beyond such pressures there was the intuitive perception of the futility of radical politics in the old sense. This sense of futility was endangering the survival of any sort of left on the campus, when in 1954 the H-bomb fallout that showered a Japanese fishing boat with deadly ash provided student radicals with a new cause: the fight against nuclear weapons.

The alienation of youth takes many forms. One of them is a withdrawal from and hostility to an adult world which offers no perspective for the development of the potentialities intuited by the adolescent. We can see this reaction among the rebellious delinquents of the street gang, as well as among the beats and their withdrawn, suspicious counterparts who may be found on any campus in the country.

For the latter the futility of the old liberal and radical politics brings little disillusionment. That the subjugation of moral and emotional instincts to reason leads to default, is no surprise to them. And the possibility of nuclear explosions—the highest achievement of scientific rationality—filling the world with poison, offers them a unique opportunity to accuse the world—the world of reason, abundance, compromise, and adjustment—of its ultimate hypocrisy.

This attitude is one of the major elements in the current student antiwar movement—if a few hopeful spurts of activity on perhaps a score of campuses can be called a movement. The enthusiasm has both good and bad sides. It indicates a reservoir of energy. It tells us that apathy is not universal on the campus, and that at least some of the juices of rebellion are being directed against society without taking the form of vulgar delinquency. In a way, it makes for a more honest political life. There are wonderfully few "apparatchniks" among the new radicals. There is little of the windy appeal to theory through which in the past simon-pure revolutionists kept themselves from radical action.

At the same time, obvious problems await the new groups, precisely because of their aversion to theory. Their education and ability to think rationally are of no use here because they tend to identify both education and rational thinking with the adult world which, in their politics at any rate, they reject. This is why the suggestion of a discussion group frequently arouses the same enthusiasm that would greet a summons to a sixth three-point course. Where, then, does one go from the stage of vehement excoriation? The problem is il-

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luminated by a friend's account of a recent protest meeting against anti-Semitism. The young leaders of the affair proposed a picket line around the German consulate. My friend interposed that perhaps the anti-Semitic outbursts might be related to the persistence in the German government of unrepentant Nazis, and the latter phenomenon to American policy toward Germany since 1945, especially to the effort to put Germans back in uniform. He then proposed that if they really wanted to protest, the logical objects would be the rearmament of Germany in particular and the arms race in general. The indignant reply was that anti-Semitism was not a political but a moral problem, and must be dealt with by moral protest.

In the anti-bomb campaign, too, a chasm frequently appears between the spheres of analysis and action, with the latter often assuming the guise of moral protest. The attempt to bridge this chasm as well as to provide an organizing center for the anti-bomb sentiment has so far been the work of the pacifists. *Speak Truth to Power,* a pamphlet which combines the notion of individual nonviolent resistance with a foreign policy program for massive economic aid to underdeveloped countries, is the best example of the ideological side of this work, and such organized campus activities as those under Robert Pickus' West Coast *Acts for Peace,* or the Student Peace Union in the midwest, guided by the AFSC, represent the organizational side.

The pacifists have always been a tiny fringe on the campus, but today, owing to the rise of the beat attitude, and of one other source of radical strength yet unmentioned, they have a considerably larger arena for their activities than previously. Thus, it is usually the committed pacifist who plays the leading role in organizing and giving form to campus anti-bomb sentiment.

However, the Protestant religious background of the pacifist movement sometimes places obstacles between itself and those groups it wants to organize. To overcome these obstacles, the pacifists sometimes work through other groups, such as SANE or *Acts for Peace.* But it is noteworthy that often the most political expression of the pacifist outlook, such as *Speak Truth to Power,* will not arouse much enthusiasm, while a pacifist-sponsored demonstration may.

FAILURE TO DISCUSS the student Communist in an article on campus radicals may once have been unpardonable. But today this species has become as rare as the whooping crane, and its occasional appearance evokes little attention except among political ornithologists. To be a Communist today requires defense of Russian intervention in Hungary, denial of Russian anti-Semitism, and loathing for Howard Fast. Very few young people can stomach this. But there are those who once did, and time moving as it does, many of their children are now in the colleges. These are often youth in search of a cause. They tend to dissociate themselves from their parents' mistakes, but try to salvage their ideals. Often they join student SANE, where, with their inherited sense of political obligation and organization, they may be the backbone of a local chapter. Like the beats, they are enamored of moral causes. A classic response of one of them, when asked why she put in

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so much time for SANE, was that she didn't want to feel responsible if she heard of someone dying of leukemia. No slogans, no programs: just a direct emotional response.

Yet is this enough? All three of the elements merging in the campus anti-bomb movement have their virtues. The beats have a desire not to conform and a passion for moral and emotional directness. The children of the disillusioned may have a little less of these, but they do have a sense of political commitment and a talent for organization. The pacifists have a great deal of conviction and a level of analysis that at least lends consistency and direction to their efforts. Yet if one steps back for a moment, the total picture remains uninspiring. Next to the nearly three and a half million college students, the few thousands involved in the new radicalism seem less than puny. And perhaps more serious, there is a certain poverty of leadership, a tendency to chew over a few simple slogans and dicta, an absence of intellectual development.

Perhaps the trouble now is that the students in the anti-bomb movement and in such groups as SANE, have failed to be sufficiently ideological—that sin of former times. Their fascination for direct unthinking response has made them rebels whose goals are so undefined and whose means are so undiscriminating that they can easily exhaust themselves in actions peripheral to their main purpose. (Example: SANE adherents have for two years been circulating petitions of their senior organization that do little more than support the government's own decision to negotiate a test ban. Gradually, the students have come to read the petitions they have so avidly circulated, and often a sense of weariness has been the result.) A solution for this part of the problem could only come from the development of a new radical theory, which could explain their social predicament in their own terms,

Restless Youth in Russia

The November 14 issue of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* describes the arrest of a group of Moscow *stilyagi* on the charge that they had speculated on the foreign currency market. The author of the article writes: "During the investigation, I talked with the accused several times. They told me that they were 'people of broad tastes and views. The cultural life of all the world interests us.' [But] there is a surprising emptiness and a shocking spiritual squalor behind these phrases. . . . The unrestrained worship of everything foreign, the indifference to politics, the bourgeois cul tof money, and . . . the failure of one's associates to interfere . . . these are the things that have brought these fellows to court."

Literatura i Zhizni (December 2, 1959) offers the following account of an incident in a southern city: "It was decided to conduct a Saint Bartholomew's Massacre against the *stilyagi*. During the evening, 'Huguenots' wearing narrow pants and modish hairstyles were grabbed and dragged off to police headquarters. These 'Huguenots' tried in vain to prove that they were not *stilyagi*, but that they simply preferred narrow pants and fancy hairdos. Their sentence was imposed on the spot—their trousers were ripped open along the seams and a bald strip was shaved down on the back of their respective heads."

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and show the place of the struggle against the arms race and the garrison state in the context of that predicament.

As it is, the student anti-war movement, without much theoretical equipment but with a fair amount of conviction, will probably continue to grow, though with something less than revolutionary speed. Should the government proceed to give atomic bombs to everyone in sight, it will grow more quickly, and if the Teller faction at any point assumes total control of U.S. atomic policy, it may even spread to some of the campuses where a radical today is someone who doesn't join a fraternity.

THE NEATNIK

Ed Murray

Whatever its deficiencies, the younger generation has not suffered from a lack of labels. The era has been called shook-up and apathetic; white-collared and black-leather-jacketed; organized and uncommitted. But in all this generation-labeling perhaps the largest and most important segment of youth has gone untagged, almost unnoticed: the segment that might be described as the neat generation.

Miltown, which tranquilizes the neat, outsells mescaline, which sensitizes the beat. Gray flannel and even old-fashioned blue serge are still more in evidence than faded blue jeans. Crew cuts outnumber beards. The pony tail is still an exception; most girls wear their hair decorously bobbed. Yet the hophead, jeanage, hirsute few enjoy the fame, while the more numerous neatniks attract less attention, not only because they are commonplace, but because they are dull.

The neatnik may be of little interest because his own interests are so slight; yet his narrowness is the key to his importance. Neatnik draws his name from his outstanding characteristic—his determination to keep all things tidy. The world about him grows increasingly complex and messy, but neatnik bends his efforts to creating the appearance of a circumspect universe.

Unhappily, he manages to bring order out of chaos chiefly by ignoring the real problems of his age. Though he interests himself superficially in many of the world's major messes, he withdraws his real concern to the microcosm of home and family. His crisp clothes and trimmed lawns are false but valuable symbols. They tell him that all is well, and from this he draws his consolations.

The women's magazines have been astute in recognizing his importance. Here the heroine of a recently published short story sums up her life:

"I live, I suppose, in the world of the squares . . . But where else can one live? Without the standards Greg [the 'hip cat' she 'dug' but didn't

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marry] so blithely ignored there could be no family life, no industry, no community, no nation. Only anarchy."

WHAT IS the neatnik really like, this backbone of industry, community, Nation? This getter of the girl?

Neatnik, son of Babbitt, bears only a faint resemblance to his father. He is better educated, more widely traveled, more sophisticated in the manners of sex and more involved with the accoutrements of culture. While Babbitt was bound to be a Republican, the neatnik career-chaser may style himself a political independent or even register as a Democrat. But this doesn't mean very much. Democratic neatniks are transforming the party of FDR into an engine of enlightened conservatism. GOP neatniks are busily rescuing the "new" Dick Nixon from the short-sighted Old Guard. And the neatnik who affiliates with no political party displays not so much independence of mind as an unwillingness to commit himself.

If Neatnik is more likely to be a regular church-goer than Babbitt was, he is also more likely to be skeptical or indifferent on questions of divinity and dogma. He regards religion more as a stepping stone to here-and-now security than as a ladder to pie in the sky.

He is no less a joiner than was Babbitt, but the motive for his joining is now less a desire to belong than a compulsion to get ahead. He is more likely to be active in the Junior Chamber of Commerce than to be kicking up his heels with the Shriners. And when he does join an organization like the Rotary, he often cares less about sociability than its value for career and suburban community.

Dull and inconspicuous himself, the neatnik often displays a fascination for unusual behavior. The coffee houses of Manhattan and San Francisco may feature beat poets, but they are sustained by neat customers who come-a-slumming on weekends.

The neatnik may even adopt some of the external features of the beat —but only up to a point. The young executive who sports a neatly trimmed beard is always dressed in white shirt, dark suit and tie and polished shoes. His co-worker, who affects open collars and suede shoes, will be sure to appear clean shaven. The neatnik knows that when only a touch is used, taboo is a perfume. He won't go overboard.

THE COLLEGE-AGE neatnik, whose lack of character is not yet fully formed, sometimes feels vague yearnings for a world where life isn't so neatly ordered. A freshman at New York's City College recently interviewed an alumnus, circa 1940, for a student publication story on undergraduate life "then and now." After listening to stories of peace strikes and protest picketing, rallies and political feuds of two decades ago, the freshman wrote, "It must have been exciting. Things are quiet today."

It was not surprising that left-wing organizations all but disappeared from American colleges during the McCarthy era, but even such middle of the road groups as Students for Democratic Action have withered under an assault of nothing more hostile than apathy.

The neatnik is conspicuously tractable in his behavior. Hadley DePuy, assistant dean of men at Cornell, reporting on a six-year study of discipline problems, concludes that today's student is "extremely" well be-

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haved, especially when discipline is administered by judiciary boards made up of fellow students.

Dr. Edward D. Eddy, provost of the University of New Hampshire, has described today's student as "primarily interested in the maintenance of the status quo—a very comfortable status quo—which makes him the sought-after darling of business and industry." Dr. Eddy attributed to the typical student an attitude he termed "*privatism*," and said, "His strong interests are centered on the material benefits he and his family may be able to enjoy."

Neatnik's stolidity, his sheer massive endurance, is one of the secrets of his power. Though more mobile than Babbitt, the neatnik does tend to settle down earlier and move less often than many of the more enlightened members of society. While journalists, educators, city planners and social workers may stir up a community from time to time, they seldom stay put long enough to see their vision of society through the tedions process of acceptance, enactment and continuance. It is the more patient neatniks who stick around and keep communities in business. They are influenced by the transitory intellectuals and reformers, but their solid burgher instincts inevitably temper reform and cool progress. This, coupled with their greater numbers, makes the neatniks the unsung molders of our age.

CONVINCED BY THE BEATNIK that salvation is merely a matter of Buddha, promiscuity and sloppy dress, the neatnik skims a magazine article on Zen, flirts with his neighbor's wife and wears stylishly scuffed tennis shoes on Saturday afternoon. Convinced by the intellectual that progress is a function of slum clearance, welfare services and improved education, the neatnik replaces two tenements with one parking lot, urges wider support of the United Fund and enlarges the school board.

The female of the neatnik species is a domestic animal. But, unlike her mother, she has thoroughly domesticated her mate. While the cut of her own clothes has been getting more masculine, she has persuaded her spouse to brighten the color of his haberdashery, cars and places of business. Meanwhile, back at the split level ranch house, she has made her own domicile more business-like. Though even less publicized than her husband, she is the power that has made his power what it is.

This then is the typical neatnik. A creature who has sold his birthright for a mess of mortgage and traded in his masculinity for a tail fin. A creature whose intellect is as firmly buttoned down as the Ivy League collars he loves to wear.

In school he pays more attention to his social "contacts" than to his studying. In business and civic affairs he is more involved with balance sheets than with balanced social benefits. At home he is more concerned with the disposal of his garbage than with the waste of his leisure. His dreams may be as narrow as his tightly knotted ties, but the well-pressed neatnik has great staying power. His creases are guaranteed to hold and in the uniformity of his vast numbers he has found strength.

The beatniks, hip to Zen Buddha and hooked on exhibitionism, may achieve nirvana and notoriety, but the neat—the neat shall inherit the earth.

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GEIST, GUISE AND GUITAR

Neil Friedman

Many students today are more interested in examples to follow than ideas to promote. They look for styles of life that will allow them the substance or illusion of personality. They search for external marks that may validate a hoped-for internal distinctiveness. It is a short-breathed desire, eager for quick and dramatic manifestation, for outbursts of resentment or ecstasy rather than long-range expectations.

And it is this situation which explains the curious popularity of beatnik styles among such students. That somewhere there are genuine beats I do not doubt, just as somewhere there may be genuine hipsters. But anyone familiar with an American campus these days knows that, most of the time, what one encounters is a mimicry of the beat style—and one, it is no surprise, that comes almost effortlessly. Despite the hostile sermonizing it has evoked, the beat style has not been shunned by the campus squares; rather, it has been embraced by them. There is a general cultural fascination with the beatnik: coffee houses are overrun with people watching people watching people; folk song albums by the Kingston Trio are at the top of the EP hit parade; churches and synagogues are holding "beatnik dances"; Hollywood has just issued "The Beat Generation"; Tommy Sands (of "Sing, Boy, Sing" fame) has recently recorded "Sinner Man"; Zen, distilled out of its cultural milieu, has become a household item, no bigger than a breadbasket; boatneck sweaters and sockless sneakers are publicly acceptable attire; "Villager" shirts are the latest bestsellers in men's fashions.

What has been happening is that all the external attire and pursuits previously associated with the avant-garde have been assimilated into our proverbial melting pot. Just as Elvis Presley's primitive gyrations have met a need in an over-civilized society, so the call for a return to kicks has attracted those in (or about to enter) the rat race. "One is Hip or One is Square" is how Norman Mailer categorized mankind in "The White Negro." But since that article's publication it has become increasingly difficult to tell which team a player is on from his uniform.

Of course, the end product of this assimilation is a very domesticated version of the beatnik. Anything really protestant in his style has been filtered out in the process of popularization. Just as Zen cannot be extricated from its milieu without a loss in its meaning, so it is with avant-garde pursuits. The resulting imitation remains a superficial one: that of beat-garbed individualists who

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seem dedicated neither to art nor to theater but to a measured effort to appear nonchalant. When a Boston impresario announces that "all folk singing is a form of social protest," he is deluding either himself or his rapidly growing audience. For to the great majority of his dungareed converts "folk music" is just an amiable way of filling in their leisure time.

Which leads us finally to a consideration of the effects this superficial acceptance has had on those who are really in revolt. There have been numerous hypotheses advanced as to why the contemporary rebellion has, instead of producing new revolutionary "isms," remained entirely vapid. The war, the threat of the bomb, our prosperity have all been blamed. I would suggest that we now have an additional factor: mass fascination has been the kiss of death.

For as more and more of their labels have been expropriated by the society at large, those who still wish to proclaim their personal rebelliousness have been pushed to further and further limits. The problem of distinguishing themselves from their look-alikes has led to a fixation upon style and a concomitant disregard for content. They have diverted their energy from the creation of ideas to the maintenance of a marginal differentiation from their square imitators. Their immorality has to become a conspicuous immorality; their dissipation must become a public ritual. Digging jazz has become a popular avocation and so the die-hard beatnik has to approach his digging as a deadly serious responsibility.

In fine, it seems that the Bohemian has become caught up in his own kind of rat race, an imitation of the Org Man's rat race which he despises so much. In turning his attention almost entirely to developing his style, he has come up with merely another manner of gaining status rather than an attack on a status-seeking society. As Paul Goodman puts it, "The style of life resulting is obsessional conformity . . . with no goal." He has become so entangled in questions of guise that he has ceased to have his own unique *geist*.

THE CASE FOR DELINQUENCY

Edouard Roditi

It is believed in New York that Puerto-Rican immigration is one of the main causes of the city's rapidly increasing juvenile delinquency. In London, a similar social phenomenon has been attributed, at various times and in various neighborhoods, to the recent immigration of relatively large numbers of West Indians, West Africans, Pakistanis, Maltese or Cypriots. In Paris, it is similarly attributed to the vast influx of North African Arabs; in most West German cities, to the influx of refugees from Eastern Germany; in Rome and Milan, to the influx of desperately

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poor, underprivileged and unskilled young people from Southern Italy.

In America, England, France, Western Germany and Italy, public opinion thus attributes increases in juvenile delinquency to a recent influx of immigrants, generally boys and young men seeking employment, of a different race or a darker complexion, which actually applies, in Italy, to Calabrians and Sicilians too, but does not apply, in Western Germany, to refugees from the East.

A CERTAIN PROPORTION of the young people who arrive as political refugees from Eastern Germany are actually petty criminals on the run or unstable and unruly young people who have simply failed to adjust themselves to the strenuous life of totalitarian Eastern Germany and been attracted to the West by the legend of its prosperity and of its easier way of life. The number of juvenile delinquents from Eastern Germany, especially in West Berlin, is quite shockingly high in many of the published statistics. But the families of refugees from the East have also been far more cruelly disrupted, first in the exodus that was caused by the Soviet invasion in 1945, then by the social upheaval and the police-measures that accompanied the collectivization of the East-German economy. These young East-German refugees have much in common with the *Besprizorni* of the post-revolutionary era in Soviet Russia; they are to a great extent the psychoneurotically maladjusted by-products of a vast social and economic upheaval. In West Berlin, many of those apprehended are still residents of East Berlin who commute to commit crimes in an economy where crime pays more.

Yet West-German public opinion, in blaming the increase of the nation's juvenile delinquency on the influx of refugees from the East, actually reflects the same kind of basic guilt-feelings as does public opinion in other nations, where this phenomenon is blamed on an influx of darker and less privileged immigrants from warmer climates. Immediately after the unconditional surrender of the defeated Third Reich, all crime was blamed, throughout Western Germany, on the Displaced Persons, former forced laborers from occupied foreign countries or former prisoners of war and concentration-camp inmates. Of course, the accumulated resentments of these victims of the Nazi regime tended to express themselves, for a while, in occasional acts of violence. But the numbers of these displaced persons were soon vastly diminished as most of them returned to their countries of origin. While juvenile delinquency failed to decrease, its prevalence could scarcely be blamed on the hard core of remaining displaced persons, many of them old people and invalids. Only then did public opinion begin to blame juvenile delinquency on the refugees from Eastern Germany.

IN SPITE OF the different circumstances of their emigration, these refugees have certain handicaps in common with the North-African immigrants to France, the West-Indians, West Africans, Pakistanis, Maltese and Cypriots in England, the Southern Italians in Northern Italy, the Puerto Ricans in New York and the Mexicans in Los Angeles. All these immigrant or refugee communities come, in general, from a less developed and under-privileged economy where they have but rarely been provided with the skills that would allow them to compete on

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equal terms in the labor-market of the land they have "invaded." Even the East-German refugees, for instance, often come from the "underdeveloped" agricultural regions of East Prussia, Pomerania or Brandenburg.

The hue and cry against these immigrants is largely an expression of guilt feelings. It shocks us to discover, in our officially prosperous economies, so much poverty and misery. We feel that we ought to have done something about it. In the case of the immigrants from colonial, semi-colonial or formerly colonial areas, like the Puerto Ricans in New York, the Arabs in France and the West Indians, West Africans and Pakistanis in England, public opinion refuses to admit that this recent influx is the direct consequence of many decades of maladministration and exploitation, as a result of which the population of these areas has been taught to expect the same opportunities as that of the metropolis but has been deprived of the skills that would assure them these opportunities.

This applies to Italy, too, where the monarchy, ever since the defeat of the Bourbons in Southern Italy and the unification of the whole peninsula, had neglected to reform the economy of the *mezzogiorno* just as irresponsibly as our own government neglected, for many decades after the Civil War, to reform that of our Southern States, or as the British government once neglected to develop the economy of Ireland. Once it is too late to eliminate the causes of such a phenomenon, it is only human to blame its consequences on the population that has borne the brunt of decades, if not centuries, of maladministration. In France, the consequences of the Arab influx have, moreover, been aggravated, in the last few years, by an epidemic of political crimes and by a veritable police-dictatorship wherever large numbers of Arabs happen to reside. In this atmosphere of civil war, juvenile delinquency, political crimes of violence, and ordinary crime overlap to such an extent that the motives of many individual crimes remain a mystery. Ordinary hold-ups, for instance, are often reported as political crimes in the Paris press.

Statistics on the actual involvement of these immigrant groups in crime and juvenile delinquency vary from one community to another, from one nation to another. Crimes of passion reported in the local North-Italian newspapers seem, to a great extent, to be committed by immigrants from the South. But it has frequently been pointed out in the less nationalistic French journals that the daily press in Paris never fails to report a crime committed by a North-African while often neglecting to mention similar crimes committed by Frenchmen from metropolitan France. Editors know the temper of public opinion and tend to pander to prejudices.

In England, the present offensive against prostitution has revealed that a surprisingly high percentage of the pimps who live off the immoral earnings of prostitutes are Maltese, Cypriot, West Indian or West African. But popular superstition attributes greater sexual potency to darker men. A West African theological student once complained to me of the aggressiveness of English women who even ridiculed him when he protested that he was a devout and clean-living Christian. Far from perverting the British, many immigrant boys may actually have been taught by British girls that they might

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make an easier living as pimps than as unskilled laborers.

In New York, the hue and cry against the Puerto Ricans has reached disgraceful proportions. The racialist campaign bears no relationship whatsoever to the responsibility of Puerto Ricans for the present increase of juvenile delinquency. Besides, is it really an increase? Are we not realizing at last that juvenile delinquency, like sex in the adage, is "here to stay"? Are we not facing, for the first time, reliable statistics on a kind of crime that had long failed to attract attention? May not our press, knowing our fears and prejudices, merely be supplying us with a more extensive coverage of juvenile delinquency, especially if the culprits happen to have Spanish names? Or might not the increase of juvenile delinquency be but the price we pay for a vastly reduced infantile and juvenile mortality? We know, from masses of such documents as Thomas de Quincey's *Confessions of an English Opium-Eater* and the travel-descriptions of Regency England written by Prince Pückler-Muskau, that juvenile prostitution and crime were rampant in all the cities of England during the decades of the Industrial Revolution. But nobody worried much about it, no statistics were kept, and most of the child-prostitutes and child-criminals died young, of disease or malnutrition or of maltreatment in prisons, workhouses and factories. The problem of integrating them as responsible citizens in a society of adults was never really raised or faced.

In our own society, statistics prove very little. Certainly, the Arabs of France, the Puerto Ricans of New York or the Maltese of London's Soho do not represent, in our midst, a criminal race. In another context, all these groups have produced valuable citizens and may still produce them in their new habitats. If offered the normal opportunities of less underprivileged communities their youth would offer fewer flagrant examples of maladjustment. Actually, cases of juvenile delinquency crop up even in our conformist suburbs. In an economy geared to sell mainly on credit, the young, who enjoy no credit facilities, are exposed to the same temptations of the advertising-industry as are the old and, unable to purchase legally what they are taught to desire, resort to the same "delinquent" devices as any other under-privileged group that has no cash and no credit. The Talmud proclaims quite rightly that it is as immoral to tempt as to fall victim to temptation. Islamic moralists affirm that the man who offers a bribe is as corrupt as the one who accepts it; in a society where the rich enjoy all the power, a righteous Moslem judge, unable to condemn the man who offered the bribe, therefore tends to let off lightly the poor culprit who accepted it. Perhaps we should similarly resign ourselves to living with juvenile delinquency as one of the necessary evils of our society and economy; to eradicate it, we would have to eradicate too many of its causes—causes that also happen to be basic elements in our civilization.

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IN PLACE OF A HERO

Michael Walzer

Young people today have no spokesmen. The day of the youth league and its ideology seems to be over. Today we have the club again, and the gang, and perhaps the family. It might even be wrong to say that the young have heroes—models of courage, skill, commitment or self-sacrifice. Bright middle-class teenagers often have a developed sensitivity to each other's problems, but are very unlikely to require heroic activity from their friends. Young people do sometimes have *successes:* short-run Horatio Algers of the entertainment industry, eighteen year old novelists, precocious females demure and impure. These are even sought out, by men who know the market. But among the young themselves, they are usually the objects of a very cynical admiration; they have "made it"—which is to say: they have been made.

Ideology, heroism, success: none of these seems sufficiently compelling. For the young today, the importance and excitement of the adult world have become somewhat problematic. On the one hand this can lead to that odd combination of indifference and professionalism which one sometimes encounters in college students. On the other hand, it produces an earnest confusion, less often critical than nostalgic, which contemplates without enthusiasm or alternatives its possible maturity.

Some sense of this confusion and of the painful sincerity that goes with it is necessary in order to understand the phenomenon of J. D. Salinger, the writer most admired and read by many young people today. In one sense, Salinger represents the indulgence of a mood; but he is also the confidant of those who indulge the mood. Affectionate and tender, he speaks to the adolescent soul with urgent but reassuring intimacy. Yet he is also full of advice. He understands the ways in which growing up is a misfortune, a process of compromise and surrender. Reconciliation, however, and not resistance is his eventual concern: he is whimsical, all right, but not absurd. His opening theme is childhood lost, his conclusion is a half-mystic, half-sentimental resignation—with an ultimate glimpse of childhood regained. Finally, he is successful, appealing and comforting because he suggests a kind of reconciliation with the adult world which is at the same time an evasion of worldliness.

It is in grateful recognition of this evasion that many young people have accepted Salinger's characters, Holden Caulfield as a brother and Seymour Glass as a private and sainted memory. Holden, it should be remembered, had his last fling at sixteen; Seymour committed suicide

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at thirty-one. The two events have the very moderate virtues of aimlessness and failure—we don't after all want moral lessons—but in their retelling, Salinger slips into sentimentality, contrived whimsy and a cagey, esoteric piety. So the academic critics, committed as they are to the surface seriousness of things, call Holden a pilgrim, and undoubtedly one of them will shortly grasp the somber truth that Seymour is a martyr and a saint.

This portentousness is Salinger's own fault—perhaps his intention—and it surely misrepresents the young; it even misrepresents Holden and Seymour. For precocious piety and innocent goodness are not yet wisdom, resourcefulness, or moral conduct; they cannot motivate martyrdom or, by themselves, make pilgrimage significant. They are qualities which remain to be tested, to be embodied and sharpened by worldly encounter. Salinger, however, turns them into the standardized equipment of a cautious, wistful rebel. When the earnest and uncertain young men identify with Holden Caulfield, they are expressing a deeply felt discontent. But it is a discontent devoid of all appetite for adult satisfaction. It seems on the one hand to lack purpose and on the other hand to be free from all anxiety about purposelessness. It lacks, above all, just that moral irascibility which was once thought the truest sign of youth. This vague rebelliousness is Salinger's material—what he both truly expresses and badly exploits. He cultivates a sense for its style, and he adds to its gentle ineptitude an engaging piety, at once sentimental and exotic. He does not, of course, suggest any actual confrontation between the discontented and the world of their discontent.

II

Salinger's characters are not heroic in part because they are members of the family. They are members, almost, of a Victorian clan—the patriarch vague or missing, the clan more of a fraternal coterie—and it is familial feeling which provides the background for the affection, honesty, and love which he seeks to describe. The gang would not do, for the gang exists in the jungle, its energy is already worldly. Salinger's family is an alternative to worldliness, a place of dependence and protection, a safe foundation for fantasy. Out in the world, Holden is a delightful and an inventive liar; he resembles at moments the characters in some recent English comic novels. Like them, he has nothing to tell the truth about. But to his ten year old sister, he can explain—at length and with *sincerity*—how he really feels. Holden, that is, has someone to tell the truth to; in this sense, at least, Salinger may well be a prophet. The English have not yet advanced so far that they can recognize the family as a retreat.

But Holden explains himself also to us—the painful readers—and it is to us that Buddy Glass addresses his tense and emotional reminiscence. "If you really want to hear about it . . . What I mean . . . If you want to know the truth . . . " Salinger's artfulness is best revealed in his ability to reconstruct the circumstances and sentiments of teenage revelation: sit down a minute, I want to tell you everything.

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He tirelessly reads us his family mail, prints fragments from the diaries of the dead Seymour, relates the unassorted jottings of his brothers and sisters. He gathers his stories through a presumably random (but he assures us, total) recall, and pays a public price for the remembering. He drags us into his living room for "home movies"—I think of Salinger as the only modern writer with a living room—and there we sit, silent members. He is insistently intimate, urgently garrulous, wordily familiar. For Salinger this familiarity has a moral (as well as a literary) motive, and that motive is affection. He seeks to draw us into the clan, to bind us by the somewhat tendentious (not to say, onesided) heatedness of his intimate, utterly candid communications. There is not a drop of cold blood in his veins.

Outside the family "people never believe you," as Holden says. He means adults and he is right enough; adults are suspicious, and children, if they have a native honesty, have also a native gullibility. Salinger is incapable even of suggesting the virtues of the wary, artful adult. In the past Americans discovered a kind of heroism in the tight-lipped, middle-aged man who combined reticence, competence and secret goodness. He was a "tough guy," and his toughness paid awkward tribute to experience; one was not born resourceful and independent. But today, Salinger seems to say, the only contrast to the innocence and fervor of the child is the affectation, the cruel conventionality, the phoniness of the adult world. The adult is not "real;" he lives amidst sham.

But not sham at all: that is what one would like, for it is at least the proper opposite of innocence and sincerity. If children are candid, then let adults be hypocrites and the war of generations rage. But neither Holden's complaint, nor that of Franny Glass, is about hypocrisy; they are not really concerned with the lie, nor with actual cruelty. It requires something like moral firmness to resent hypocrisy, and though Holden has, as do all of Salinger's children and, I would guess, many of his readers, a natural sense of the sweet and the good, Holden is no moralist. His true concern is with foible, affectation, minor pomposity, casual carelessness—all of which combine to make this a jungle of fallible (but not ferocious) animals. The jungle itself, however, is no part of Holden's experience. Nor of Franny's; and when her brother tells her that every fat woman is Jesus Christ (and hence not to be resented), it is a counsel of imperfection which bears little relationship to the real imperfections of the world. Love, he tells her, can transcend foible and fatness alike: *it certainly had better.*

So the professor who goes into the men's room to muss up his hair before class is after all no villain. Nor is the Ivy Leaguer in the theater lobby who "said the play *itself* was no masterpiece, but that the Lunts, of course, were absolute angels." With them, one can make emotional peace. But surely the hypocrite and the moralist have another difficulty, and a fairly simple one: they are permanently at odds, irreconcilable. This occurs to none of Salinger's characters, and for that reason I don't believe it is fair to say that they are simply unspoiled; I think they are untouched.

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At the same time as the child approaches the adult world, he escapes into fantasy. Holden's fantasies are relatively modest, though they bear a close relationship to the religious aspirations of Salinger's later characters: Holden dreams of being a "catcher in the rye," the defender of children at play, or a gas station attendent in the west, deaf, dumb and solitary. Now these are obviously not alternatives to his inevitable fate; his older brother, a writer, is already "out in Hollywood . . . being a prostitute." Still, if fantasies were alternatives, they would not be fantasies. It would surely be foolish to wish that Holden dream instead of a better social order, or of revolutionary heroism. His own dreams are attractive enough: childlike, comfortless, intransigent. What is disturbing, however, is that his dreams do not lead him to any kind of adventure, not to anything at all but casual encounter and sensitive recoil. As Seymour's mother-in-law says, he doesn't relate. Salinger's characters can't like or even know anyone they don't love—*who isn't in the family, for chrissake.*

If this is really true, then why doesn't Holden set out for that gas station in the west? He might be a beat traveller. That, I suppose, is the real alternative and it is not especially interesting. Holden, instead, goes home to his ten year old sister; he doesn't want adventure, any more than do most of Salinger's readers; he wants affection. He will become an adult gently, carrying with him in the phoney world only a single moral image, the image of childlike simplicity.

One of Salinger's most enthusiastic critics, Arthur Mizener, with a revealing inability to imitate that simplicity, has suggested that the writer's search is for the Good American. I'm inclined to agree, despite the capital letters. The concept is worth examining. The Good American wears short pants, preferably; he's not too tough ("I'm a pacifist, if you want to know the truth"); he's a little precocious and entirely inexperienced and he goes under as soon as he encounters America. "I mean it's very hard to meditate and live a spiritual life in America." A rebel in a world he scarcely saw.

III

Since Holden's last fling, Salinger has written almost entirely of the Glass family, a clan of seven precocious children, of Irish-Jewish stock and distinctly Buddhist tendencies. The main theme of these stories has been love. Love is the bond which holds the seven children together—and love, along with a touch of friendly condescension, is what binds them even to their parents. The family here is a mythical gang, truly fraternal, truly affectionate; it is as if, remembering Holden's loneliness, Salinger is determined never again to permit one of his characters to be alone.

The precocity of Salinger's children takes many forms: they learn foreign languages with amazing ease and write poetry in Japanese. But the most important form is an extraordinary religious and mystical insight. I think it fair to say that love for Salinger is either familial or Christlike; it is the love of brothers and sisters—or of brethren. The

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last of these is obviously the more difficult, and Salinger sensibly recommends but does not describe it. He writes of erotic love not at all, and it is worth at least entertaining the idea—though it contradicts many of the operative assumptions of our culture—that his young readers are really not interested in it, that they are entirely satisfied with the love of Holden and his sister or of Zooey and Franny.

Marriage in Salinger's stories is a sorry affair; it takes place only after childlike love is finished or surrendered. Seymour marries in what seems to have been a burst of purely private ecstasy and mystic condescension. He needed, he thought, the "undiscriminating mind" of his wife; she would represent and embody his commitment to the ordinary. His wife Muriel married out of "a primordial urge to play house permanently." Seymour's suicide, in one sense at least, was an escape from a woman he had neglected to meet. Towards her Salinger is pitiless, even (or especially) when he is being kind, and yet, except for Sister, Muriel is his only woman. Poor thing, she has neither mystery nor wisdom; neither innocence nor whimsy. She is at home in the world, the phoney world, and therefore no part of Salinger's fervent household.

But reconciliation with the ordinary world there must be, else Salinger's affection would have curdled long before now, and his readers, who can have little taste for bitterness, moved on. Seymour's marriage was an apparently unsuccessful rehearsal for this reconciliation. But his suicide was less a confession of failure than a whimsical withdrawal from the commitment. His brothers and sisters continue the effort to invest the conventional world with a spiritual value they know to be peculiarly their own. If only they can believe it, the fat woman *is* Jesus Christ—though it is not, after all, necessary to marry her. Commitment can happily take less physical forms (and withdrawal less drastic ones); characteristically, these forms are occupational. Zooey Glass becomes a television actor; Buddy Glass, Salinger's favorite narrator and the writer of the family, teaches English at a small, upstate New York girls' college. His withdrawal is signified by his unelectrified, unwinterized cottage, on the other side of the mountain. At the very end of Salinger's last story, Buddy describes, in an amazingly pretentious paragraph, the true nature of reconciliation:

> I have an impulse . . . to say something mildly caustic about the twenty-four young ladies, just back from big weekends at Cambridge or Hanover or New Haven, who will be waiting for me in Room 307, but I can't finish writing a description of Seymour . . . without being conscious of the good, the real. This is too grand to be said (so I'm just the man to say it), but I can't be my brother's brother for nothing, and I know—not always, but I *know*—there is no single thing I do that is more important than going into that awful Room 307. There isn't one girl in there, including the terrible Miss Zabel, who is not as much my sister as Boo-Boo or Franny. They may shine with the misinformation of the ages, but they shine. This thought manages to stun me: There's no place I'd really rather go right now than into Room 307. Seymour once said that all we do our whole lives is go from one little piece of Holy Ground to the next. Is he *never* wrong?

Yes, he is wrong. There is a great deal of ground that is not holy,

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acres of it—if you will just look. What is most objectionable in the passage above is its terrible inclusiveness. I don't doubt that every good teacher, when he goes into Room 307, must—sometimes—feel something of what Salinger has described; but if he begins to imagine that every girl in class is his sister I can only suggest resistance. But Salinger is wholehearted; Room 307 undoubtedly represents the whole world; it must be indiscriminately "awful" and indiscriminately "holy." In a similar way, Buddy is terribly superior and infinitely condescending, and his embrace must be all the more total for the emotional distance from which it is undertaken.

Love at a distance, whimsical appreciation ("the terrible Miss Zabel"), manages to combine commitment and withdrawal; I would guess that it makes both marriage and suicide unnecessary. But what does it do to the quality of love? In Salinger's stories love, familial and Christlike together, is primarily the habit and the wisdom of precocious children. It is almost inevitably, given Salinger's style and his subject matter, a bit precious. It is also indiscriminate and uninvolved. "They don't seem able to love us," Teddy says of his parents, "unless they can keep changing us a little bit." He loves them, on the other hand, with no such demands. Preciousness is even more revealing. As a small boy, Buddy glows to tell us, Seymour refused to go to the barbershop when he thought his neck was dirty, for fear of hurting the barber's feelings. Holden is a little bit in love with "old Jane" because when they play checkers she won't move her kings out of the back row.

Love is also made a matter of mystic feeling and insight, but of this I will offer no examples. Salinger has announced that he is holding oriental cards—in footnotes and occasional esoteric references he has specified, presumably for the learned, which cards those are—but he has not yet played his hand. Holding exotic cards is something like refusing to move one's kings from the back row. It's a testimony to one's unusual self, but it has little to do with other people.

IV

Whimsy and religion are Salinger's ploys. He does not mean them to indicate willfulness, that is too harsh, nor mere childishness, that is too unimportant; nor morality, that is too difficult, and not pure contemplation, that would be farfetched. He means them to indicate *superiority*. Whimsy is the caprice of the precocious; religion, their secret insight. For such people does Salinger write: gentle, unconventional people, who find themselves behaving exactly like everyone else, but who know that they are different, if only because they remember that once they were young. But is that really such a precious or exclusive memory? Perhaps it is, and perhaps that moment of uncertainty before a young man surrenders himself to higher education and total organization is as important as Salinger's prose suggests. But I doubt that the moment is adequately represented by whimsy, or that it can survive in reminiscence, or be resurrected in esoteric piety.

The numerous silent members of the Glass family, Salinger's ardent

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readers, share a kind of emotional superiority, which, one must admit, has little that is worldly in it. They pursue their careers with a sense of grace, that is, with an assurance of style. They are reckless, but only in imagination; after all, they were rebels once. They are painfully sincere, which is to say, loquacious; and—their truest mark—they are whimsically discontented, that is, they complain only about unimportant things.

Membership in this fervent household, however, is for the good alone. And here I think Salinger and his admirers must be taken seriously. Goodness for many of us has always implied activity, vigor, commitment. Good men—let me put it strongly—are energizing centers of ethical action. This is simply not so for Salinger, and presumably it is not so for most of his readers. Goodness for them seems rather a matter of personal style and impulse; its quality is unpretentious, naive (indeed, willfully so), sincere, whimsical. It imitates the child because he presumably has these qualities naturally and indulges them freely; he represents the absence of convention and corruption. That is not, of course, because he is incorruptible. But what is for him a merely temporary condition can easily become a permanent posture. The posture is not entirely incompatible with world activity, but questions of ambition, work and conflict are evaded; the engaging precocity of the *wunderkind* makes them all seem irrelevent.

Salinger's idea of goodness is another version of disaffiliation, but it is the happiest version, and the easiest, because it makes disaffiliation a secret. Who, indeed, would guess that S. never moves his kings out of the back row? So far as society is concerned, the earnest, uncertain young man goes underground. But not to cultivate the resources of the rebel, not to test his capacity for silence or for patience. The underground is his irregular home, a unique realm of security and affection, sharply contrasted with the worlds of Hollywood, advertising, the organization. Up above, the young man may lie, it is a bit of whimsy; he may prove querulous, it is an indulgence; he may be a success, it doesn't matter; but he will not be active, involved, driving, lustful. He is the first among the disaffiliated to give up cult of experience, and therefore he is permanently untried. But for his readers, perhaps, that is Salinger's greatest appeal. I said above that he is seemingly incapable of cold-bloodedness; surely his readers understand this and appreciate it. Their lack of ambition is also an absence of taste for danger, even for the simple dangers of everyday human encounter. But what will their love come to, and what their goodness, if they do not calculate and take risks?

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TOWARD TOTAL DISARMAMENT

Norman Thomas

According to UN statistics, the nations of the world are spending about $90 billion annually in preparation for the kind of thermonuclear war which would destroy civilization and perhaps mankind—this in a world where 70 per cent of its people live on the border line between hunger and starvation. The logical reaction to these facts should be universal and controlled disarmament. We ought not to trust ourselves with such dangerous and costly toys. On the most optimistic estimate there can be no victors in the old fashioned sense in any large thermonuclear war.

This logic of universal disarmament has made some progress in the desire of men and of nations. It has been supported categorically in statements by President Eisenhower of the U.S., and Dictator Khrushchev of the USSR. Nevertheless in what may be called politically sophisticated circles, there is little or no hope of disarmament. Oskar Morgenstern who has written what seems to me the ablest single book on *The Question of National Defense* (in military terms) is sorrowfully sure that our protection must lie in the possession by both sides of "invulnerability of retaliatory power." At the end of his argument that such power must rest primarily on "an oceanic system" in which submarines will be the principal bases for the use of missiles of the Polaris type, he concludes that "the probability of thermonuclear war's occurring appear to be significantly larger than the probability of its not occurring." He dismisses without extensive discussion any possibility of effective disarmament.

Former president James Conant of Harvard in a recent address made a plea that we awake to the realization that our only hope of safety lay in much greater military expenditure to the end that the Russians might know that if they could destroy half of our "complexes" in one attack we could in retaliation destroy three-quarters of theirs.

While most Americans insist that they renounce any advocacy of preventive war, one can hear talk of such war under its new name, "preemptive", if circumstances arise in which we believe that we might prevent a probable attack by attacking first. There is a grim logic in this position.

The greater probability, however, most writers agree, is that a small war or a limited war, which, they argue, we must be ready to fight, will grow into a major thermonuclear conflict, or that war may come by accident or design, the work of more or less anonymous military officers in possession of thermonuclear weapons. The number of men capable by mistake of precipitating the worst kind of war will inevitably grow as more and more

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nations acquire thermonuclear weapons.

This multilateral disarmament, though dismissed by so many of our savants, seems to me to offer our only hope in this world of risks where "an optimist is a man who believes that the future is uncertain." Infinitely the lesser risks lie in persuading mankind that our own collective achievements compel us to find an alternative to the institution of war which men immemorially have so hated and yet so cherished.

LET US LOOK BRIEFLY at the obstacles in the way of disarmament which make so many good men dismiss it as impossible. To begin with there is a traditional acceptance of war, an acceptance which goes deep into the consciousness and subconsciousness of us all. For millennia of time war has been a final arbiter of disputes. Along with suffering and woe—even to victors—it has brought glory, profit, and power. It has been an inspiration of literature and art. (History has always been written by survivors.)

To this fact must be added the even more serious fact that the moral code which men have painfully evolved for their personal relations does not apply between absolute sovereign nations which can and do sanctify whatsoever seems necessary for their power. It is not God but the sovereign national state which says to men "Thou shalt have no other gods before me." What beginnings we have made of supranational organization are relatively weak. There is as yet no sufficient power in the UN effectively to substitute law for war.

This general lack of confidence which characterizes the mutual relations of sovereign national states is heightened by the profound distrust between the principal adversaries in the cold war. Morgenstern, to be sure, finds no real difference of principle to account for the existing cold war, despite the fact that "each side has an ideological structure of phrases which have different meaning even to people on the same side." Essentially we face a power conflict. (I would give greater weight than he does to the evil Communist record and its extreme exaltation of the doctrine that the end justifies the means.) In this power conflict, given the present state of our technology, the establishment of adequate fool-proof controls by inspection is impossible. The establishment of *adequate* controls is difficult, but given an increase of power of supranational authority and a widely diffused love of peace, by no means impossible.

To these basic considerations must be added the usual observation, only partly true, that armaments are not a cause of wars and conflicts but rather the consequence of them. (This statement ignores such facts as Lord Grey's statement that the naval rivalry between Great Britain and Germany was a principal cause of World War I. On this continent the disarmed border between Canada and the U.S. helped to keep the peace even in times of tension. The disputes which may cause war unquestionably would admit of easier settlement in the general framework of disarmament.)

STILL, THE CASE against disarmament is not lightly to be dismissed. But in man's long and painful evolution he has had to learn to do what he had never done before in order to survive. It is a pretty hopeless view of humanity which believes that we cannot

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escape destruction by our own scientific achievements. The problem is to present the issue effectively enough and to that end make use of whatever years the so-called "shield of deterrence" or "balance of terror" may give us. It is absolutely certain that in a world of accident and passion that precarious shield will not protect us forever. Men get what they prepare for—however glibly the makers of the Atlas missile may proclaim "we shall have failed if this weapon ever has to be used."

It is of course necessary that disarmament be under a strengthened UN made capable of substituting law for war along such lines as Messrs. Clark and Sohn have persuasively laid down in their very important book, *World Peace Through World Law*. As I have often said, if some greater Savonarola should by his eloquence persuade all nations to throw down their arms as the passionate monk persuaded the Florentines to renounce their luxuries and vices, the nations, like the Florentines, would pick them up again unless in the meantime they had provided themselves with the alternatives that a properly constituted federation would afford them.

Multilateral disarmament must be total. Partial disarmament, except as it is a stage to a recognized goal, will invite defeat. All that should be left is police power within nations to preserve order, and police power for the UN to deal with brushfire wars. To this universal disarmament down to a police level under a strengthened UN must be added a progressive disengagement from the alliances and commitments that invite conflict, and a cooperative attack on the desperate poverty of so much of mankind. The lifeline to peace must be braided of four strands: disarmament, the strengthening of the UN, progressive disengagement, and a planned use of a large part of what is saved on arms for the conquest of poverty.

IN THIS SHORT ARTICLE, however, I am discussing what is the principal strand in most minds, and that is disarmament. This is not to be dismissed by the blanket statement that "you cannot trust Russia." In point of fact disarmament is necessary precisely because we can no more trust armed nations to keep peace than armed individuals in domestic society. We are not seeking in the beginning the kind of trust that exists between sworn friends but rather a common recognition of the necessity of disarmament if we are to continue any decent existence on this earth. I think Khrushchev is as serious in proposing disarmament for the sake of existence as are many men high in our own government. He is very confident of what he can win by economic competition, and his Russia cries out for manpower for the production of consumer goods while we worry what would happen to employment if disarmament should come suddenly. The question to raise with Khrushchev—and to an almost equal degree with many of our own military men and congressmen—is the effectiveness of the control that they will accept. It is at that point of control that men —especially those who wish to rationalize their own material interests in keeping up the arms race —will be able deliberately or instinctively to sabotage negotiations. They will systematically exalt the lesser risks over the enormously greater.

This is fairly evident in the current negotiations at Geneva concerning the ending of nuclear tests. Their suc-

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cess is admittedly vital in terms of the world's health, the beginning of inspection, and in checking the rush of other nations to join the nuclear club. There can be no fool proof inspection. The question is one of balance of risks, and the risks of no agreement are enormous. The failure to make any progress in what men have come to consider the first stage in disarmament would be practically and psychologically disastrous. It would mean an increase in health hazards, a rush of other nations to acquire nuclear weapons, and a dangerous frustration of men's hopes. Success—even qualified success—in agreement on ending the tests would be very valuable, but only as a first step in a rapid and orderly progress to universal disarmament under a strengthened UN.

For this progress not all the signs are bad. The USSR has consented to renew the general talks in a ten-nations committee of the UN. It has not tried to annex the moon or to launch military satellites—lines of action urged on us by many of our military brass. It has agreed to keep the arms race out of the Antarctica. Khrushchev at least temporarily is holding back his fellow Communists in the Far and Middle East. He is reducing the size of his armies. He wants the summit conference or conferences.

So DOES EISENHOWER, and so I think do the American people, although their thinking is likely to be confused rather than helped by the nature of our political campaign, and their voice muted in the clamor of politicians more concerned to belabor each other and to get out the maximum vote than to speak clearly on issues. We shall hear large generalities rather than our specific proposals for a sounder foreign policy. Fundamental to such a foreign policy is American advocacy of the achievement of controlled universal disarmament through progressive stages. This our nation must work for with a combination of devotion, energy, imagination and a grasp of realities of the thermonuclear age far greater than anything heretofore displayed by our government or either of our big parties.

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PARADOXES OF FOREIGN AID

Henry M. Pachter

When the Roman Empire had grown old and tired it began to rely, for the defense of its ramparts, less and less on the prowess of its citizens; instead, it paid *subsidia* to its minor allies, and even *tributum* to some petty kings for staying neutral. This wise arrangement helped preserve the *Pax Romana* for several centuries. Nevertheless, it drew noises, substantially similar to Messrs. Bricker's and Talmadge's, from some senators who—happily—were not in a position, then, to disturb the Emperor's political decisions.

A modern Secretary of State is less fortunate than his ancient predecessor. To justify a policy which simply happens to be intelligent and appropriate, he must prove that it also is virtuous. The idea of foreign aid first was sold to the American voters, following World War II, not on its own merits but on two secondary grounds: it was philanthropic and it was supposed to keep the Communists at bay. Vice-versa, it was attacked for the opposite reasons, as a tool of wicked imperialists and as the fancy of starry-eyed globalists. Defenders of foreign aid, paradoxically, answered the charge of "imperialism" by pointing to the good they were doing to the needy abroad, and the charge of "idealism" by pointing to the good they were doing this country; to counter one type of argument, they espoused the other.

Further confusing the issue, a widely-held sentiment welcomes foreign aid as an opportunity to expiate the sins of imperialism.[1] But if this redemptive offering is supposed to placate the ire of colonial rebellion, alas it only kindles resentment; since to a pre-capitalist mind misery is the fault of misers, the sacrifice is not even accepted as *bona fide*. Palestinian refugees set fire to a UNRRA ambulance which came to fight epidemics in their camp; they hold responsible for their plight those who pay for their meagre rations. During the famine of 1953, American wheat was sent to India; but instead of gratitude the U.S. Senate only earned reproaches for holding a hearing about the need for relief—and also because Indian forwarding firms were not allowed to share in the shipping profits. When "Atoms-for-Peace" was offered with a control device against military use of the donated materials, Krishna Menon cried "collective imperialism." The Marshall Plan was discounted as a clever device to dispose of surpluses; other forms of aid are suspected of hidden strings which might encumber the "sovereignty" of the beneficiaries.

Small nations are tied by government grants and loans no less than by old-fashioned colonialism or financial penetration. Aid is offered not to the worthy poor but rather to those among the weak who are sufficiently strong to warrant appeasement or who promise to be desirable allies. Yet this tech-

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nique need not shock us, provided it is used honestly, without hypocritical claims of humanitarianism. There is nothing wrong with helping one's friends and nothing immoral in withholding help from one's enemies. No Secretary of State need pretend that he negotiates from positions of kindness. Brushing aside all sentimentalism, therefore, the Randall Report[2] frankly built its case for foreign aid on the premise that no underdeveloped nation has a "claim" to be helped. More and more, foreign aid comes to be regarded as a measure of economic self-protection, the way slum-clearing increases real estate values and decreases health hazards.

Somehow related to the idea that the poor might be bought off by charity is the theory, likewise undeservedly widespread, that underdeveloped nations will not go Communist if properly bribed. Admittedly, this technique has become extremely difficult to use in recent years. Once it was sufficient to hire a few key men or, at worst, a small ruling minority in backward countries. We cannot do so any longer while pretending to sell them democracy in the same package. It is necessary also to "raise living standards" for the broad masses. Aside from being rather expensive, this idea contradicts every historical experience. Populations suddenly torn loose from their tribal moorings and exposed to the vicissitudes of "modernization" will turn radical more easily when demagogues promise them to loot the rich—preferably those abroad —and they would rather be poor and proud than dependent.

But the living standards rise rather slowly. Much of the "aid" we proudly offer for the noble purpose of lifting people out of poverty fails to percolate to the level where it would do most good. The distribution cost of gifts is almost prohibitively high in those latitudes where any influx of free dollars first increases the demand for Cadillacs and refrigerators, thus returning to the United States the dollars that had been sent to plug the hole in the foreign exchange reserve.[3] Anyway, this operation, though in a left-handed way, keeps the friendship of the classes that matter in foreign affairs. It remains for the political analyst to tell the U.S. Government how long those classes can stay in power or can be shored up through such devices.

In Iraq, e.g., we failed to shift our support to other classes in time. These "progressives" usually can be satisfied at considerably lower expense, through political slogans, the delivery of modern weapons and other toys which flatter their ego rather than their stomach. The Russians, who like to get their allies cheap, prefer this kind of foreign aid, but by no means do they own a monopoly on it.

II

In the cold-war competition of subsidies to underdeveloped countries, the Russians clearly have the operational advantage of long-range planning, flexibility and quick decisions. Congress consistently refuses to give the President authority to commit the United States for more than a year; our aid, consequently, consists of half measures and often fails either to meet the more fundamental needs of the beneficiaries or to enlist their enthusiasm and imagination. Soviet aid remains quantitatively far behind U.S. contributions, but it is concentrated on areas where it does the greatest good to both the

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Soviet Union and the beneficiary country. Also, instead of free grants the Soviet Union gives repayable loans which usually bind the beneficiary economy far more than any U.S. strings; but the projects it sponsors in this way show that it has a better understanding of the mentality and requirements of the new countries.

Even so, the U.S. foreign aid effort has been considerable and remains remarkable even after the criticism we shall apply to its statistics. Since the war's end, U.S. grants and credits to foreign countries have averaged 5 billion dollars a year, or roughly 1.5% of the gross national product, 10% of the federal budget, and 20-35% of the total U.S. exports, providing jobs for approximately half a million Americans.[4] Nearly ten billion dollars' worth of surplus goods have been disposed through various aid programs, some of them of a military nature. One half of the total—35 billion dollars—consisted in outright grants for non-military purposes or was subsequently converted into non-repayable aid. Grants for military purposes accounted for nearly one-third of the total, but their share increased after Korea; both the 1960 and 1961 budgets call for around 2 billion military assistance and an equal amount for other credits.

The over-all statistics do not distinguish sufficiently between genuine foreign aid, subsidies to the ruling caste, and military support. Many distinctions that are being made are purely administrative or for the convenience of Congress, which finds it easier to vote for projects labeled "defense" or "defense support." Financing a railroad in Thailand may be difficult, but in Turkey it can be justified as "defense support" of NATO. Moreover, some of the hardware and foodstuffs that have been delivered were surplus, and the prices at which they have been "sold" are arbitrary. This may account for the increase of economic as against military aid in the latest Eisenhower budget. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the economics of foreign aid present bookkeeping problems which invite fraudulent entries on both sides of the ledger.

Capitalistic notions of sound banking practice also create unnecessary confusion over the nature of foreign aid. We plan an operation which is meant to be a loss or a gift—and then we try to save the appearance of an ordinary business transaction by slapping 6% interest on the debt which we know will not be repayed. In Argentina, dogmatic strings of orthodox austerity have guided the post-Peron government to the edge of political disaster—but the budget is balanced. If our billion dollar investment in Frondizi should be lost, at least we lost it in applying sound principles.

The Asswan Dam project offers as good an example as some of the lesser failures of Western aid policies. It clearly was not a business proposition to begin with. Its impressive dimensions would have put extreme strain on economies many times stronger than the combined forces of Egypt and the Sudan; construction works of this order can be undertaken only under Pharaonic conditions or with the credit system of a modern, fairly advanced industrial society. Moreover, pumping a billion dollars into an otherwise poorly supplied economy must create inflation; maybe that would suit the Russians, but the World Bank certainly was right in warning that the project was not sound

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in terms of capitalistic accountability. Though technically feasible and demographically desirable, it requires thorough economic planning in many fields far away from the construction site. Even if, business-wise, it had been possible to raise a hundred million dollars yearly for ten years for the purpose, and if, politically, it had been possible to guarantee a sustained effort until completion, the Egyptian Government could not have promised in good faith that it would maintain the political and economic balance the Dam was supposed to stabilize. The repercussions of large-scale investments amount to social and economic upheaval and therefore are not an unmixed blessing to the forces they are designed to shore up politically for a time.

The Soviet Government gives preference to such big undertakings, like the Bhilai Steel Mills in India and the Asswan Dam, for their spectacular propaganda value. Since its military, economic and publicity budgets come out of one pocket, it can afford to subsidize projects that capitalistic accountability does not justify. Nor need it fear Nasser's inability to pay or to maintain himself in power. Even so, it took the Kremlin three years to decide that such a propaganda victory over the West was worth immobilizing that much capital in one spot; and that decision could not be made before the propagandist, Khrushchev, had firmly asserted his power against the Pervukhins and other opposite numbers of Eugene Black.

Despite their propaganda-directed, low interest rate of 2%, Russian loans usually are more "imperialistic" than Western aid terms. They bind the export trade of the debtor to their own empire-planning. They supply technicians and know-how, but they give few grants. They do not, as the American Government does, subsidize the export prices of underdeveloped countries. The United States usually pays in dollars and agrees to receive "soft" currency in return. This can either be spent locally by the American Government, or it is released later for the use of the recipient government; in this way, billions in so-called counterpart funds have been converted into grants. A plan promulgated by the Italian Government would convert all Marshall Aid returns into a development fund for Asia and Africa. The new subsidiaries of the World Bank, the billion-dollar International Development Association, and the Inter-American Development Bank are specially designed to lend money to countries which in all likelihood will continue to have transfer difficulties for a considerable time.

Asia, Africa and Latin America now are receiving a larger share of the Russian as well as the American and international aid program.[5] Moreover, whereas the original defense support aid was mostly spent in hotly contested areas, such as Korea, Vietnam, Greece, Turkey and Formosa, the stream of grants and loans now is more likely to fertilize projects worth while in their own right.

III

From baksheesh we should clearly distinguish international solidarity. At United Nations headquarters, the need to channel capital and know-how from the advanced to the underdeveloped countries is conceived as simple economic logic. Uncoordinated growth causes more frictions as new

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countries assert their interest in the world markets. The unequal pace of development daily widens the gap between the most industrialized and the backward countries; instead of catching up, the latecomers either fall behind or must take measures which are as odious as they are heroic. For the sake of international order, or even for a little orderliness in the application of modern technology, we must understand international aid as a necessity rather than an exercise in morality or an interest of donors and recipients.

We therefore define international aid as the organized flow of capital, know-how and skilled labor from the more to the less developed areas, compensating the discrepancies of production and consumption levels, and balancing the international money exchanges. It should be understood as a concerted effort to achieve *collective economic security*. We have accepted social security at home; in international politics we are aware of repeated attempts to organize a system of collective security; taking both together we form the *conception of an orderly world economy* providing security and opportunity for all nations.[6]

Starting out from these premises, we distinguish three kinds of international aid according to purpose, two kinds according to sources, and three kinds according to manner. International aid may be:

a) emergency aid, such as meeting a famine;

b) specific aid to promote or accelerate certain projects in one country;

c) general planning for area development or for the balancing of international exchanges.

It also may be either governmental or non-governmental. And finally, it may be either bi-lateral, or multi-lateral as in the Colombo Plan, or international as in United Nations.

A specific bilateral grant between governments is considered the least desirable; it tends to make the recipient government into a debtor of the donor country, and it may subordinate development needs to other considerations.

The most desirable aid, on the other hand, is one given by an international agency for the purpose of long range development, in an area short of capital but rich in undeveloped resources. In such areas private capital often could be obtained for profitable investment if river regulation, roads, power and a communications system could be provided with the help of public funds. These facilities are called the infra-structure of an economy. The thickly settled, commercial nations emerged into the industrial age with governments willing and able to supply these services; in underdeveloped countries, where normally the home market is weak, amortization of such projects would be too slow unless they were related to defense. Three strategic observations were suggested to this point by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold:

1) A comparatively small amount of aid, judiciously applied to the infra-structure, may attract a large amount of development capital from private sources.

2) The massive investment in infra-structure and basic industries may create the home market for other industries.

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3) An international agency may select projects different from those which could be financed by bilateral agreements and hence may turn the development of a country's resources away from the defense-economic desires of an alliance, to projects more germane to the real needs of the population.

Most of the foreign grants in the immediate postwar period were of the nature of emergency aid. The U.N. Rescue and Relief Administration, the U.N. Children's Emergency Fund, private overseas donations and organized philanthropies, loans or grant of grain and seeds to famished nations were shining examples of international solidarity almost unique in history. The United States which—privately or through its government—contributed more than 80% to these funds has earned less credit for its generosity than it deserved. But important as this aid was for its recipients, and pure as it may have been in its intentions, it only differed in scope from other philanthropies. The first radically new departure was the Marshall Plan with its emphasis on the channeling of capital supplies and its requirement of organization and integration for the recipients. On the other hand it was "tainted" with a political motive—to prevent revolution in the Western Europe and to assert American leadership in the free world market. The projects which followed after 1948 had less and less the character of emergency measures, but the planning features of the Marshall Plan also disappeared and the political motives became more and more distinct, until eventually we have engaged in a foreign gift competition with the Soviet Union. In this process prestige projects of limited development value tend to gain preference over area planning.

IV

Liberals who would like to show their international solidarity and simultaneously serve their own country are prone to advocate a policy of "massive aid." Competing with Russian examples, they often think "the bigger the aid the better." Their eagerness to give away some show-case projects has opened an enormous *potlatch:* threatening to accept the same gift from the opponents, some dictators got themselves some monumental white elephants—a modern hospital with no doctors to run it; a steel mill where there is no iron, no coal and no market; an auto highway leading to tribes addicted to camel riding; irrigation dams where the soil was too salty for any vegetation to grow; armor for an army which could not use it, etc.[7] In their eagerness to be helpful, happy cold-warriors have foisted on their unhappy grantees projects which might have made sense under a different latitude and longitude, but were obnoxious to the people whom they were supposed to win over. On the other hand, they have given some countries prestige toys which they knew to be economically unsound.[8]

Ironical is the complete reversal of all former theories of imperialism. The wicked alien conquerors came neither to sell their surplus merchandise nor to acquire sources of raw material or frontiers for capital investment. They came begging humbly that the underdeveloped countries should be so good as to accept the gift of tractors, steel mills, irrigation dams, technical advice (first rate and truly disinterested at that!), tanks, schools, submarines.

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For "imperialism" is not motivated by the desire for profit; its mainspring is the power conflict which feeds on itself.

In the latest development of this competition, we have untied all "strings" that used to be attached to such gifts. Long ago, of course, we abandoned the requirement that the grantee should be a paragon of democracy. Gradually we renounced the condition that he should be on our side, and we do not even insist on strict neutrality any more. In the recent Polish deals we granted aid to a country under Russian domination and tied to the Soviet Union by solemn bonds of common interest and common fears. We did so for frankly self-serving political reasons, but if this be either imperialism or crusade against "Communism," we have to revise the terms in our *Politgrammata*. The mighty no longer dare offend the meek; the strong can be exploited by the weak.[9]

A third feature of this "new imperialism by gift" does not fit the classical Leninist pattern. Private capital used to go overseas in search of markets and investments opportunities, sometimes preceded by the missionary, but invariably followed by the marines. The governments and national pride eventually became involved in a conflict of policy where originally there had been nothing but an innocent hunt for dollars. This was called dollar diplomacy, diplomacy subservient to "the interests." Nowadays, on the contrary, the government is begging the corporations to please invest some money abroad so as to increase our political influence by decreasing our financial exchange surplus. Capital, however, unorthodoxly satisfied with 6% in the domestic market, cannot be lured abroad by an offer of 10% or even 15%. Its spokesmen even reject iron-clad government guarantees and refuse to be attracted by tax privileges and other devices of channeling capital into underdeveloped areas.[10] Eisenhower now uses the term "dollar diplomacy" in a new sense—the use of economic pressure for political purposes.

V

Certainly, some private capital is still seeking investment abroad, at the rate of perhaps 5 billion dollars yearly, including reinvestment of unrepatriated profits. But not quite 40% of this capital is being invested in countries which might fall under the general description of "underdeveloped areas," and a more detailed breakdown of the total shows that we must make further significant qualifications. The bulk of these funds is concentrated in mining and oil enterprises, or in the public utilities of a few Latin American countries. While "lending to the rich" is still a preferred investment risk, some of the funds which are invested in advanced countries eventually find their way into underdeveloped countries—but in a rather round-about way. Thus, the first investment of the new International Finance Corporation, (an affiliate of the World Bank, launched in 1956 especially for the purpose of channeling private capital into private enterprise overseas) was a loan to the electro-works Siemens of West Berlin for expansion of its facilities in Brazil.

But private capital will not venture into countries whose governments are considered socialist, nationalist or otherwise irresponsible. These governments in turn find it politically unwise to accept loans from foreign banks, and they

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cannot assure investors that stable laws will permit prolonged operation of foreign enterprise. Special taxes, protective measures for native craftsmen, laws prescribing the hire of native labor and native partners, or any number of regulations may be incompatible with capitalistic notions of controlling property.[11]

Government economists in the underdeveloped countries privately express regret that foreign capital finds the climate unsympathetic to large-scale participation in their development, but they will not publicly state that such participation is desirable enough to call for more lenient legislation. Private foreign capital is less available to the new countries than at the time of foreign domination, while native capital is fleeing.[12] In fact, one argument for generous foreign aid, seldom realized for its cogency, is precisely the expectation that it might encourage the formation of native capital and persuade it to stay. Incidentally, the governments of new countries often are reluctant to force the transformation of native wealth into capital.

Private foreign investments are favored over government loans by all experts, including Gunnar Myrdal,[13] an ardent advocate of national and international socialism. Various schemes have been published with the aim of facilitating the flow of capital to the areas of the potentially most rapid development, but they all depend on those imponderables which today divide the political from the economic interests of the underdeveloped areas. Moreover, under the stimulus of national planning, an urgent and massive need for foreign capital, foreign equipment and foreign know-how has arisen in economic areas which promise little profit in the short run—projects which may be too huge for private enterprise to handle or which may be necessary in the interest of area development without being remunerative in themselves. Some of these projects may be indicated simply to make a young nation livable, to solve an urgent resettling problem, to make a people independent from further subsidies or to permit industrial growth at a faster rate than native resources permit. The outstanding case in point is India, whose rapid development is favored by the Western powers as a counterweight against Communist China.[14]

VI

Plans of this kind require investment aid from governments or from international institutions. For political reasons, the latter seems to be preferable, if only because India's pride is hurt less by the indirect than by the direct grant of American money. Proponents of such schemes to pool all the available funds, however, seem to expect very different benefits from them. The technocrats in the United Nations economic staff honestly believe that such a pool would enable them to promote regional plans for the greatest benefit of the needy masses, overriding the national prestige projects which get first consideration under the present arrangements of bilateral aid. Some of these pet projects are undesirable in the eyes of the technocrats or from any point of view which looks toward peace—yet they are the ones some nations hope to realize, through log-rolling and political pressure in the board or council which is to administer the pool. Again, some astute Americans

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have calculated that contributions to such a fund would be cheaper for the U.S. Treasury than the present system of competitive donation, while on the other hand the USSR could be challenged to match American dollars with an equal ruble amount under the rules of an impartial accountancy system. An advantage recognized by all would be a universal sharing of responsibility. As in the International Monetary Fund, no single country would be expected to contribute more than 33% of the total amount, and all countries including the beneficiaries would contribute some money, while representation would be proportionate to the contributions.

The principle of universal participation was first realized in the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration. Every country, however small, contributed to the roster of experts who may be sent into any part of the globe to help in fighting disease, animal pests, hunger, illiteracy, in devising techniques for the improvement of productivity and of living standards, in drawing plans for the development of an area and for the easing of social differences. Technical Assistance itself does not invest money; it helps provide the technicians and experts. Since lack of know-how is one of the major deficiencies in underdeveloped countries, and would-be investors sometimes cannot provide it either, many worth-while projects would remain dormant without this cooperative U.N. service.

By separating the three functions of investment from each other and providing for each in its own way, a government may obtain the know-how from the U.N., the equipment from private suppliers under an international loan, and then may be able to secure additional credit for the supply of labor and materials. A Special UN Fund with yearly pledges of $29 million[15] has recently been established to initiate large-scale projects in the infra-structure of underdeveloped economics. Its authority would help in finding supplemental investments to speed the development of communications and transportation facilities. The Special Fund itself does not invest money either. It studies investment needs in the infra-structure and may advance some contingent or initial expenses if businesslike or state investments guarantee the project.

The U.N. thinking here has taken its cue from TVA's amortization scheme: the power it generates must pay for a part of its installations, but their flood-controlling function is subsidized.

It is essential to separate this "social overhead" from profitable investments. While the surveying service may take the form of a grant and contingent benefits may be subsidized on a pro rata capitalization basis, the projects themselves should be made to pay their way. Capital can be mobilized only if it has the guarantee that its investment is looked upon as a business venture, and is so understood by the recipient government and people. If the government or a public authority contracts for the loan, its *bona fides* will be judged by its own austerity, its efforts in assembling everything that can be paid for in local currency and supplied by local labor, its ability to tax its own rich and to strive towards at least the same measure of social equality within its own boundaries that it wishes to attain in terms of international equality between nations. Even the very latitudinarian proponents of generous international aid, Rostow and Millikin,[16] seem to have misgivings

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that beneficiary countries occasionally expect more from others than they are willing to do for themselves, and they insist that two essential conditions should be fulfilled—the project should make the most effective use of the grantee's resources and be carried out with reasonable efficiency. As at least one critic[17] has remarked, these conditions place on the grantee as heavy a burden as a repayable loan whose use is controlled by the grantor.

Outside the underdeveloped countries few people realize how prohibitive the condition of profitability may prove in practice. Even donated machinery may not find employment in the absence of other facilities, skilled labor, markets and transportation to make use of it. Point Four experts took some time to find out that India does not need tractors but millions of simple iron plows; they learned the lesson—only to stumble into worse conditions elsewhere. Some countries recently liberated from foreign domination also lost the middle echelons of executive, administrative and technical personnel and have great difficulty maintaining the former efficiency standards of their railroads and utilities. Their problem, says a study by the International Monetary Fund,[18] is not how to advance, but how to prevent regression.

VII

Money is not all the poor need to receive from the benevolent rich. Israel cannot obtain enough capital to suit her immigrants from industrial countries; but in neighboring Arab countries even the small amounts of foreign aid cannot be usefully invested. The constant influx of revenue from oil so far has failed to bring much change of habit and outlook to these countries. To some extent in Iraq, which had a development plan even before the Kassem coup, and under the exceptional conditions of Kuweit, the income has been converted into native capital; elsewhere it has been treated as a treasure by the sheikhs. Likewise, many former colonies or economically dependent countries enjoyed, for well over twenty years, an uninterrupted boom of their exports and export prices. Uranium, tin, copper, zinc, manganese and lead were stockpiled at support prices by the American government; nitrates were in heavy demand. Rubber, it is true, lost ground after a short boom because the synthetic substitute turned out to be better in many respects; but wheat, sugar, tobacco and cotton farmers prospered under the shelter of the American price support program and American-sponsored cartels. In the case of cocoa and rice, the Ghanese and Burmese governments, respectively, created monopolistic trading companies of their own. The commonly-heard lament[19] that underdeveloped countries are hewers of wood and drawers of water, and that the "terms of trade" are constantly against them, is no more true than a similar complaint made by the American farmer. But the latter has used the profits to improve his farm technology. Abroad, vested interests have maintained low efficiency standards and low wages. The actual hewers of wood and drawers of water did not obtain a fair share of the twenty-year bonanza and of foreign aid; neither mass markets nor venture capital have been created in preparation of an independent industrial economy. The gap between classes, rather, has widened—and we are asked to underwrite this sorry state of affairs through grants-in-aid!

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Revolutionary leaders of the new countries, ignorant of the blood and sweat and tears which the creation of industrialism cost the Western nations and the Soviet Union, now are trying to achieve, with the aid of foreign grants, three things at a time. They wish to equip themselves with the most modern machinery and infra-structure facilities; they wish to raise the living standard of the masses; and they wish to protect their ancient handicrafts and to preserve the hallowed ways of life. All this and a modern army plus luxuries such as jet planes, while there is need first of all for home and school construction, the development of domestic consumer markets, promotion of a national capital market and above all an agrarian revolution.[20] Grants-in-aid, Technical Assistance and credit facilities should be used, not to superimpose a modern steel mill on an otherwise primitive economy but to create the conditions of a less primitive economy. No amount of foreign investments and aid money can be a substitute for the slow growth of new habits in work and studies, in shopping and saving, in marketing and vacationing, which must accompany the great transformation from a pre-industrial to an industrial society. This process is sometimes painful, its achievements deceptive and its delusions dangerous, particularly if a nation has set itself such contradictory goals as indicated in India's Second Four-Year Plan. Foreign aid can smoothe out some of the roughness of that path, but it still goes up a steep hill.

There is hope in modern technology; it may short-cut some of the serpentines. But we are lacking either in candor or in humility if we pretend that our know-how and financial aid can lift the new countries over the hump. They still have to carry most of the burden, and they may often be tempted to shift it over onto the willing shoulders of some dictator. Moreover, since it is their wish to emphasize their independence, and the big powers encourage them to stay out of blocs, they are likely to fall back on protective policies which make it even harder for us to help them. Gunnar Myrdal, who has lucidly described the conflict between national and international integration, concludes his book in resignation with this advice to the older powers: Accept and forbear, have patience and save what little can be saved of an international economy; give the new countries fair and stable prices for their goods, and encourage the flow of capital into the new countries. Such measures, in themselves, should do a number of things which an intelligent foreign aid program is supposed to achieve. If supplementary aid is desired, it should preferably be given through international agencies or the World Bank.[21] Participation of other industrial countries is bound to increase. The European Payments Union has contemplated using accumulated excess credits for international financing. Arrangements such as the Colombo Plan should increasingly permit underdeveloped countries to dispense with unilateral aid and similar operations which tend to embarrass the donor and the grantee countries alike.

To be candid, every open-minded student of the problem now agrees that an intelligent program of international foreign aid must force the underdeveloped countries themselves to face the task of modernizing their ways. International solidarity is the duty of those who are more advanced; but the greater burden lies on the shoulders of those who must catch up.

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[1] John Strachey in his new book *End of Empire* also uses this argument, although he actually finds the final amount insignificant in comparison with total accumulation from domestic resources.
[2] U.S. Commission on Foreign Economic Policy: "Report to the President," Washington, 1954.
[3] Ragnar Nurkse, *Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1953), points to the difficulties arising from caste-ridden consumption patterns.
[4] National Planning Association, quoted by *Business Week*, April 6, 1957. Yearly Soviet loans now run to a billion dollars outside the satellite empire; the amount of intra-empire aid is unknown.
[5] E. S. Kerber, "Major Shift by Area in Foreign Aid," in *Survey of Current Business*, October, 1956. Trends here emphasized continued in following years (same sources).
[6] Gunnar Myrdal, *An International Economy*, (Harpers, 1956), gives the best exposition of this viewpoint. Paul Hoffman in his booklet, "One Hundred Countries . . . How to Speed Their Economic Growth and Ours in the 1960's," (Albert D. and Mary Lasker Foundation, 1960), supports a similar outlook. Acting Secretary of State Dillon's Report on Grant Economic Assistance of March 4, 1960, pursuant to section 503(c) of the Mutual Security Act, ironically says, in effect, that the best means to reduce bilateral grants is to give them without regard to immediate defense needs.
[7] Similar occurrences have been shoddily compiled in what might be described as the least informed and most irate book on the subject, a widely advertised Regnery publication. The unjustly famous book by Lederer and Burdick also condemns "big projects," though the authors clearly don't know what they mean by such a term.
[8] There is an almost mystical belief that the possession of steel mills makes for greatness. Cf. P. C. Mahalanobis, writing in *Sankhya, The Indian Journal of Statistics*, December, 1955. Disagreement on what was good for Iran also led to the dismissal of a U.S. Technical Assistance team by the Shah. The point that one country often has different priorities from another, and for reasons not always intelligible to that other, is forcefully made by Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostov in *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy*, (Harpers, New York, 1957.)
[9] Eugene Staley, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries*, (Harpers, New York, 1954), points out that the grantor nation even may become a captive of the grantee's form of government and social structure.
[10] Two oil executives, Emilio G. Collado and Jack F. Bennat, writing in *Foreign Affairs* for July, 1957, favor tax privileges but think guarantees are a handicap rather than a help.
[11] C. N. Vakil and P. R. Brahmanand, *Planning for an Expanding Economy*, Bombay, 1956.
[12] John A. Williams, *Economic Stability in a Changing World*, (Oxford University Press, 1953).
[13] Gunnar Myrdal, *An International Economy*, (Harpers, 1956).
[14] It is axiomatic with Western writers that India must succeed even though unaligned. Liberal writers will go to any lengths in fulfilling every whim of Indian politics; Millikan and Rostow in their otherwise courageous book present a system of economic theory which, upon closer inspection, appears to fit no country but India.
[15] Report by Raymond Scheyven to the Tenth Session of the General Assembly, May, 1955, Supplement No. 17 (A-2906), Resolutions in the 13th and 15th Assemblies. The Special Fund concentrates on large projects; the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, closely connected with it, generally spreads its resources over a large number of small projects. Both now have taken the place of the more ambitious SUNFED project which was to have a revolving capital of $250 million.
[16] *World Politics*, July, 1957.

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[17] Felipe Pazos, "Economic Development and Final Stability," Staff Papers IMF, October, 1953.

[18] Ragnar Nurkse, "Reflections on India's Development Plan," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 1957.

[19] Gunnar Myrdal, op.cit., proposes that underdeveloped countries should cartelize their export goods and highly developed countries should "discriminate against their own nationals." This device will not sell more coffee and bananas; but it may lift the morale of some countries if we pay our *tributum* to them in the form of higher cocoa or tin prices instead through foreign aid, which is subject to review by 100 senators.

[20] Tax laws in the donor countries are incomparably stiffer than in the recipient countries. The latter should expropriate their own millionnaires, kill their sacred cows and allow birth control information to be disseminated before they use their numbers as an accusation against the more fortunate modern nations. These should refuse to underwrite chauvinism, backwardness and class conceit abroad.

[21] Agencies now available for international aid are the following: a) United Nations: Technical Assistance and its Expanded Program; the Special Fund; the Children's Emergency Fund; b) International Monetary Fund; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) with its subsidiaries, the International Finance Corporation, the International Development Association and the Inter-American Development Bank; c) American: the Import-Export Bank; the Development Loan Fund; the Public Law 480 Administration (Food surplus disposal); Technical Assistance (Point IV) and the ad hoc budgets under the International Cooperation Administration; d) British: the Colombo Plan; e) Russian: ad hoc programs under the Ministry of Foreign Economic Policy; f) European: Economic Cooperation Administration (liquidating Marshall Plan funds) and European Payments Union, apart from ad hoc programs.

FOYER PABLO CASALS

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Spanish Refugee Aid hopes to open a center this Spring for aged Spanish Refugees of the Spanish Civil War, living in Montauban, France. It will be called the FOYER PABLO CASALS. Its main aim will be to supplement the tiny incomes of 75 people over the age of 60, most of whom live on $12 a month (the "minimum vitale" in France is estimated at $50 a month per person). Each week a $4 package of food will be given out to 75 needy individuals. There will also be free coffee, tea and snacks at all times while the center is open. And there will be a warm comfortable place to sit, find amusement and congenial company, hear music, read, keep warm. We plan also to have a sewing room and there will be entertainment and movies, once or twice a month.

Many refugees will benefit from the special efforts being made for them during WORLD REFUGEE YEAR which ends in June. But there are only a few who will remember and feel the importance of helping the political refugees from Franco's Spain. If you are among these, please send us a contribution for the Foyer. We must raise $25,000 for installing and running it for a year. Any amount that you send will help.

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This article, by the distinguished English economist, is a condensed version of a longer study which first appeared in the English magazine, New Statesman and Nation. *The condensation has been checked by the author.*—EDITORS.

THE ECONOMICS OF WORLD TENSION

Thomas Balogh

Successful co-existence of capitalist countries with the Soviet bloc depends on the realization in the former that the non-totalitarian ecnonomic system has been put on the defensive.

The rising standard of comfort and ease in rich capitalist countries and the lessening of class bitterness mask a drift toward productive inferiority in relation to the Communist bloc. Moreover, the contradictions in the non-Soviet world between the problems of the highly developed and those of the poor areas is likely to frustrate efforts to achieve stability in the former and make it difficult to bring effective aid to non-Communist governments in the latter. It is the long-run menace to the existence of the latter which is, perhaps, the most dangerous threat to the present efforts at relaxing world tension.

In the rich countries there has been a return toward the policies of the prewar period, in which rising prices lead to insistent calls for restrictive monetary action—no other weapon being available to governments which are pledged to economic "freedom" and the abolition of discriminatory controls. Internationally, this anti-inflationary polciy in highly developed areas has had the effect of undermining the earning capacity of the less developed areas by reducing the demand for their products. This exacerbates the poverty, which is basically due to shortage of equipment and to the relentless acceleration of population increase caused by improved public health policies; these have reduced mortality rates without much hope of an early fall in births. Non-Communist countries, moreover, have not mobilized their vast under-employed rural manpower for productive investment.

In comparison with these factors the problem of armaments expenditure is of minor importance. But, at any rate in the United States, this kind of expenditure is being widely encouraged as the only safe way of increasing government outlay and so sustaining expansion. To call for an increase of social expenditure on education, say, or health or the underdeveloped areas seems to be considered politically dangerous. However, armaments themselves do not make war; it is the socio-

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logical effects and moral implications of this attitude which may become damaging to the cause of the 'West.'

These problems are not necessarily inherent in the private enterprise system as such. They could be solved without doing irremediable harm to basic individual rights or changing the character of the system. Unfortunately, there seems to be no immediate prospect of the pragmatic approach that would be needed to tackle them. The dogmatic fervor which has overtaken western governments seems to doom us to frustration and might condemn us to defeat.

THERE IS A SHARP CONTRAST between mobilization in Communist countries of vast manpower reserves for productive investment, and the feeble efforts which the poorer non-Soviet countries have hitherto made, even with the substantial aid in resources and technical knowledge which has been supplied to them. This raises a question of far-reaching importance: does not the approach to economic development adopted in the non-Soviet countries, including the organization of technical assistance, need thorough reappraisal and reform?

On the other hand, it should be said quite categorically that an economic solution to these problems cannot by itself guarantee that adverse shifts in the international balance will not occur. Exasperation with the status of political and racial inferiority, which the economic trends consolidate, may clearly make Communism attractive to people who have never had opportunities to enjoy democracy. But it would certainly be foolish to hope that slight increases in the standard of life, without increased self-confidence and hope, would be enough to reduce discontent; profound institutional changes have become inevitable.

If, then, the socio-economic dogma of uncontrolled markets have imposed a growing unbalance and spiritual dissatisfaction even within rich and highly developed countries, its impact on the poorer areas has been disastrous. In the first place, the dismantling of direct controls has had more debilitating effects in the poorer than in the rich areas. Their national income is far less evenly distributed than in richer areas. They completely lack the social integration which comes through the Welfare State, and high, progressive taxation. Decontrol, therefore, has resulted in a dissipation of investment power, in favor of luxury building and luxury imports of western durable consumers' goods, as the rich have used their new freedom to satisfy their desire for these conspicuous signs of eminence. The pressure of salesmanship of the rich countries, the prestige conferred by the possession of articles of conspicuous luxury (Cadillacs, television, etc.) have aggravated the problem. Investment power has been further reduced—and thus the means by which the inequality within these poor areas, and between them and the rich countries, could be mitigated.

The fact that foreign—especially American—help was in many cases dependent on decontrol (recent flagrant cases in point include Turkey and Spain) meant that these countries were, so to say, bribed by tem-

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porary relief (without due overall analysis of their problems) to accept policies which are in the long run bound to weaken their capacity to increase their standards beyond the temporary increase that foreign aid spurred. The growing hostility in Latin America to the activities of the International Monetary Fund is an eloquent proof of the grave dangers of this policy to the cohesion of the non-Soviet world.

The *malaise* in the underdeveloped area has further been aggravated by the worsening, since 1951, of the terms at which they can sell their produce in exchange for manufactures. Poor primary producers are notoriously in a weak bargaining position when the sellers' market disappears. They cannot easily curtail their production. They are, in most cases, unable to hold their produce even temporarily off the market in the hope of obtaining better conditions, because they lack both the financial institution to help them to carry stocks and the means to store and manage them. Consequently, a system in which the highly developed areas periodically restrain demand by monetary policy, and the impact of this policy in primary-producing markets, necessarily causes a sharp deterioration in the terms of trade.

This impact is the more likely, as the long-run world market outlook for some primary products is not at all encouraging. There is:

(a) a technical agrarian revolution going on in highly developed areas by which their productivity in regard to temperate-zone food and raw materials is increasing at a rate faster even than industrial progress. This agricultural revolution has been most conspicuous in America and Germany, but it is now gaining ground in France and Britain.

(b) Far less ominous, far more easily remedied, is another problem—agricultural protection in highly developed areas, including the efforts of the US government to get rid of commodity surpluses without being willing to pursue a planned policy of economic expansion in the underdeveloped areas. The efforts of the US to curtail home production, while famine conditions obtain in important strategic areas illustrates the failure to understand the problem.

(c) Industrial progress has also had an unfavorable effect on primary producers. On the one hand, it has reduced waste, and therefore reduced the need for any given output of corresponding raw materials. On the other (and even more important) it results in the discovery of new and superior materials which displace the natural products by virtue of their cheapness, evenness of quality and other advantages. Buna rubber, glass-wool (replacing cork), artificial fibers, and highly refined and cheap groundnut oil show the immense threat involved to specialized primary producers.

(d) Last, but not least, tastes have changed—and the change has been accentuated—by incessant advertising—towards highly manufactured durable consumer goods and against goods with a high content of imported agricultural products such as food or clothing.

THUS, PRIMARY-PRODUCING countries, after a short period of relief immediately after the war, are finding it increasingly difficult to start or sustain capital accumulation sufficiently to induce sustaining

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growth. According to the UN *World Economic Survey for 1958,* the poor primary-producing areas lost more as a result of the deterioration of their terms of trade than the whole of their foreign aid. At the same time they are under a deadly threat of a rapid increase in their populations which itself is the result of the medico-technical revolution which has been going on in the rich countries. The decline in the rate of mortality in the last century was followed by a decline in the rate of births in most advancing countries, as a natural outcome of an organic improvement in general well-being. The collapse of death rates in underdeveloped areas has been the consequence of advances made not in those countries but elsewhere. It is this contrast which makes the prospect of the population movement in underdeveloped areas so ominous.

In the teeth of all evidence, strenuous efforts are being made by economists in the rich countries to show that in the long run the primary producers have nothing to gain and much to lose by diversifying their economies, by accelerated planned investment in industrialization. Even if the whole of the international social unbalance, the growing discrepancy between the fate of the rich and the poor countries, were the fault of the latter (e.g., the inability to curb the rise of populations and mismanagement of investment), the increasing unbalance could not be regarded with indifference by the former. It might well increase the attraction of the Communist solution—especially if that is seen to be "working." The success achieved by China in mobilizing the underemployed rural masses for productive investment is ominous for the non-Soviet world, as it contrasts with an almost complete failure in this respect in the underdeveloped part of the non-Soviet world, including in particular India. Moreover, evolution in the Soviet world, and especially in Russia, is likely to favor the Soviet buying of primary products at high prices relative to manufactures.

The inequality between rich and poor countries is actually increasing. This cannot be entirely attributed to the decline in international private investment due to the wickedness of the debtor countries, their inflationary policies, and the like. Indeed the opposite may be true; the failure may have been caused by the failure of investment, of mobilizing the rural population. This in its turn was due to a failure to push through reforms in land-tenure, in taxation, and effective direct controls. It is not that the investment programs of the underdeveloped non-Soviet area were too ambitious: they were not ambitious enough.

Yet their increase cannot be accomplished by the traditional means of market economics. The political risk is obviously much higher in the relations between the poor and rich countries than it is within the rich countries themselves. There is no doubt, moreover, that technical progress in the highly developed areas has been so strong as to make investment relatively very attractive. Thus, it is only in certain specific instances, and mostly to exploit raw material resources either by way of plantations or by way of mines or wells, that foreign capital has flowed from the rich to the poor in any considerable quantity.

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It is an open question whether the rich in this way have exploited the poor. In one sense they have, and continue to do so. They obtain labor much more cheaply than they can at home, and they have access to favorable raw material bases. On the other hand, without foreign capital investment, the poor countries would be even poorer; and since progressive taxation has now been introduced in most areas (this contrasts strongly with prewar practice), the poor areas also participate in the profits earned. Thus the rich, in a sense, exploit only the opportunities they themselves created. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that private investment is not a sufficiently broad basis on which to start a self-generating process of expansion. Inasmuch as foreign investors have exerted pressure against state enterprise, they may in the long term have harmed rather than helped the poor countries.

In the postwar years, government aid, in the form of low interest bearing loans or outright grants channelled either directly or through international agencies, has represented a very considerable contribution. In the years since the war, America alone has provided $62,133 millions in this way; total bilateral and multilateral aid and technical assistance programs represented $11,251 millions, between 1954 and 1957. Much was accomplished; yet if the vast amounts are taken into account, the achievements are disappointing. There is hardly a poor country where self-sustaining growth can safely be said to have been started.

The reason for this is partly the immense difficulties in finding suitable administrators and entrepreneurial ability in underdeveloped areas. It is also due to the multiplicity of the agencies in charge, the lack of co-ordination and the failure to take an overall view and to apply aid and technical assistance at the points most likely to yield best results on the basis of comprehensive surveys. It is also partly due in certain cases to the financial myopia which dominates the International Monetary Fund, and which has caused untold harm to the democratic cause in poor areas.

Foreign aid can and should play an important role. By putting additional resources at the disposal of the poor, the need for compulsion can be reduced; voluntary co-operation can be induced by enabling the peasant and the laborer to earn some immediate income if he participates in communal investment. By such "linked public works" financed by the recipient governments with foreign aid, much of the liberty of the individual could be safeguarded. But foreign aid can be only marginal; the main effort must come from the recipient country itself. This is possible only if a desire for general popular participation can successful be evoked. Such enthusiasm is unattainable without far-reaching social and economic reform, including mass education. Foreign help needs, therefore, to be carefully planned to promote reform, and to enable a general economic mobilization. Hitherto it has been used, if anything, to induce the deferment of reforms. This is the basic cause of our failure.

A new menace has arisen in this respect in the gold losses recently

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suffered by the U.S. Instead of regarding this as a healthy readjustment (and merely calling on other countries to refrain from turning their dollar assets into gold) the danger is great that the U.S. will cut its aid faster than western Europe expands its program. To the worsening of the terms of trade of the poor countries a fall in direct aid would then be added. Only a thorough overhaul and liberalization of the constitution and functioning of the International Monetary Fund and the Bank which provided for a mechanism to offset such gold losses could prevent a positive aggravation of the already unfortunate position of the primary-reducing countries.

If Russia were to make use of her superior industrial productive capacity to obtain raw materials and food by exchanging them for industrial products, the terms of trade of the primary countries would violently shift in their favor, and these countries would have considerable benefit by trading with Russia. At the same time, Russia, far from suffering a disadvantage from such exchanges, would also benefit as she would obtain food and raw materials on far more favorable terms, by concentrating her own efforts on industrial expansion, than she is capable of doing at present. Thus, Russian self-interest and the interest of the poor countries would coincide. This is an extremely menacing prospect for the industrial countries of western Europe which depend on the import of primary products and export manufacturers.

Here then is a threat of extreme gravity both to our influence in the poorer areas of the world and also to the standard of living of the highly developed countries of Europe. So long, moreover, as productivity in Russia is increasing at a rate far faster than in America or western Europe, the potential threat will constantly increase. A deterioration in the terms of trade by ten per cent, for instance, would wipe out all gains from the present rate of increase in productivity in Britain. The Russians have it within their power to condemn important western European countries—and especially Britain, which has fallen far behind Germany, France and even Italy in the rate of her economic expansion—to stagnation, unless these countries can decisively increase their rate of investment and progress. Moreover, Russian interest in harming western Europe is increased by their failure in agriculture. The satisfaction felt in some circles in the West at this failure is therefore misguided. Once the arms race were over, the Russians could concentrate on drawing their rural manpower into industry more quickly (57 per cent of their population—a higher figure than Italy—was still rural in 1956) by being able to provide more production. A lessening of tension is therefore to our advantage in the medium run, by speeding up agricultural and spreading industrial advance.

There has been an irresistible tendency toward independence in the colonial areas of Asia and Africa; and in South America, too, there has been a decided quickening of popular discontent with traditional regimes which combine economic liberalism with military dictatorship.

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The prestige of having broken through poverty and stagnation virtually by their own efforts has had and will have immense propaganda value for the Russians in these areas. Against this success, the fear of compulsion will weigh less and less in favor of the West if it is not able to tackle the problem of poverty successfully. In principle there is nothing which the Soviet system can accomplish which cannot be done with equal or greater ease (because the West still contains by far the richest areas of the world) by western Europe and North America. It is not the techniques that are lacking but the social and economic insight, which must be ready for a pragmatic approach to any question. The fact that the cost of a change in automobile models is equivalent to the whole of the productive investment program of India for several years should at least make people wonder whether the present system of allocating resources of the western alliance is sufficient as things stand to cope with their international politico-economic problem.

WHAT IS THERE TO BE DONE? The diagnosis of the long-term economic outlook for the West suggests a number of ways in which improvement might be striven for.

(1) The allocation and growth of the national income ought to be influenced more consciously than at present. This means wages-policy, tax-reform and control over investment. The present system leads to instability, unemployment and a decline in the relative growth of the non-Communist world. It also over-stimulates expenditure on conspicuous consumption in contrast to collective well-being and an increase in investment (which is sorely needed in Britain and in the poorer areas). It must lead to a polarization of sentiment and to tension within, and between, countries. All non-Communist areas need a vast increase in investment in human beings, both in health and education, and in housing and urban planning to buttress their spiritual well-being. They must find a balanced way of deciding between increases in leisure and incomes.

(2) It would seem essential in view of the relentless increase in Soviet economic efficiency to accelerate growth even in the most developed countries of western Europe. The threat of Soviet competition in primary-producing areas is steadily growing and could only be met, without detrimental consequences for the increase in the standard of living, by accelerating investment and growth. This is impossible so long as the non-Soviet orbit relies for stability solely on monetary policy, i.e., on the deliberate creation of uncertainty and fear. In particular, speedy measures must be taken to prevent gold losses by important countries and the shortage of international liquidity which leads to a cut in total aid to the poor areas. A transformation of the IMF into an International Central Bank with powers to create reserves and a reform of its present policies and attitudes is essential to this end.

(3) The needs of international, as contrasted with national, development have also been largely misunderstood. Allocations of for-

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eign aid and technical assistance have been made on a piecemeal, project-wise basis from year to year, thus preventing the full fruition on even those insufficient amounts that have been voted. Foreign aid must be used to stimulate national effort and reform, and to reduce the need for compulsion in mobilizing the rural manpower of the poor areas for accelerated growth.

(4) It has been suggested that the cost of such a restoration of internal and international social balance might be more easily borne if financed by increasing indirect, rather than direct, taxation. I doubt this. I feel that indirect taxes, if applied on a sufficiently large scale, can, in a democracy, be made as obnoxious by skilled propaganda as direct ones. A further alternative could be the extension of public ownership. This has also been attacked successfully by the propaganda of those who fear to lose their privileges. So-called libertarian "cajollery" bids fair to doom the West to inmobility and failure. Under the attractive guise of defending basic liberties it wishes to preserve the *status quo,* and to induce further decreases in the allocation for collective needs. At the same time it encourages consumption in the affluent countries instead of undertaking measures to moderate international inequality and use the quickening increment of national income in the rich areas for the benefit of the poorer ones.

(5) Beyond all this is the relentless increase in population which again overshadows the greater part of the world, and threatens to negate all efforts to increase *per capita* national incomes. Here we are confronted with a problem which causes a grave split in the opinion of the Free World, since an important fraction regards it as a religious issue on which compromise is not possible. It is desirable to find a voluntary solution. There can be no doubt, however, that some solution will have to be found in the less developed areas, for otherwise all their efforts will be doomed to failure.

EVEN SO CURSORY an enumeration of some of the ways in which relief might be sought from the present trend towards increasing internal and international tension is sufficient to show the immensity of the psychological problems involved. The main stream of public opinion in the West, far from promoting the creation of the preconditions needed for an outcome favorable to democracy, is marshalled in a diametrically opposite direction by advertising campaigns. There has been insistent propaganda in favor of restoring the sway of the uncontrolled working of the price mechanism in "free" markets acting through the profit motive and of forswearing Keynesian methods of stabilization. Yet it is clear that even such Keynesian methods cannot achieve the acceleration of growth and decrease in international inequality which are needed.

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AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF NEGRO AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE

Daniel M. Friedenberg

One of the most significant political events of the 1950s was the movement of the African states, and in particular the Negro peoples of sub-Sahara Africa, toward independence. As the previous decade belonged to the liberation movements of Asia, so the same wave of nationalism swept forward to engulf what had been considered the most backward continent in the world. And the crescendo has not yet been reached in this unheaval which, historically considered, seems to kaleidoscope eons into mere months. The white man, whose domination was so assured throughout sub-Africa ten years ago, may in another decade be a distant memory of oppression.

The flood tide of freedom in Negro Africa is singularly different from the liberation of the Asian states. An open explosion in India was only averted by the sympathetic reaction of the British Labor party to demands for freedom. Indochina and Indonesia came to statehood by revolt against the European masters. And the Arab states, in their chaotic campaigns for both freedom and the new freedom to oppress others, almost dragged the major powers into a new world war. But without exception the new states of black Africa have achieved their independence while maintaining a degree of relative harmony with the former colonial powers.

An analysis of the nature of these new nations adds to the bewilderment. The colossal population of India made British toryism decline combat. Little Holland could not hope to defeat in direct warfare the natives of the thousand-mile archipelago of Indonesia. The close-knit culture and religion of the Arab states presented a forbidding face to new European adventures. But the African states were small, impotent and lacking in industrial equipment. Most of these backward territories had not even arrived at a historical level where national feeling was a deep impulse. What then has happened? Are the European nations suddenly becoming benevolent, are they deliberately yielding power out of fatigue? Is it possible they have finally accepted the position of Thucydides, suggested over two thousand years ago, that a democracy by its very nature cannot be imperialist?

To touch beneath the skin of events, it is imperative to relate political to economic movements. A world transformation is now beginning whose ripples, contrary to the image of a stone thrown in water, are seen best at the outer shores of impact.

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Movement to Political Independence

The evolution in French policy is a most instructive case history. France, sullen after two centuries of failure to dominate Europe, had turned to Africa as a reaction against defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. In the period from 1879 to 1900 the French acquired their vast empire south of the Sahara. But by one of the ironies of history, the enormous territories of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa were found devoid of natural resources. Contrary to the high hopes, it was soon evident that, in spite of the most ruthless exploitation, the cost of maintaining the colonies was higher than the benefits received.

Up to World War II the difficulty was resovled by evasion. It was unthinkable that France would permit its imperial policy to be affected by considerations of the cash register; one simply turned away and tried to forget certain areas existed. In a matter as important as education, for example, only one per cent of the tiny French Equatorial African budget went to all sources of education lumped together, while in French West Africa there were only 36 secondary schools for 17 million persons.

The advent of World War II changed the entire African picture. The myth of France cracked under the blitzkrieg and its reverberation sounded in the most backward villages of Negro Africa. What was left of the myth fell apart in Indochina, where Senegalese troops saw at first hand the new reality. Mighty France was a shell and the shell itself was so riven by internal dissension that the empire was crumbling with each passing day: it seemed an irrevocable torrent to the young intellectuals of black Africa, the handful of students who went to study at Paris and heard the voices of the wave of the future from their white comrades at the Cité Universitaire.

Almost overnight, powerful political parties began to rise in the African territories: the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, harnessed by the moderate Félix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast with the radical wing whipped forward by the dynamic Sekou Touré of French Guinea; and a fusion of all the older leftist groups into a new Parti du Regroupement Africain, Marxist and independence-oriented, with the firebrand Léopold Sédar Senghor at the helm.

THE PULSATING ACTIVITY in Negro Africa was of course scrutinized by the same officials whose job it was to budget money in order to support these deficit colonies. And as the psychologic weariness caused by the loss of Syria, Lebanon, Indochina, Tunisia and Morocco, spread through France, a new school of what has aptly been called "anti-colonialism of the right" for the first time began to gather force. Why should we spend many millions of francs to subsidize colonial dependencies when on all political issues the ingrates side with our enemies?—this question was increasingly being asked by Frenchmen in responsible positions.

Another important aspect was the history of Germany and Japan

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since World War II, and even more so that of Holland since the loss of Indonesia. It was widely known in France that the growth of her internal economy had been crippled by overseas obligations, while the countries shorn of colonies by war or revolt had moved far ahead. To take a typical example, a German company could export capital on a profit basis to an underprivileged area and receive a most cordial welcome, while the French subsidies for roads, harbors and hospitals were viewed as oppressive acts.

The economic facts supported the anti-colonialists of the right. The adverse trade balance of the principal French African colonies ran to many millions of francs per year, the difference being absorbed by the mother country. And the classical argument that "invisible returns"—money flowing back through private profit—compensated for this loss was refuted by careful studies. Indeed, the well-known French writer Raymond Cartier went so far as to publish in *Paris-Match* three famous articles in 1956 advocating the abandonment of the African colonies as total losses.

These were the facts that explain how a man of the right like General de Gaulle, though obsessed as he is with *la gloire* and *la mission civilisatrice* of France, could make a startling offer of freedom to the French colonies. The first step occurred on August 24th, 1958, at Brazzaville, the capital of French Equatorial Africa. When talking of the new Constitution, the General offered independence to any colony which affirmed that position by referendum; and going further, stated that any member of the French Community (except Algeria) could vote to leave even subsequent to the referendum.

France had finally learned the lesson of history. In a desperate gamble, de Gaulle thought that the advantages of French subsidy inside the franc bloc would keep the African colonies within the Community. He was right for a brief period, since only Guinea under Sekou Touré opted for independence.

But the tide of history kept running. The states of Senegal and the Soudan, under the impetus of Léopold Sédar Senghor, fused into the Mali Federation. As a reaction against this radical group, Félix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast organized the Entente Sahel-Benin, consisting of the Ivory Coast, Niger, Dahomey and the Voltaic Republic. The leaders of the two groups were soon at odds, which was what the French wanted. But what forced the issue was the international prestige accorded to Sekou Touré. Jealous of Touré, the heads of the Mali Federation presented an ultimatum to France: either the French Community would evolve into a Commonwealth, with each state having its own independence and representation at the United Nations, or Mali would leave the Community.

On December 12, 1959 de Gaulle capitulated. At Saint-Louis in the Senegal, the General stated that the sovereign states of the French Community were linked "only by their own free will" and that Mali could accede to full sovereignity "not only with the accord but with the aid of France." The leaders of Mali immediately pledged that France

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could maintain military bases on their soil, that French would be the official language of the new state and that Mali would remain in the French monetary and customs union. *La gloire* remained intact if slightly tarnished, but the franc was still entrenched; de Gaulle's capitulation was more apparent than real. France had slowly begun to learn American and British tactics.

THE BRITISH, with their more pragmatic approach to empire, saw the lesson of history earlier and with eyes wiser than the French. The experience of India, whereby that country was saved for the sterling bloc through the mystical formula of "independence and free association," had not been lost to the Whitehall conservatives. Shortly after the Tory party came back to power in the postwar period, a new colonial policy was laid down, following a study of United States interests in Latin America.

American moneyed interests have never needed political domination to achieve their aims. As the foremost capitalist nation, America developed a technique of economic infiltration which eliminated any need to control the political machinery in the European sense. In the most advanced form, as in Venezuela, the United States companies invest money in ventures that purely domestic capital cannot exploit. A high return is received, of which a stipulated percentage goes back to the nation involved. Contrary to common belief, local labor is usually paid the same or higher wages than it would receive in the home market, and the difference is then spent in the acquisition of other American goods. A circle of mutual advantage is created as long as the nation involved accepts the economic bondage implied.

This was the new pattern of colonialism determined by England. A seemingly ludicrous situation then developed. Instead of putting revolutionaries in jail, Britain *aided them* while mouths foamed in Paris and Brussels. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, though he parades himself as the first modern Negro premier in Africa, in a most subtle way—unknown even to himself— is a British stooge; for Lever Bros., Ltd. can say more, and with greater authority, through a black than a white mouth on the Gold Coast. Nigeria, the Sudan, the British Cameroons, Sierra Leone and Tanganyika are all magnificent tributes to this policy which, in sum, consists of eliminating subsidy and retaining the market. The policy is even carried to the rigorous absurdity, from a traditionalist colonial view, of trying to unite dissident local factions in Uganda so they can take over political independence. The British, as a consequence, have met with remarkably little disorder in the evolution of their 100 per cent Negro colonies in Africa. They have applied with enormous success the trick of combining economic dependence and political independence.

The Problem of Racism

If the economic considerations of the mother countries—with the possible exception of the Belgian Congo—alone carried import, all

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of Africa would be free in five years. But the fly in the ointment is the European colonial, the white man who has settled in Africa and considers his color an automatic guarantee of elevation. Terrified of the overwhelming alien Negro mass, hallucinated by myths of racial superiority, he stands as the principal obstacle not only to African evolution but also the regularization (i.e., the transforming of political dependencies to economic markets) of relations between the mother countries and their former colonies. Even against the real interest of the land of his ancestral origin, the colonial is the cause of that parlysis confronting intelligent English and French policy in certain regions of Africa today.

For, all economic studies notwithstanding, General de Gaulle would never dare to leave the initiative of accepting or rejecting total independence in the hands of a populace where a single white vote is only equal to a single black vote, were it not for the overriding fact that there are almost no *colons* or white settlers in French West and Equatorial Africa. Every economic statistic relevant for French Negro Africa is equally relevant for Algeria where, to add to the woes of France, the revolt costs an additional billion dollars a year. But Algeria has close to 1 million French settlers (Europeans are all classed as "French") in a total population of some 10 million persons, while there are only 150,000 whites among the 30 million natives of all French Africa south of the Sahara.

The British are faced with the same dilemma in Kenya and the Rhodesias. In Kenya today, for example, England is supporting a less than 1 percent minority of aristocratic expatriates on feudal estates at the expense of the Exchequer. Every time London attempts to ameliorate the worst excesses, the colonials vituperate the administration; every time revolt breaks out, the colonials hastily roll out the royal flag and call for home country troops.

A pattern can be discerned under this welter of problems. A study of the ethnic and economic resources of the various African territories south of the Sahara gives a clearer picture of what is evolving (p. 193).

Two general conclusions stand out from this mass of statistics that can be summed up in a simple formula: The degree of independence is in inverse ratio to the white population and/or favorable trade balance.* Wherever the European population is of some size and works with rich resources (Union of South Africa, the Rhodesias), a white authoritarian government—the more polite name for color fascism—exists. Where the white population is smaller but profitably engaged (Belgian Congo), bloody repression has been employed with considerable success though most recent events show a change in tactics. Where the white population is equally small but less profitably employed (Kenya), indications are that former repressions are giving way to a more sane policy. And

* There are two partial exceptions to this rule. The Portuguese colonies are quiet; since the home government reflects a pre-industrial mentality, the wave of modernism has not yet touched these colonies. The Belgian Congo, to the contrary, is so advanced economically that it is a question whether the native Congolese even need the economic dependency implied by the usual type of political freedom.

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POPULATION BY TYPE* Country	% Negro	POLITICAL SITUATION	ECONOMIC SITUATION (% indicated wherever over 10% of total world export trade)
SUDAN	99.99	Independent	31% of cottonseed.
NIGERIA	99.96	Independent in 1960	49% of oil palm kernels; 95% of colombium ore; 34% of peanuts; 10% of sesame seed; 14% of cocoa.
GHANA	99.85	Independent	36% of cocoa; 24% of manganese ore; aluminum ore; diamonds and gold.
UGANDA	99.84	Postponed only by internal factions.	Cottonseed and sisal.
TANGANYIKA	99.80	Setting date of independence.	37% of sisal; hard timber.
FRENCH WEST AFRICA†	99.63	Europeans vainly attempting to hold.	23% of peanuts; 10% of oil palm kernels; cocoa.
BELGIAN CONGO	99.50		Major source of uranium ores; 74% of cobalt ore; 66% of diamonds; 11% of oil palm kernels; copper, tin, lead, zinc and silver ores.
FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA	99.46		— — —
KENYA	99.26		Cottonseed and sisal.
PORT. MOZAMBIQUE	99.16	Near color Fascism	Cottonseed.
PORT. ANGOLA	98.09		— — —
NORTHERN RHODESIA	97.59		11% of copper ore; vanadium and cobalt ores.
SOUTHERN RHODESIA	92.36	Color Fascism	15% of chrome ore; 12% of beryllium ore; asbestos.
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA	79.15		A major source of thorium and uranium ores; 49% of gold ore; 21% of manganese ore; 26% of chrome ore; 24% of platinum ore; 11% of diamonds; 11% of beryllium ore; vanadium ore and asbestos; citrus fruits.

* Population figures courtesy *Demographic Yearbook, 1956,* United Nations and *Inside Africa* by John Gunther. Economic figures courtesy *Oxford Economic Atlas of the World,* 1955; (U.S.S.R. excluded from many statistics). 1948-1950 Averages.
† French Guinea has already opted for independence.

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in the areas of very small white intrusion (Nigeria Ghana) or deficit financing (Sudan, French West and Equatorial Africa), independence has either been achieved or is around the corner.

The new technique of colonialism, therefore, is to give political independence in the hope that it will better insure economic dependence, "this kind of thing euphemistically called having close cultural and economic ties" as Nehru sarcastically defined it. The prime aim is to keep the former colony in the monetary empire, the franc or the sterling bloc, and thus to perpetuate an investment and market climate. The British have learned the political wisdom which consists of forfeiting prestige to secure cash. Even the die-hard French seem to be studying economic history and, slowly, most reluctantly, may save the remnants of empire despite their imperialists. And the only impediment to the complete political independence of Africa lies in the infinitesimally small white minorities that infest certain regions.

The Underlying Economic Meaning

The entry of the white conqueror into Africa may be reviewed strictly as economic rather than political or moral history. It is then seen as a thread in the larger cloth of European economic expansion. This falls into three approximate epochs.

The first, which may roughly be defined as 1500-1870, was the period when all efforts were concentrated on obtaining capital during the initial stages of industrialism. Capital can only be secured through limited means: borrowing; stealing (conquest or tribute); or forced labor (either one's own people or others). The prospects of enslaving Negroes for forced labor, rather than depressing the local populace with all the political implications involved, was what made the African slave trade so entrancing to the European powers. "Black ivory" when worked in the mines and plantations produced valued food products such as sugar and tobacco, or minerals of small bulk and high worth, such as silver and gold. The difference between the low cost of production and high sale price led to accumulations of capital which could then be reinvested in producer's goods.

This first or preliminary stage had its end parallel with the defeat of French hopes to dominate Europe and the subsequent rise of Germany. By 1870, the pattern of modern Europe was reaching crystallization, with each nation concentrating on its own national development. But the home markets of these individual states were too small to satisfy the growing pressure of excess capital. Production had sated the limited possibilities of each of the internal markets among the more advanced states, and these nations began to look for markets beyond their frontiers. This epoch, which might be defined as ending with World War II, was characterized by enormous investment outside of Europe. The surest way to protect such capital was extension of the local police or army to the newly acquired area, and the natural result was territorial expansion into Africa (as well as Oceania, the unappropriated parts of Asia, etc.).

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

CULTURAL AREAS OF AFRICA

(Revised, 1958)

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THE TREMENDOUS TECHNOLOGICAL revolution centering around World War II brought forth a new and momentous stage. The concentration on heavy industry, whose production had been assured through investment during the previous period—concomitant with new energy forms developed—now meant that machines could mechanically produce cheaper than slave labor. As an example, tractors can sow and reap grain more cheaply in the high labor markets of the United States and Canada than can peon labor on the Argentine pampas. The whole basis of economic slavery was therefore rendered untenable, a fact more important than all the ethical and religious diatribes against human oppression. Furthermore, the newer industrial processes demanded educated labor, not merely well fed, well clothed and well housed, but of a degree of understanding capable of operating and repairing very complex machines. For the first time in history, it *paid* the holders of capital to invest in the human beings operating their property.

Alongside this extraordinary development, a new shift was directed toward the expansion of the market rather than continued emphasis on cheaper materials and labor. The concern of the capitalist (whether individual, state-controlled or the state itself) therefore was only secondarily with his material and labor costs, but primarily his market potential. Modern heavy industry is so rationalized that the break-even point of cost is now down to 60 percent or 70 percent of capacity; thus the profit is assured not so much from reducing costs but rather a concentration on a market which will absorb capacity or 100 percent production. Increased sales beyond the break-even point are far more important to the profit ratio than a reduced material or labor cost in a static market.

This implies (where production is not devoted to war) a higher consumer standard of living, since the workers, whose productivity is raised by the good living conditions and education necessary to operate modern machinery, are the only available expanding market once the middle class is sated. Decent conditions are necessary to train workers to operate modern machinery; and these workers are the only enlarged market available in which to sell the goods produced. This is the cycle of the second stage of the industrial revolution.

The consequence in Africa is apparent today, where this economic transformation calls for a logical necessity to shift from colonial or political control to economic control for marketing purposes. Putting aside all propaganda, this is the true inner meaning of the de-imperialist policy of the advanced European nations.

Pattern of African Independence

It is a law of crystallography that shattered crystals retain their lines of crystallization. Political and cultural units follow the same law, as can be seen in the present fight between Cairo and Bagdad for the Arab world. There is every indication that Africa south of the Sahara is beginning to enter a similar epoch.

According to Melville J. Herskovits, who has made a detailed study

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of this region, sub-Sahara Africa can be divided into distinct cultural areas: the Khoisan, the Click linguistic group of the Bushmen and Hottentots in South Africa; the East Africa cattle area, stretching from the extreme south all the way along the east coast to the Sudan; the Congo area, embracing the Belgian and French Congos as well as northern Angola and Rhodesia; the Guinea coast, including the entire littoral following the West African coast from Nigeria to Sierra Leone; the Western Sudan, lying between the Guinea coast and the Arabized Sahara to the north; and the Eastern Sudan, a buffer and transitional culture to the north of French Equatorial Africa.

Professor Herskovits has shown that three of these culture areas, those of the Western Sudan, the Congo area and the Guinea coast, were admirably evolved before the European intrusion. The Western Sudan had market centers such as Kano and Timbuctoo, noted by Europeans even in feudal times. Conquering empires such as the Hausa, Songhai, Ghana, Mali and Fula exercised tremendous power at different periods. In the Congo area, a well-developed commercial order, with money and trade, blossomed into complex federations and kingdoms. The Guinea coast, with its dense population, had a specialization in crafts and arts unequalled in sub-Sahara Africa, with a guild system that preceded the white man.

It is an interesting and extremely relevant fact that the three areas in Africa which had evolved their own high culture, though sundered by the invader into an absurd patchwork of national interests, are the very ones springing to leadership today. Liberia, Guinea and Ghana already self-governing; Nigeria, Togo, Dahomey and Sierra Leone scheduled for independence: the entire Guinea littoral will be liberated within a few short years as though the reign of the white man was a dream. The Western Sudan, as politically dynamic as the Guinea coast, is at present dominated by the Mali Federation which has only recently been promised full freedom by de Gaulle. And even the crushed Congolese are now asserting independence.

Without doubt, the future of Negro Africa lies in the unrolling of these three major culture areas. Putting aside a history of the bickering, the party interests and personal ambitions involved, inevitable to a time of change, certain hypotheses may be tentatively suggested:

A. *The Western Sudan,* the spiritual heir to the Songhai and Mali empires, has leaders with more brains than economic resources at their disposal. If men of the stature of Senghor and d'Arboussier appeared in the Congo, the history of Africa would be writ large in the near future. Subtle, profoundly European in education and taste, these leaders are a credit to their people.

There is every indication that the Mali Federation, which was originally supported by Dahomey and the Voltaic Republic until Houphouet-Boigny began to pull strings backstage, will act as a centripetal force on all the states of the Sudan area. This pressure will push the moderate elements to seek a confederal or regional grouping rather than

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affiliate themselves with Mali. The desire of individual leaders to have consular and United Nations representation, more than the petty Machiavellian efforts of France, may prevent Mali from swallowing all the Western Sudan.

The area had a rich past because it was the trade route lying between the Mediterranean world and tropical Africa. There is little indication that trading will revert to this specific pattern, which means the Western Sudan does not seem to have a strong economic future. Since some kind of French (or American) subsidy will be provided, it will partially resemble Tunisia in its general orientation.

B. *The Guinea coast* has impressive advantages and disadvantages. Its worst liability is a split between former English and French colonies, a problem not merely linguistic but also monetary. The wretched education granted to these colonies by the occupying powers will now appear as an asset, since the thin veneer of Europe-oriented individuals may soon be absorbed in a common reversion to the Kwa dialect of the Niger Congo language.

Although Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekou Touré of Guinea are talented and noted figures, the individual personality of Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and the new leadership of Nigeria will be the determining factors in the evolution of the Guinea coast. Both Ghana and Guinea are "guided democracies" in the sense of Sukarno's Indonesia, while the Ivory Coast and Nigeria tend to be more traditionalistic. Houphouet-Boigny, very pro-French, represents the bourgeoisie of the rich Ivory Coast who are afraid to be submerged in a poor larger mass. And most important is Nigeria, where the tremendous population,* dwarfing the entire rest of the Guinea coast put together, matches its bulk and mercantile skills with sizable resources.

The people of the Guinea coast, whose natural democracy and agricultural talent have been noted from earliest times, appear to have an attractive future. Unfettered by rigid cultural anachronisms, alert and happy by disposition, this area has all the rudiments of a flourishing commercial economy. The religious tension between the conservative and feudal Moslem north and the progressive Christian south is a disturbing factor that better relations between Cairo and the West may offset. Cultural ties between the Guinea coast and Negro America (their blood cousins) are close and, given a minimum of understanding in Washington, this area should take its place in world affairs as a confederated commercial union sympathetic to those concerned with human as well as economic values.

C. *The Congo* is the big question mark of Africa, since it is the one area that has both a valuable cultural heritage and the basic economy necessary for a powerful state. Indeed, the Congo is the only state (putting aside the special problem of the Union of South Africa)

* Excluding South Africa, out of 21 cities in sub-Sahara Africa having more than 100,000 inhabitants, 7 are in Nigeria.

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which has the potential to develop in rapid fashion from a commercial to a modern industrial economy. In the cases of the Western Sudan and the Guinea coast, political independence for a considerable period will cloak economic dependence on Europe and America. But the incredible natural resources of the Congo and the skill of its trained native labor, the most advanced in all Africa, are unique. Belgium, which acts as a middleman for the Congo ores, is totally unnecessary to this evolved economy: the American interests, for example, who buy up the entire uranium ore supply, would be glad to provide working capital at almost any terms a native regime would ask rather than see it go to Russia.

The most dangerous aspect of the new Congo is that the Belgians, who encouraged economic skills, refused all political and humanistic training to the natives. The consequence is that men such as Nkrumah, Touré and Senghor, a Europeanized and educated elite, are non-existent here. We have the frightening image of a state evolving with embryo political leaders not trained beyond tribal values. The potential of the Congo is unlimited; but disaster may occur because of Belgian stupidity. Certainly the Belgians will not give up political control without absolute guarantees of continued economic control.

The areas of low cultural level throughout Negro Africa will probably remain in a torpid condition for a longer period. British East Africa (excepting the Kikuyu of Kenya), the Portuguese possessions, French Equatorial Africa (excepting Gaboon), the Eastern Sudan and Sudan proper, lack the material resources and cultural heritage to create national states in the modern sense. Though many of these areas will soon have the paraphernalia of political independence, in the form of Liberia or Ethiopia, they will be of little import in the coming emergence of Africa. And the Union of South Africa, whose situation is apocalyptic, remains a threat to civilized society in the foreseeable future.

SUMMING UP, it can be said that the Guinea coast, centered around the emergent state of Nigeria, and the Congo, which may form a centripetal focus for Angola, Nyasaland and northern Rhodesia, will be the future centers of Negro African power. Nigeria and its confederate Guinea coast states to the west should emerge as a commerical economy, with fishing, agriculture, shipping and the exploitation of hydro-electric power to smelt its aluminum and manganese ores. The Congo should develop into an enormously important industrial economy, the focus of attraction and emulation for the surrounding regions. The possibility of a civil revolt against the Belgians is not all unlikely if Belgium does not keep its word on the promise of independence. Far more serious, an eventual war between the Congo and the Union of South Africa, a fierce race war with a helot uprising in the Union as part of the conflict, is within the range of near reality.

As to the form of government that will arise in these new countries, the most logical one is that of "guided democracy" as now used in Ghana and Guinea. This method of harnessing the energies of new lands is

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the only viable substitute for totalitarian tyranny, either fascistic or Communistic, and its plastic shape can make many compromises without killing hopes for a more truly democratic future. The tribal background, religious conflicts, low level of education and incomplete use of known resources, make impossible parliamentary democracy in the American sense. We must learn that other systems do not automatically mean dictatorship; and even that some dictatorships can be popular and progressive. Most important, there is little indication that any of these new African governments will be proto-Communist, if only for the simple reason they depend on European subsidy and Western markets. At most, several, such as Guinea, may take a neutralist position under extreme aggravation. As the French *mots* put it: "Marx dissolves a bit under the Equator." It is Africanization, not Marxism, that the modern African wants.

The more likely threat to the political dynamism of the new Negro states will be the entrenched conservative elements: the feudal Moslem emirs of the north; the traditional chiefs such as the Kabaka of Buganda; the pro-French *hallucinés* who dream of a Latin Africa; and the backward states such as Liberia and Ethiopia. It is significant, for example, that only last year President Tubman of Liberia deliberately torpedoed the "union now" concept of Ghana's Premier Nkrumah, stalling to wait for the more conservative influence of Nigeria to influence Guinea coast confederation.

A Pandora's Box of possibilities lies ahead for Africa as it enters the modern world. But choice means life and there is far more optimism in the new areas coming into self-rule than tired Europe today. It should be our privilege and duty to welcome these newcomers into the fraternity of civilization, for the shrinking world has truly made us all brothers.

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WITH EACH NEW CRISIS...

Jean-Jacques Mayoux

We have survived yet another crisis in France. I use the passive form feelingly. It shows how far we have come since May 13, 1958 [the date of the Gaullist coup] and indeed since long before then. To some of us it had not been clear for a good many years how France could again become a working democracy. I say, again, as one might speak of restoring the Golden Age, for to me French democracy was like a childhood legend.

The Fall had taken place, to my reflective sense, in 1914 when the French Socialist Party decided to share responsibility for the war against Germany—I need hardly add that the corresponding decision of the German Social Democrats was equally fatal with regard to German democracy. At that moment the language of our socialists became a lie. The tenor of all propaganda was summed up for the average Frenchman in one fatal phrase: *bourrage de crâne,* brain stuffing, the true predecessor of brain washing. Each country had its share of the phenomenon, but in France it seemed worse than elsewhere, perhaps because here self-awareness is particularly keen.

The loss of values was terrific, yet less than proportional to the loss of blood. French military leadership was criminally inefficient, and a country with less than forty million inhabitants lost a million and a half dead. I have sometimes thought that the sheer spilling of blood must have induced a collective trauma from which, in the absence of a great new imaginative purpose, the nation could not hope to recover. There followed, in any case, a sharpening of the critical sense and an awareness of the duplicity that pervaded all statements of values.

Integration of the individual into the community has never been a strong trait among the French, and what there was of it I have seen dwindle in my time. Repeatedly Frenchmen found that between the two wars they voted into office left wing governments and that in a few months these governments were perceptibly altered by reshufflings, after which they would be replaced without any new election by a center-right coalition. As long as the left was in office, the Stock Exchange registered vivid, irrestible slumps; as soon as the left was removed, astonishing recoveries took place. Obviously, another "will" was at work, unconnected with the naive game of universal suffrage. Nor did this hidden will regulate only matters of finance. It made sure that all the important permanent civil servants belonged to the upper bourgeoisie and were of a

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rightist complexion. It made sure that the army officer corps was overwhelmingly reactionary.

Frustrations accumulated. The Communist Party rose and thrived on them, becoming the dominant force within the working class. Trying as it did to serve Moscow and win the people, this party represented a frustrating double intent and structure. The Socialists, if anything, were worse; they spoke a firm Marxist language, yet all their actions were colored by the fact that their following came increasingly from the mean and greedy lower middle class, whose energies were devoted to climbing up the ladder of the party hierarchy.

THE TREMENDOUS STRAINS of world politics between the two wars were felt with a peculiar intensity in France. It was the divided army of a divided country that was so easily defeated by the Germans in 1940. It was a divided nation which suffered the occupation. Many fatal habits were added between 1940 and 1944 to an already full collection: fraud, double-dealing, conspiracy, civil and military disobedience became virtues, while the law-abiding unpoliticals were trapped into adhesion to a near-fascist state. The British were fortunate to get the kind of war that elicited their capacity for restraint and self-discipline, while the French got a war that turned their besetting sin of indiscipline into a national virtue. And the European population of Algeria was still more attracted to the Petainist "National Revolution," for they had particular reasons to favor authoritarian patterns.

When peace came the Italians were relieved of their colonial problem, the British felt victorious enough to be sensible and start in India on the road to de-colonization, but the French under General De Gaulle showed unhealthy signs of an inferiority complex. The self-liberation of Paris became a myth within the larger myth of the *Insurrection Nationale,* cultivated mainly by the Communists, while the Gaullists magnified the share in the Allied victory of a brave but very small army. This army, led by a corps of officer-adventurers often involved with the *réseaux* of right wing resistance and the secret services, emerged from the war feeling more frustrated than fulfilled. Colonial reconquest would naturally give them another chance, and there the French would be on their own. I am sure that the most doughty of them felt elated by the prospect of the war in Indo China.

The Vietnamese war started with a characteristic incident: the deliberate bombing of Haiphong by the French navy. Primarily responsible for this, it should be remembered, was Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, De Gaulles's henchman. And since it was the absurd Vietnamese war which ruined the hopes of the Fourth Republic, it is only right to recall the responsibility of the Gaullists. Indeed, under De Gaulle, the Fourth Republic started on a series of costly and anachronistic campaigns, thereby denying itself the possibility of a quick financial recovery. Mendès-France's plans for strict financial austerity were the true means of restoring republican virtue and spirit, but the chance for this lasted only a few months. De Gaulle, in rejecting it, chose loose

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finance and large gestures. By the time he withdrew from power everything in the ensuing process had become fatal: the seeds of decay pervaded the "system."

I ESCAPED FROM FRANCE late in 1943 and became a Resistance delegate to the Algiers Consultative Assembly which met again in Paris after the liberation. In earlier years I had joined and left the Socialist party. I have joined and left many things in my lifetime. Well aware of this deficiency and despite my decision not to make a career of politics, I suffered the bad conscience of an intellectual who feels he should not leave politics in the hands of unscrupulous politicians. The Resistance, in which we had staked everything, had had its political Charter and had mapped a social democracy which we had pledged ourselves to help bring into being. To me at least it was an obvious corollary that the colonial system was played out. One of our earliest clashes with the General in Algiers had been over Lebanon, then struggling for its independence against France. When De Gaulle, in his Brazzaville speech at the beginning of 1944, gave an outline of his projected "French Community," this was another disappointment, for it was obvious that "Community" was but a new name for old colonialism.

Meanwhile I had again joined the Socialist party. It took me three years to realize that few of the attitudes and fewer of the decisions of this party rested on a determination to stimulate the liberation of the exploited classes or countries. Only the Communists, for their own reasons, opposed the Vietnamese war. The Socialists seemed to find it impossible to let go even of the principle of colonialism. Their share in carrying on the next war—the war in Algeria—is sufficiently indicated when one mentions the name of the pro-consul and SP leader, Robert Lacoste. And the French working class, like the workers in other countries, was not immune to the poisons of racialism; the lower middle class was still worse. What made possible the pursuit of one of the ugliest and most cruel of all colonial wars in Algeria, was precisely the lack of a determined popular opposition.

Lagaillarde, leader of the Algerian mob, recently said: "The Fourth Republic died in Algeria." Not entirely true; it died of a lethal germ caught in Vietnam. It was in Vietnam that the most intelligent and politically-minded of the officer corps, reaping not new glory but new humiliation, began to meditate on the methods of the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists for systematically "remolding" the minds of a population. Separated from the nation by more than space, these officers found in the Communist fusion of military discipline with extensive brainwashing, a model for their own conduct: they would set up a counter-revolutionary equivalent of these "revolutionary methods." For comparatively simple minds, accustomed to the rough logic of military life, there must have been something fascinating in this discovery of a new basis of authority. But whoever undertakes to wash brains believes or makes himself believe that he is doing it for the good of the washed as well as the washer, and that he is replacing an unhealthy brain-contest

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with a healthy one. Even civilian educators, to say nothing of religious misisonaries, have been known to enjoy the intoxication of wielding power over minds at their disposal.

In the spring of 1958 I, in common with other Frenchmen, had been invited to take De Gaulle or to face fascism, and had been told that De Gaulle alone could be trusted to bring peace in Algeria. At the same time I was amazed to hear that in Algiers the rioters and their "Committee of Public Safety" were also clamoring for De Gaulle. Later we learned of the part that had been taken in some of these plots by the men who for at least two years had been conspiring for a Gaullist take-over in which De Gaulle himself was regarded more as a means than an end. Soustelle, Blocqu-Mascart, Debré—now prime minister—had consorted more or less as fellow-conspirators with killers and counter-terrorists: Debré has not yet even tried to deny his past connections with the authors of the "bazooka murder" of Commandant Rodier, Swift or Voltaire could hardly have invented a more bizarre situation than has existed since De Gaulle under army pressure was called to power, and acclaimed as the man who would both bring peace to Algeria and keep Algeria French. A comic outcome was the double-speak that De Gaulle's agile mind invented so that he could publicly persuade the *Algérie-Française* people and the peace party that he was with them.

I BELIEVE IT MORE IMPORTANT to see De Gaulle's situation clearly than to practice exegesis on his cryptic utterances. Putting lust for power before contempt for plotters De Gaulle had allowed them to distance. They—the military activists and civilian ultras—saw things otherwise, and held that the sovereignity was really theirs, though formally deposited in De Gaulle. Neither party felt strong enough to clear the muddle, until General Massu's notorious interview forced the issue.

The French Army had reacted against the intolerable humiliation of being made to fight a sordid and costly war without knowing what it was all leading to. It had discovered in the Communist techniques a way of both waging war and endowing it with an acceptable meaning. Some of the officers were mere sadists, some mere slaughters of Arabs; a good many, however, were pseudo-thinkers who invented their own methods for welding Algeria to France. Their solution was the "integration" of Algeria into France. If France were truly a parliamentary democracy, the prospect of 129 Moslem deputies wielding a balance of power at crucial points (say, on the relation of church to state) might be difficult to face. But only if France were so silly as to be a parliamentary democracy . . . For the Army and the ultras "integration" meant that 45 million people would swallow 10 million, instead of letting a million French settlers in Algeria confront an increasingly aggressive ten million Moslems. The formula, "From Dunkerque to Amanrasset" meant for some safe tenure of their Algeria *latifundia,* for other that there would be no arguments as to who owned Saharan oil.

But the Algerians had been so noisy since 1954, they compelled the

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world to listen. And De Gaulle, both because he genuinely wanted peace and also that through peace France would regain importance in world affairs, decided to give a perceptible bias to his double-speak: hence his proclamation on September 16, 1959, of self-determination for Algeria after the war. Anyone who has witnessed an election in Algeria knows that unless the future proves very different from the past, self-determination for the Algerian Moslems need not mean much more than the vote for Negroes in Alabama.

Still, one never knows. The Moslems are in the majority, ten to one. They are fast maturing from an incredible—not primitivism—but degradation. For the army and the colons De Gaulle's proposal, its vagueness notwithstanding, had obvious dangers. That is why when General Massu gave his interview to the German journalist Kempski, he made it clear that he disliked De Gaulle's equivocation and that he believed in *Algérie Française,* as well as in the solidarity of the army and the French settlers. General Challe, supreme military commander in Algeria, added that the army was in Algeria and meant to stay there.

It was a direct challenge. De Gaulle, a very brave man, took the risk of sacking Massu, idol of the paratroopers and the colons. So again the Algerian mob moved into action, setting up barricades and killing 14 of the gendarmes who hardly dared shoot back and who were hastily replaced . . . by paratroopers with whom there was no question of shooting either way. The leaders of the mob were a new deputy and former leader of the Algiers students, Pierre Lagaillarde, and the racketeering Poujardist pub-keeper Ortiz.

The terrifying game had started again. With stupid amazement, like a sleeper who wants to react to the presence of danger but cannot stir his limbs, we watched from afar. It was clear that every local measure solemnly announced against the insurgents was actually taken both by them and the army together.

LET US RETURN to the moment when De Gaulle took power. In May 1958, Frenchmen—our government, deputies, trade unions, parties of the left—might have decided to make a stand against the army and Algiers. They did not budge. The working class was not much more stirred by the collapse of the Fourth Republic than a century earlier by the slaughter of the Second. And now, twenty months later, by a grotesque turn of events, it was the government born of the May riots, when the forces of democracy had lain paralyzed, that found itself facing the next outburst. And it was to this government that we had to look for resistance—resistance of a kind that our republican regime had been unable or unwilling to summon. For men of the independent left, it was a difficult moment. We might watch in unconcern, as opponents of the regime. We might decide that since parliamentary democracy was dead anyway, De Gaulle, like Louis-Philippe, was the best of Republicans and therefore side with him. So thought the Socialists. Those of us connected with the small but lively left wing groups decided that if we tendered our specific help for any strong measures against the Algiers

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movements, as one might help anybody put out a fire, we should be careful not to pledge lasting allegiance to one man's self-chosen policies. On the contrary we should take the opportunity for reasserting our belief in peace in Algeria through negotiations. Yet the fact remains that our action, like that of the Communists in their way, had to take De Gaulle as intermediary and executor, which for many of us was a form of recognition we had never yet willingly given.

De Gaulle's speech, when it came, was a remarkable performance. In this precarious situation he showed every sign of firmness. He restated the self-determination policy for Algeria, as well as his decision not to negotiate with the *fellagha* (laborers and peasants). But one soon made the startling discovery that even now there was room for double-speak. What did De Gaulle mean when he said he would never negotiate the future of Algeria with a so-called "provisional" rebel government which falsely claimed to represent all of Moslem Algeria? Did he mean that he might negotiate with the heads of the military rebellion and underground, not the future political status of Algeria nor yet a mere cease-fire, but what was most important: the conditions for the resumption of political life in Algeria which would have to precede a free and honest referendum in that country?

This was a tempting interpretation. Or at least it would have been tempting if De Gaulle had not also reasserted that the army would remain in Algeria and see to it that future elections were honest—presumably as it had seen to the honesty of the last election which had sent to the National Assembly the most grotesque crowd of yes-men ever mustered together. Here De Gaulle seemed to be giving Challe and Massu precisely the assurance they had demanded: that the army should see the peace settlement in and not that the peace settlement should see the army out.

Despite some signs of activity from the workers and the political left—a token general strike, a strong stand by the teachers union—the popular response was apathetic. Passivity, weariness and skepticism—engendered in the working class partly by too many bends in the Communist line an dtoo many glib rationalizations for those bends—remain the enemies of any effort to bring democratic life back to France.

And there, at the moment I write, things stand. A more hopeful note is struck in the area of culture. Ionesco, the most robust of our symbolist playwrights, has just given in his latest play *The Rhinoceros* a message of brave individualism. The play tells of how a strange phenomenon—epidemic or mutation—suddenly begins to spread in the body social: one by one its members turn into rhinoceroses. As soon as the trend is seen to be a dominant one, there is less and less inclination to resist it. First it seems horrifying; then it becomes accepted; and finally resistance is regarded as an obvious manifestation of wrongheadedness. Yet there is one who does resist. Here lies the virtue of the play, for in the France of 1960 nonconforming heroism cannot be praised too much.

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BOOKS

All Men Are Equal, But Some . . .

THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY, by Michael Young. Random House, New York. 160 pp. $3.50.

Neither socialists nor sociologists have done full justice to the ambiguities of the idea of human equality. "Socialists," writes Michael Young, "did not see that, as it was applied in practice, equality of opportunity means equality of opportunity to be unequal." In America equality of opportunity has been a deeply-rooted article of faith, and it has usually been recognized that it implies the existence of an unequal order in which effort and ability find their approriate level. Gene Debs' "I want to rise with the ranks, not from the ranks" differentiates the socialist conception of collective equality from the individual ambition to rise in the world and also, by implication, from the goal of creating an open society permitting maximum "circulation of the elites." But American sociologists, reflecting the credo of their society, have devoted far more time and attention to social mobility than to the different kinds of hierarchy within which mobility may occur.

Both European socialist and American sociologists have usually assumed that a hierarchy based on differences in ability is more humanly tolerable than one based on birth. The former, it has been supposed, eliminates both the smoldering sense of injustice aroused by unearned privileges and the gulf between top and bottom levels existing in hereditary class societies. Applied to America this view has a certain plausibility, but the examples of the Catholic Church and professional armies, not to speak of contemporary Communist parties and regimes, cast doubt on its general validity. And now Michael Young, a British sociologist and former Labor Party research director, has written a book to demonstrate that the full realization of equality of opportunity in an industrial society would subvert not merely liberty, as has often been claimed before, but also fraternity, perhaps the most cherished and distinctive ideal of classical socialism.

The Rise of the Meritocracy belongs to the genre of negative Utopian literature. But unlike *Brave New World* or *1984* it is cast in the form of an historical interpretation written in the year 2033 for the purpose of illuminating the causes of recent uprisings and demonstrations against the Meritocracy, the relatively benevolent despotism which has gradually evolved in Britain since the closing decades of the nineteenth century. The imaginary author of the book is a "reasonable" supporter of the regime, anxious to justify it against its new "Populist" critics and to minimize the extent of mass discontent. Unfortunately, an editorial note informs us that he has been killed in the Peterloo Massacres of the twen-

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ty-first century before he was able to correct the galley proofs of his book.

THE MERITOCRACY is the result of three historical forces: the revolt against hereditary privileges led by the socialists, the pressure of international economic competition demanding an economy that maximizes efficiency and technical progress, and the transformation of formal education by improved mental testing into a school system which segregates the intelligent from the dull at progressively earlier ages and irrevocably guides individuals towards their eventual positions in the social order. The technocratic strain in socialism, converging with capitalist worship of productivity, has triumphed and the Webbs, Shaw, and Stalin's successors in the Soviet Union are hailed as the prophets of the new regime. William Morris, Tawney, G. D. H. Cole, and Orwell are remembered as quaint sentimentalists who were willing to sacrifice equality of opportunity and efficiency to full-fledged equality.

But the Meritocracy is not a true Utopia—that is, a society where "people want to do what they have to do." It generates its own conflicts and discontents which accumulate to endanger its survival. Young is, after all, a sociologist, though an uncommonly imaginative one, and he declines to resort to Huxleyan science fiction devices or Orwellian nightmares to eliminate the possibility of reform and rebellion. The relentless elevation of all able persons into the Meritocracy has, it is true, deprived the lower classes of leadership; their organizations, the trade unions and the Labor Party, have become hollow shells utterly unable to bargain or compete effectively with their brilliantly directed opposite numbers. Parliament, still recruited by popular election, has become a ceremonial institution resembling the Monarchy in today's Britain, while real power resides with the upper ranks of the Civil Service, the heads of industry, and the top educational and research administrators.

But if the masses have thus been politically castrated, the Meritocracy itself throws off a certain number of malcontents. Parents become attached to their offspring and when, owing to genetic accident, the child of meritocratic parents is consigned to a lower place in the social system, painful emotions inevitably result. Equality of opportunity has been extended to the sexes also, but women find that their skills rust during periods of retirement from work for childbearing, thus confronting them with an unpleasant dilemma. Also, "intelligenic" marriages have taken the romance out of sex and devaluated physical beauty, but women, inexplicably, have remained incurably romantic. High life-expectancy has increased the numbers of the aged, some of whom wistfully recall the old order, while others resent occupational downgrading when their abilities diminish with age (merit has universally replaced seniority and fixed tenure in all occupations). Thus "a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift" to provide the masses with potential revolutionary leadership.

I HAVE EMPHASIZED the strains and tensions to which the Meritocracy is subject in order to highlight the differences between Young's version of a possible future and the anti-Utopias of Huxley and Orwell with which reviewers have inevitably compared it. But Young's intent is of course fundamentally the same as that of the

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novelists: to describe a possible, *though not necessarily probable, new* order representing the ruthlessly logical fulfillment of present tendencies and values. The form Young has chosen has advantages over the novel in enabling him to trace through the consequences of a single policy or institution at a time and to show just how the historical transformation leading to the new order has taken place.

But Young's imaginary monograph has disadvantages as well. By solidly rooting the Meritocracy in English history, Young is guilty of a certain insularity, an insularity that has characterized much of the best work coming from England in recent years—I am thinking particularly of the novels and dramas of Amis, Osborne, and Company and the cultural criticism of Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams. We are compelled to ask whether *any* meritocracy would necessarily have the effects Young imagines. To what degree are these the result of British "inevitability of gradualness," of the slowness of the transition from feudal aristocracy to industrial society and the continuing steepness of a status hierarchy which even today makes it possible for the notion of an "Establishment" recruited partly by merit to be used as a virtual synonym for ruling class and for "scholarship boys" from working-class homes to feel utterly cut off from their origins? Would a meritocracy look the same in America where populism rather than working-class socialism has been the chief source of egalitarian ideals and where, debased by commercial and political flattery of the "common man," it has encouraged cultural and intellectual mediocracy?

American intellectuals, whether of the Left or the Right, have tended to resist this debasement in the name of meritocracy. And American sociologists, good liberals anxious that their society live up to its professed ideals, have been preoccupied with the rate of mobility and with exposing the barriers to opportunity. Their commitment to a narrow and formal notion of scientific objectivity has led them to stress the gains in "efficiency" and "productivity" to be expected from greater mobility, thus giving priority to the very values by which Young's imaginary regime justifies itself. The only detailed account of a possible American meritocracy I have seen comes, not from the pen of a sociologist, but from a young West Coast lawyer and Sunday school teacher, twice an unsuccessful Democratic candidate for Congress, named Stimson Bullitt, who last year published a penetrating little book on American politics called *To Be a Politician*. Bullitt is as concerned as the next man over the evils of industrial mass society, but his picture of the coming American meritocracy is far blander than Young's model. He foresees increased sympathy between classes and greater ease in personal relations within classes. Does the difference reflect differences in national traditions?

YOUNG'S CHOICE of Utopian satire as a form permits him to avoid answering some of the questions he provokes. A not-too-bright reader might take the book to be a brief for the at least partial retention of hereditary classes; a few Tory intellectuals in England have indeed made just such ideological use of the specter of meritocracy (see Peregrine Worsthorne's suggestive article, "The New

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Inequality," *Encounter,* November, 1956). And how are industrial societies with growing populations—or how is Britain in particular—to moderate the undeniable pressure toward economic efficiency and a tight technical-bureaucratic hierarchy? The sentimental egalitarianism which has been flayed by tough-minded socialists like G. L. Arnold hardly provides the answer.

But enough is enough for one book. I have scarcely done justice to the fertility of Young's wit and inventiveness, to say nothing of his dazzling perceptions. He lists footnotes referring to pompously titled sociological articles written by himself in the late 1960's and even tells us what the favorite themes of popular romantic fiction will be after the triumph of the Meritocracy. *The Rise of the Meritocracy* is a brilliant book.

DENNIS H. WRONG

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Political Journey

AUTOCRITIQUE, by Edgar Morin, Paris, Rene Julliard, 1959. 285 pp.

This lucid and transparently honest intellectual autobiography in which the author, now the editor of the French socialist journal *Arguments,* describes his political itinerary from the late thirties to the present, from his infatuation with the Communist Party and his affair with History and the Hegelian logos to an open, non-messianic, tentative socialism, ranks with the very best accounts of the radical politics of our times. Far removed from the middle brow pot boilers of Howard Fast and John Gates, this book is seriously and passionately concerned with the adventure of ideas of the radical intellectual.

I know of no better pages on the attraction and fascination of Stalinist Marxism than can be found in this book. When Morin writes, "The dialectic of the cunning of Reason combined with the reification of the Party, mixed inextricably idealism, religiosity and dialectical intemperance. All this would necessarily lead, after a while, to the *credo quia absurdum*: one is right to be wrong with the Party, one is wrong to be right without the party"—one feels that he has understood the secret springs of motivation on which the Communist party rests. When he writes, "We believed that we adjusted ourselves to reality when we were subject to the fascination of power," or "Evil was projected upon the outside (of the party), good was projected upon the future" or "This was an ultra-materialism open to the infinite possibilities of the future, but closed to the possibilities of the present"—then we see that Morin has

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brought back a rich harvest from his "fantastic adventure." Morin's impassioned account of the emotions which first drew him to Communism and that repelled him is a splendid achievement. This book should be translated soon; it deserves to stand on our bookshelves next to Silone, Koestler and *The God That Failed.*

L. C.

Algeria's Hidden Civil War

TRADE UNIONISM IN ALGERIA, A Letter to the Free Unions issued by the Union des Syndicats des Travailleurs Algeriens, SP-SDF, 400 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois. 24 pages, 35c.

The struggle in Algeria has frequently bordered on the edge of civil war, with Frenchmen of Algeria pitted against those of metropolitan France. If open civil war between the French has thus far narrowly been avoided, the same can hardly be said for the Algerian nationalists. Among them a bitter, largely unknown and silent struggle has raged since the opening days of what now promises to be the most tragic, drawn-out and disastrous nationalist struggle of our time.

This pamphlet tells of one aspect of this civil war within the ranks of the Algerian nationalists, that between the predominant National Liberation Front (FLN) and its rival, the Algerian National Movement (MNA) of Messali Hadj. This struggle takes place mainly within the framework of the Algerian trade union movement, in which two rival organizations battle for influence over the numerous if largely unskilled Algerian working class (particularly that section of it living in France). Actually, however, the trade union phase of the civil war—which by itself has already cost the lives of hundreds through assassination and counter-assassination—cloaks the ctill more bitter clash over political tactics and strategy. How shall Algeria win its freedom? What shall the new Algeria be like? These are the focal questions in the internal civil war which proceeds alongside the national liberation war.

The value of this brochure is that: (a) it presents the viewpoint of the nationalist group which has been most neglected and ignored in the world press, that is, Messali Hadj and his MNA; (b) it hints at the complexities and difficulties of the Algerian question itself; (c) it makes a contribution toward our understanding of one of the most difficult of all world problems. Copies may be had by writing to the Socialist Party of Chicago at the above address. S. P.

Position of Labor

LABOR IN A FREE SOCIETY, edited by Michael Harrington and Paul Jacobs. University of California Press. 186 pp. $3.

This collection of articles is taken from a conference held in May 1958 under the auspices of the Fund for the Republic. The editors write: "There is no formal continuity in this volume, no single narrative theme which links all of the papers together." And that is exactly the trouble. The book itself, like a good many of its component essays, is much too discursive, given up to the kind of generalities that flourish at this kind of conference.

Still, a few of the papers have value. I found extremely interesting Erich Fromm's paper on "Freedom in the Work Situation" (which, incidentally, should be considered together with a remarkable 16 mm. film, "Man on

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the Assembly Line," put out by the National Film Board of Canada.) The late Sumner Slichter's article on "The Position of Trade Unions in the American Economy" provides a helpful introduction for discussing the decline in the public position of unions in the recent period. And Archibald Cox's "The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy" is useful in regard to the Landrum-Griffin Management-Labor Act. But the book as a whole serves mainly to illustrate the weaknesses inherent in the kind of conference—so fashionable in recent years—which tries over a weekend to discuss just about everything.

FRANK MARQUART

Not to Be Forgotten

L'INSTITUTION CONCENTRATIONNAIRE EN RUSSIE 1930-1957, by Paul Barton. Introduction by David Rousset. Paris, Librairie Plon, 1959, 519 pp. 1650 Francs.

This book presents the most thoroughly documented account of Russian concentration camps available in any language. The earlier work by Dallin and Nicolaevsky (*Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*) carried the dismal story of the camps to the mid-forties, but now Paul Barton documents the changes in the camp system, the revolts and strikes which led to a number of ameliorations, the more lenient treatment of the prisoners, and then the gradual dissolution of the concentrationary system in the last few years. The documentation is ample for the author makes full use of the numerous eyewitness accounts which the International Commission Against the Concentration Camp Regime has gathered over the years and also uses with great skill other published documents and accounts of former inmates. He offers detailed descriptions of administrative structure, and of changes in that structure, of working conditions and the economic and social functions of forced labor in Soviet society.

At a time when some intellectuals are again succumbing to an ignoble fascination with the power of the Soviet Union, a book of this sort is most welcome. It makes us aware of that foundation of human misery, waste and exploitation on which so much of the Russian powerhouse has been erected. It furnishes a record that the worshippers of the bitch-goddess History will find hard to erase.

L. C.

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Miscellany

WHO KILLED KING KONG?

X. J. Kennedy

THE ORDEAL and spectacular death of King Kong, the giant ape, undoubtedly have been witnessed by more Americans than have ever seen a performance of *Hamlet, Iphigenia at Aulis,* or even *Tobacco Road.* Since RKO-Radio Pictures first released *King Kong,* a quarter-century has gone by; yet year after year, from prints that grow more rain-beaten, from sound tracks that grow more tinny, ticket-buyers by thousands still pursue Kong's luckless fight against the forces of technology, tabloid journalism, and the D.A.R. They see him chloroformed to sleep, see him whisked from his jungle isle to New York and placed on show, see him burst his chains to roam the city (lugging a frightened blonde), at last to plunge from the spire of the Empire State Building, machine-gunned by model airplanes.

Though Kong may die, one begins to think his legend unkillable. No clearer proof of his hold upon the popular imagination may be seen than what emerged one catastrophic week in March 1955, when New York's WOR-TV programmed *Kong* for seven evenings in a row (a total of sixteen showings). Many a rival network vice-president must have scowled when surveys showed that *Kong*—the 1933 B-picture—had lured away fat segments of the viewing populace from such powerful competitors as Ed Sullivan, Groucho Marx, and Bishop Sheen.

But even television has failed to run *King Kong* into oblivion. Coffee-in-the-lobby cinemas still show the old hunk of hokum, with the apology that in its use of composite shots and animated models the film remains technically interesting. And no other monster in movie history has won so devoted a popular audience. None of the plodding mummies, the stultified draculas, the white-coated Lugosis with their shiny pinball-machine laboratories, none of the invisible stranglers, berserk robots, or menaces from Mars has ever enjoyed so many resurrections.

WHY DOES the American public refuse to let King Kong rest in peace? It is true, I'll admit, that *Kong* outdid every monster movie before or since in sheer carnage. Producers Cooper and Schoedsack crammed into it dinosaurs, headhunters, riots, aerial battles, bullets, bombs, bloodletting. Heroine Fay Wray, whose function is mainly to scream, shuts her mouth for hardly one uninterrupted minute from first reel to last. It is also true that *Kong* is larded with good healthy sadism, for those whose joy it is to see the frantic girl dangled from cliffs and harried by pterodactyls. But it seems to me that the abiding appeal of the giant ape rests on other foundations.

Kong has, first of all, the attraction of being manlike. His simian nature gives him one huge advantage over giant ants and walking vegetables in that an audience may conceivably identify with him. Kong's appeal has the quality that established the Tarzan series as American myth—for what man doesn't secretly imagine himself a huge hairy howler against whom no other monster has a chance? If Tarzan recalls the ape in us, then Kong

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may well appeal to that great-granddaddy primordial brute from whose tribe we have all deteriorated.

Intentionally or not, the producers of *King Kong* encourage this identification by etching the character of Kong with keen sympathy. For the ape is a figure in a tradition familiar to moviegoers: the tradition of the pitiable monster. We think of Lon Chaney in the role of Quasimodo, of Karloff in the original *Frankenstein.* As we watch the Frankenstein monster's fumbling and disastrous attempts to befriend a flower-picking child, our sympathies are enlisted with the monster in his impenetrable loneliness. And so with Kong. As he roars in his chains, while barkers sell tickets to boobs who gape at him, we perhaps feel something more deep than pathos. We begin to sense something of the problem that engaged Eugene O'Neill in *The Hairy Ape:* the dilemma of a displaced animal spirit forced to live in a jungle built by machines.

King Kong, it is true, had special relevance in 1933. Landscapes of the depression are glimpsed early in the film when an impresario, seeking some desperate pretty girl to play the lead in a jungle movie, visits soup-lines and a Woman's Home Mission. In Fay Wray—who's been caught snitching an apple from a fruitstand—his search is ended. When he gives her a big feed and a movie contract, the girl is magic-carpeted out of the world of the National Recovery Act. And when, in the film's climax, Kong smashes that very Third Avenue landscape in which Fay had wandered hungry, audiences of 1933 may well have felt a personal satisfaction.

WHAT IS CURIOUS is that audiences of 1960 remain hooked. For in the heart of urban man, one suspects, lurks the impulse to fling a bomb. Though machines speed him to the scene of his daily grind, though IBM comptometers ("freeing the human mind from drudgery") enable him to drudge more efficiently once he arrives, there comes a moment when he wishes to turn upon his machines and kick hell out of them. He wants to hurl his combination radio-alarmclock out the bedroom window and listen to it smash. What subway commuter wouldn't love—just for once—to see the downtown express smack head-on into the uptown local? Such a wish is gratified in that memorable scene in *Kong* that opens with a wide-angle shot: interior of a railway car on the Third Avenue El. Straphangers are nodding, the literate refold their newspapers. Unknown to them, Kong has torn away a section of trestle toward which the train now speeds. The motorman spies Kong up ahead, jams on the brakes. Passengers hurtle together like so many peas in a pail. In a window of the car appear Kong's bloodshot eyes. Women shriek. Kong picks up the railway car as if it were a rat, flips it to the street and ties knots in it, or something. To any commuter the scene must appear one of the most satisfactory pieces of celluloid ever exposed.

Yet however violent his acts, Kong remains a gentleman. Remarkable is his sense of chivalry. Whenever a fresh boa constrictor threatens Fay, Kong first sees that the lady is safely parked, then manfully thrashes her attacker. (And she, the ingrate, runs away every time his back is turned.) Atop the Empire State Building, ignoring his pursuers, Kong places Fay on a ledge as tenderly as if she were a dozen eggs. He fondles her, then

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turns to face the Army Air Force. And Kong is perhaps the most disinterested lover since Cyrano: his attentions to the lady are utterly without hope of reward. After all, between a five-foot blonde and a fifty-foot ape, love can hardly be more than an intellectual flirtation. In his simian way King Kong is the hopelessly yearning lover of Petrarchan convention. His forced exit from his jungle, in chains, results directly from his single-minded pursuit of Fay. He smashes a Broadway theater when the notion enters his dull brain that the flashbulbs of photographers somehow endanger the lady. His perilous shinnying up a skyscraper to pluck Fay from her boudoir is an act of the kindliest of hearts. He's impossible to discourage even though the love of his life can't lay eyes on him without shrieking murder.

THE TRAGEDY of King Kong, then, is to be the beast who at the end of the fable fails to turn into the handsome prince. This is the conviction that the scriptwriters would leave with us in the film's closing line. As Kong's corpse lies blocking traffic in the street, the entrepreneur who brought Kong to New York turns to the assembled reporters and proclaims: "That's your story, boys—it was Beauty killed the Beast!" But greater forces than those of the screaming Lady have combined to lay Kong low, if you ask me. Kong lives for a time as one of those persecuted near-animal souls bewildered in the middle of an industrial order, whose simple desires are thwarted at every turn. He climbs the Empire State Building because in all New York it's the closest thing he can find to the clifftop of his jungle isle. He dies, a pitiful dolt, and the army brass and publicity-men cackle over him. His death is the only possible outcome to as neat a tragic dilemma as you can ask for. The machine-guns do him in, while the manicured human hero (a nice clean Dartmouth boy) carries away Kong's sweetheart to the altar. O, the misery of it all. There's far more truth about upper-middle-class American life in *King Kong* than in the last seven dozen novels of John P. Marquand.

A Negro friend from Atlanta tells me that in movie houses in colored neighborhoods throughout the South, *Kong* does a constant business. They show the thing in Atlanta at least every year, presumably to the same audiences. Perhaps this popularity may simply be due to the fact that Kong is one of the most watchable movies ever constructed, but I wonder whether Negro audiences may not find some archetypical appeal in this serio-comic tale of a huge black powerful free spirit whom all the hardworking white policemen are out to kill.

Every day in the week on a screen somewhere in the world, King Kong relives his agony. Again and again he expires on the Empire State Building, as audiences of the devout assist his sacrifice. We watch him die, and by extension kill the ape within our bones, but these little deaths of ours occur in prosaic surroundings. We do not die on a tower, New York before our feet, nor do we give our lives to smash a few flying machines. It is not for us to bring to a momentary standstill the civilization in which we move. King Kong does this for us. And so we kill him again and again, in much-spliced celluloid, while the ape in us expires from day to day, obscure, in desperation.

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LETTERS

Speaking of Style

Editors:

Irving Howe claims that if Christ gave his Sermon on the Mount next week, among other routine reactions would be that "Dwight Macdonald would write that while 'Mr. Christ makes some telling points' they suffer from syntactical confusion and 'a woolly pretentious style'."

This is singularly inept buffoonery, since the Sermon on the Mount is notably clear and simple, at least as rendered in the King James version, to which I have paid public homage on several occasions. But there is this much point to it, which some of your contributors might ponder: that *were* the Sermon woolly and pretentious in style, that would indeed be my reaction, and I should be right, since in that case the Sermon would not be the great moral message it is but a botch, and not only in style. Great ideas can only be expressed in a great style. There is no such thing as a clear message delivered in confused language; the *message* is the style and the style is the message. Selah!

Speaking of style, I note that Mr. Howe has been converted to Christianity, since he refers to Christ as "He." (To me, he's "he.") This shows what discoveries can be made if one pays attention to style. And, on Mr. Howe's part, what an admirably subtle way of breaking the news!

DWIGHT MACDONALD

IRVING HOWE *replies:*

Isn't Dwight Macdonald in danger of losing his sense of humor? Everytime someone takes a poke at him in print these days, off he rushes with a letter of complaint, as if he'd become an Institution.

Still, it's reassuring to learn that he finds the style of the Sermon on the Mount "clear and simple" (in the King James version, that is). The point of my little joke was that he has a narrow conception of what good prose is, and that sometimes this leads him to dismiss writers whose styles are elliptical, dense, or elaborate.

As for calling Christ "Him," that was required by my fable. For dramatic effectiveness, it needed a momentary assumption of Christ's divinity: what literary people, dear Dwight Macdonald, call "a willing suspension of disbelief." His discovery of my "conversion" throws me into panic: for if I wrote about *K*ing George II or *K*ing Louis XIV, might he not then accuse me of becoming a monarchist?

Wants More Variety

Editors:

In view of your magazine's purported desire to maintain a posture of dissent in regard to "conventional wisdom," I trust you will not be offended if I disagree with you.

As I recall some of the earlier issues of DISSENT, there was a considerable variety in underlying attitudes on the part of those who contributed articles. But in recent issues, I have felt that there has arisen something of a routinization and stereotyping of contributions. Such a routinization of perspective seems to undermine the very premise of the journal, i.e., dissension.

Is the need or social compulsion for habit, routine or "like-mindedness" so intense that genuinely variegated and continuous dissent is beyond our grasp? Do we become too quickly exhausted from the burden of disagreement? Perhaps these questions are applicable only to the American scene, outside of NYC.

This is not unsympathetically intended; perhaps you might like to play with it sometime in the future. For DISSENT it would not seem a peripheral matter.

WHITNEY H. GORDON

Muncie, Indiana

Dissent welcomes expressions of opinion from its readers and will print as many letters as space permits. An effort is made to present a cross-section of reader opinion. The editors reserve the customary right to condense letters for reasons of space.

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SOVIET SURVEY

The current number (120 pages) is devoted to problems of socialism. There are articles on Marxism, on "Revisionism," and on trends which lead beyond both. The Soviet attitude towards democratic socialism is analyzed, and a number of contributions review the state of affairs on the Left in Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, the United States, and Japan. In addition, some of the prominent figures in the history of Marxism are revisited and their views re-examined. A partial table of contents of our last three numbers will give you an idea of the scope of SURVEY:

No. 29: Ronald Hingley, *The Soviet Writers' Congress; A Soviet View of Existentialism;* Document, *Freud and Pavlov;* John Turkevich, *Soviet Science: Achievements and Problems;* Leonard Schapiro, *Judicial Practice and Legal Reform;* Hugh Seton-Watson, *Intelligentsia and Revolution;* Victor Frank, *The Russian Radical Tradition;* Leopold Labedz, *The New Soviet Intelligentsia.*
No. 30: Herbert S. Levine, *Conversations with the Planners;* R. Etiemble, *The Sorbonne in Moscow;* Gustav A. Wetter, *The Soviet Concept of Coexistence;* Douglas Jackson, *Trends in Soviet Geography;* Max Beloff, *Soviet Historians and American History;* John Keep, *Recent Russian History;* George Kline, *"Fundamentals of Marxist Philosophy";* Lawrence Krader, *Ethnography: Scope and Achievements.*
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